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Essays on Fertility and Sex Ratios in India
S Anukriti
In recent decades, several countries have experienced a rapid increase in their sex ratios at birth.
This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of these imbalances in the Indian context.
Lower desired fertility can translate into more male-biased sex ratios if son preference remains
strong, especially with greater availability of prenatal sex-selection technology. Chapter 1 investi-
gates whether financial incentives can simultaneously decrease fertility and the sex ratio at birth.
I build a model where the effects of incentives on child-bearing and sex-selection are determined
by the degree of son preference and the costs of children and sex-selection, relative to the size of
incentives. I test the theoretical predictions in the context of Devirupak, a scheme adopted by the
Indian state of Haryana. Devirupak incentivizes parents to have either one child or two daughters.
Parents of one girl receive a larger benefit than one-boy or two-girl families, who receive the same
amount. I construct a woman-year panel dataset from retrospective birth histories and exploit vari-
ation in the state and the timing of implementation and the composition of pre-existing children to
estimate the causal effect of this scheme. Devirupak lowers the number of children by 0.9 percent,
but mainly through a 1.9 percent decrease in the number of daughters. I find no evidence for an
increase in the demand for daughters in response to a decrease in their relative price in the overall
sample. However, the proportion of one-boy couples and the sex ratio of first and second births
increased significantly. Thus, schemes that induce parents to choose either sons or daughters may
lower fertility, but have unintended consequences for sex ratios, despite larger incentives for girls,
if a minimum number of sons is desired.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of tariff decline on fertility, the sex ratio at birth, and infant
mortality in rural Indian districts. In relative terms, women more exposed to tariff cuts are more
likely to give birth and these births are more likely to be female. These results are primarily driven
by low-caste, low-wealth, and uneducated women. Moreover, infant mortality decreases for girls
(but not boys) born to these low-status mothers. On the other hand, fertility decreases and female
infant mortality increases for high-status women. They also exhibit a weak increase in the sex ratio
at birth. Differential effect of the tariff reform on the relative economic opportunities of women
across socioeconomic groups is the most likely mechanism for these results.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of sex ratio imbalances on pre-marital investments and marital
outcomes in India. Changes in the availability of pre-natal sex-selection technology differentially
altered the mating pool of individuals born in different states, cohorts, and endogamous social
groups. I show that increases in the male to female sex ratio at birth are associated with a decrease
in educational attainment, age at marriage, and labor force participation rates, and an increase in
spouse’s age for women relative to men. These findings are consistent with an improvement in the
position of women in the marriage market due to their relative scarcity.
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1.1 Introduction
This paper examines whether financial incentives can simultaneously decrease fertility and the male
to female sex ratio at birth in societies where sons are preferred. In the past few decades, the sex
ratio at birth has increasingly become more male-biased in India and other Asian countries. In
comparison to the biologically normal range of 1.03 - 1.06, the sex ratio at birth in 2006-08 was 1.11
for India as a whole, and as high as 1.18 and 1.20 in states like Haryana and Punjab, respectively.2
Declining fertility, high son preference, and easy access to cheap technology for sex-selection are
widely believed to be some of the key factors underlying this trend.3 Bhalotra and Cochrane
(2010) estimate that approximately 480,000 sex-selective abortions took place per year in India
during 1995-2005.4
The growing number of “missing girls” has led to the introduction of several government pro-
grams that aim to reduce the sex ratio at birth by providing monetary incentives to parents who
have daughters.5 The eligibility criteria of these policies differ significantly in terms of the re-
strictions imposed on the number of sons. While some provide benefits to parents who have only
daughters and no sons (e.g. Balri Rakshak Yojana), others impose no limits on the number of sons,
as long as parents have the requisite number of daughters (e.g. Ladli). If the incentives are large
enough to make daughters more desirable than sons, then parents may substitute girls for boys
and the sex ratio may decrease without increasing fertility. However, if son preference is mainly a
cultural phenomenon that persists over time,6 then a program that benefits daughters-only parents
might be ineffective in persuading families to make this substitution. An alternate policy that in-
centivizes parents to have daughters without restrictions on the number of sons may increase female
births, but at the cost of higher fertility, which may be an undesirable outcome for policymakers in
highly populated countries. Thus, it is difficult to design incentives that simultaneously decrease
2Source: Sample Registration System. China’s sex ratio at birth was 1.18 in 2010 according to the Census data.
3Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010), Chung (2007), Das Gupta (1987), Ebenstein (2010), Li et al. (2011), Lin et al.
(2010), Li and Zheng (2009), Park and Cho (1995), Zeng et al. (1993), and references therein.
4This number is about one-fourth of the number of female births in the United States in 2002.
5For example, the Care for Girls Campaign in China; Apni Beti, Apna Dhan and Ladli in India.
6Abrevaya (2009), Almond and Edlund (2008), Almond et al. (2011), and Dubuc and Coleman (2007) find evidence
for persistence in son preference among Asian immigrants to the United States, Canada, England, and Wales.
3fertility and the sex ratio at birth when son preference is strong.
I examine a conditional cash transfer scheme, Devirupak, introduced by the north Indian state
of Haryana and show that even reasonably large financial incentives may be ineffective in reducing
sex ratios if lower fertility is also targeted, thus highlighting the fertility-sex ratio trade-off. I do
not find evidence for an increase in the quantity demanded of daughters in response to a substantial
decrease in their relative price. Moreover, I show that the sex ratio unintentionally increases when
parents whose only child is a boy are also rewarded in an attempt to reduce fertility despite larger
benefits for parents whose only child is a girl.
Like other states in north and north-west India, Haryana has historically been a high son
preference state and its sex ratio at birth has become increasingly more male-biased in recent
decades. The average marital fertility in Haryana,7 though decreasing, also remains significantly
above the replacement level. In light of these trends, Devirupak seeks to promote a one-child
norm8 and to decrease the sex ratio at birth. It provides monthly benefits, for a period of 20 years,
to couples who become sterilized after having one child (of either sex) or two girls (and no boy).
The magnitude of these incentives is substantial – the monthly benefit for couples whose only child
is a girl is approximately half of Haryana’s per capita monthly consumption expenditure (IHDS
2005).9 The incentive offered to parents of one girl is larger than the amount that parents of one
boy or two girls receive. Couples who are childless, have a boy and a girl, or have more than two
children receive nothing. Given its twin objectives, Devirupak provides a unique opportunity to
study how fertility and sex ratios jointly change in response to financial incentives in a high son
preference region.
I construct a simple conceptual framework where couples vary in terms of son preference and the
cost of children, and decisions about child-bearing and sex-selection are jointly made. This model
provides insights about the differential effects of financial incentive schemes like Devirupak on
couples with distinct socio-economic characteristics. At each decision node a couple chooses between
7In 2009, Haryana’s average marital fertility was 4.4 births per woman (Source: Sample Registration System).
8India’s population policy has historically promoted a two-child norm using media campaigns with popular slogans
like “Hum Do, Hamare Do” (literal translation “We Two, Our Two”) and more recently, through state-level laws that
disbar individuals with more than two children from contesting local and state legislature elections (Buch (2006)).
9The total benefit received over 20 years by these parents is also sufficient to cover the average dowry expense.
4not giving birth and pregnancy with and without sex-selection. Technology for sex-determination
is not costless but widely available. The equilibrium number and sex composition of children then
depend on the degree of son preference and the cost of children relative to the cost of sex-selection.
I show that the likelihood of sex-selection increases with the cost of children and the degree of son
preference.
To derive testable predictions about the effect of incentives, I first solve for optimal strategies
in the absence of incentives. Since different strategies result in distinct outcomes, by observing a
couple’s child composition at the start of the scheme I can deduce the strategy they were following in
the absence of Devirupak. Then I introduce incentives in the model and derive specific predictions
about whether and which couples deviate from their optimal strategy and the resulting effect on
their fertility and the proportion of sons. This theoretical framework is quite general and can be
easily modified to assess the impact of schemes with alternate incentive structures.
My model predicts that couples who have one child at the start of Devirupak in Haryana are
less likely to have a second child. However, if there is a second birth, it is more likely to be a boy
relative to second births in the absence of incentives. There are two reasons why couples who choose
to forgo the one-child incentives are more likely than earlier to sex-select their second pregnancies.
First, there is selection into second pregnancy by relatively higher son preference couples. Second,
the one-child incentives make sex-selection for the second pregnancy less “costly”. As a result,
fertility decreases but the sex ratio of second births increases for couples who began child-bearing
before the scheme. However, the effect on the sex ratio of first births is ambiguous and depends
on the distribution of son preference and the costs of children and sex-selection in Haryana. For
certain distributions it is possible that couples are more likely to select the sex of their first child
and, if their first child was born before Devirupak, more likely to stop child-bearing if the first-born
is a boy (than if it is a girl), thereby increasing the proportion of one-boy couples in Haryana.
To test these theoretical predictions, I construct a large woman-year panel dataset by com-
bining complete retrospective birth histories from the National Family Health Surveys and the
District-Level Household Survey of India. I compare women in Haryana to their counterparts in a
group of similar neighboring states and employ the variation in incentives by the year of program
5implementation and the composition of older children to estimate the causal effect of Devirupak
in a double and triple differences-in-differences framework.
My main findings are as follows. First, Devirupak reduces fertility. The number of living
children decreases by 0.9 percent. However, this is primarily driven by a 1.9 percent decline in
the number of living girls. Second, the proportion of couples with one daughter and no sons
does not increase despite one-girl being the most remunerative child composition in terms of the
scheme’s benefits. However, the proportion of couples that has only one son increases significantly
by 4.9 percent. Thus, faced with a choice between one son and one or two daughters, couples with a
preference for sons choose to have only one son, even at the cost of receiving smaller benefits. Third,
the sex ratio of first births increases significantly. This finding is important in light of the fact that
previous literature finds no evidence of sex-selection at first births in India. Since Devirupak only
offers benefits to couples with either one child or two girls, it induces couples to make decisions
about sex-selection at first parity. Fourth, consistent with the theoretical predictions, I find that
second births to couples who have one child when Devirupak is implemented are more likely to
be a boy. This increases the sex ratio of second births as well. Fifth, there is an increase in the
gap between marriage and first birth and the gap between first two births. To the extent that
sex-selection takes time, this delay in births supports my finding that Devirupak causes greater
sex-selection for the first two births. Lastly, the number of fertile years decreases and the probability
of sterilization increases.
I also examine heterogeneity in Devirupak’s effects and find that the increase in the one-son
outcome is driven by women who are less than 26 years old, who have 1-5 years of schooling, who
work outside the home, and who belong to households that are relatively wealthy or own agricultural
land. On the other hand, women who are approaching the end of their fertile years or who belong to
poor, low-caste, or landless households are more likely to choose the one-daughter option. However,
this latter effect is not sufficiently large to decrease the overall sex ratio in Haryana.
Moral arguments can be made both in favor of parents’ right to choose the sex of their off-
spring as well as against selective abortion of girls (Kumar (1983)). Abstracting from these ethical
dilemmas, there are several reasons why a significantly male-biased sex ratio at birth is undesirable.
6The resulting scarcity of women on the marriage market can substantially increase the number of
unmarried and childless men,10 who may face destitution in old age since children through marriage
are the most important source of support for the elderly in countries like India that lack institu-
tional social security (Das Gupta et al. (2010)). Rising sex ratios can lead to increased trafficking11
of women, higher prevalence of sexually-transmitted diseases (Ebenstein and Sharygin (2009)), and
more crime (Edlund et al. (2007), Dre`ze and Khera (2000)).12 Sex-selection may also result in girls
being consistently born to lower-status parents, thereby relegating women to lower social strata
(Edlund (1999)). On the other hand, sex-selective abortions might be preferable to infanticide or
postnatal discrimination (Goodkind (1996)). Lin et al. (2010) show that the ability to practice
prenatal sex-selection reduces discrimination against girls who are born.13 A shortage of women
on the marriage market may also increase their bargaining power and welfare.14
Despite a growing literature on the consequences of skewed sex ratios, there is limited evidence
on whether sex ratios will balance on their own in the future and whether proactive public policy
can be effective in reducing these imbalances.15 Moreover, the experience of China’s One-Child
Policy has shown that programs aimed at reducing fertility may lead to undesirable increases in the
sex ratios. In other countries where population policies are not coercive or restrictive, such as India,
we may observe a similar trade-off between fertility and the sex ratio at birth as desired fertility
decreases while son preference remains strong. Thus, an understanding of the factors that underlie
decisions about the quantity of children and sex-selection as well as the efficacy of incentives in
resolving the fertility-sex ratio conflict is of tremendous practical importance.
10Bhaskar (2011) estimates that one in five boys born in recent cohorts in China will be unable to find female
partners.
11Recent evidence shows that a shortage of women in north Indian states has led to the import of brides from other
poorer states in India (Kaur (2004), Ahlawat (2009)).
12Kaur (2010) and others link the recent resurgence of caste-based village councils, khap panchayats, in north India
and the imposition of extreme social restrictions on women and intra-subcaste marriages by them to the shortage of
brides.
13In a similar vein, Pop-Eleches (2006) shows that a ban on abortions in Romania led to inferior socio-economic
outcomes during adulthood for “unwanted” children.
14See Chiappori et al. (2002) and related papers for the large literature on household bargaining in developed
countries. Stopnitzky (2012) shows that a relative scarcity of women in Haryana has increased their bargaining
power on the marriage market and they are able to secure improved sanitation facilities at home as a result.
15Bhaskar (2011), Chung and Gupta (2007), Das Gupta et al. (2003), Edlund and Lee (2009).
7The literature on the effects of financial incentives on fertility16 and sex ratios in high son
preference countries is extremely limited. Li et al. (2011) and Ebenstein (2010) analyze the impact
of fines imposed by China’s One-Child Policy on fertility. Bedi and Srinivasan (2009) and Sinha and
Yoong (2009) evaluate incentive schemes targeted at reducing the sex ratio in India. However, none
of the policies evaluated by these papers target both fertility and sex-selection. To my knowledge,
this paper is the first to model and estimate the causal effect of an actual financial incentives scheme
aimed at jointly reducing fertility and sex ratios in a high son preference region. The paper most
closely related to mine is Ebenstein (2011) which uses simulations to show that a potential subsidy
worth 9 months of income for daughters-only parents may reduce the sex ratio from 1.14 to 1.10
and lower fertility from 1.81 to 1.77 births in China. Unlike these forecasts, I find that a subsidy
worth 10 months of average household consumption expenditure17 is insufficient to induce parents
in Haryana to have only one daughter and no sons.
Devirupak is one of the first schemes of its kind. In recent years, other Indian states with
skewed sex ratios have initiated similar programs, most notably Punjab’s Balri Rakshak Yojana
(2009). Given the paucity of empirical and theoretical evidence on how to optimally design these
incentive schemes, a wide variety of programs have been implemented. The findings of this paper
emphasize that the structure of these programs must be carefully designed to avoid unintended
consequences since key parameters such as the degree of son preference and the cost of children are
largely unobservable.
Section 1.2 describes Devirupak in more detail. Section 1.3 presents a simple model that
generates testable predictions and provides an intuitive understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section 1.6 presents the
estimation results and Section 1.7 concludes the paper.
16There is a larger strand of literature that studies the relationship between fertility and financial incentives in
the context of pro-natal policies in developed countries, e.g. Cohen et al. (2012), Laroque and Salanie´ (2012), and
Milligan (2005).
17I arrive at this number in the following manner. The differential monthly subsidy provided by Devirupak to
parents of one daughter is Rs. 300. At the rate of 3% per annum, the 20-year present discounted value of this subsidy
is Rs. 53,560. The annual household expenditure in Haryana is approximately Rs. 64,800 assuming that the average
monthly per capita consumption expenditure is Rs. 1,080 (IHDS 2005) and the average household size is five (2001
Census of India). Thus, the subsidy represents about ten months of household consumption expenditure.
81.2 Context
1.2.1 Details of Devirupak
The Government of Haryana announced and implemented Devirupak on September 25, 2002.18
Under this scheme, eligible couples who adopt a terminal method of family planning19 receive
monthly payments for a period of 20 years. The incentive amount varies with the number and
the sex composition of their children at the time of sterilization (Table 1.1). Couples who choose
sterilization after their first child receive a monthly benefit of Rs. 500 ($10) if they have a daughter
and Rs. 200 ($4) if they have a son. Devirupak also provides Rs. 200 ($4) per month to parents
of two children, but only if both are daughters. Couples with any other composition of children
(including no children) are not eligible to receive any benefits. The local Civil Surgeon’s Office
credits these payments into a beneficiary couple’s joint-account on a monthly basis.
Prospective beneficiaries have to register themselves with the local village panchayat or the
municipal committee. To be eligible, the husband and the wife should be less than 45 and 40 years
old, respectively, on the date of sterilization. Further, neither of them should be an income tax
payer. Registered couples are permitted to wait until their youngest child is 5 years old before
undergoing sterilization, but they start receiving the benefits only after the surgical procedure has
taken place. If their last-born child dies and a beneficiary couple undergoes re-canalization,20 they
are no longer entitled to future benefits, although past benefits do not have to be refunded. The
rules mentioned thus far have been in place since November 24, 2003 – the eligibility criteria were
more complicated before then. The original set of rules are described in Appendix 1.10.21
There are several reasons why Devirupak provides a more suitable context than other similar
policies for examining the causal effect of financial incentives on both fertility and sex ratios. Firstly,
it generates differential incentives for marginal births, sex-selection, and sterilization, that vary by
the number as well as the sex composition of older children. One-child couples are entitled to larger
18Website: http://haryanahealth.nic.in/menudesc.aspx?page=112
19Vasectomy or tubectomy (also known as male or female sterilization, respectively).
20Although sterilization is considered a permanent method of contraception, it is possible to reverse it surgically.
21I examine the differential effect of both sets of rules in Section 1.6.7.
9benefits per child than those who have two or more children. This feature is aimed at promoting a
one-child norm. However, since childless couples receive nothing, unintentionally, Devirupak also
incentivizes parents to have at least one child, which is contrary to the scheme’s stated objective of
decreasing fertility.22 For a given number of children, the incentive is larger for a subsequent girl
than a subsequent boy (but only for a maximum of two children) in order to decrease the relative
cost or increase the relative value of daughters. Secondly, other schemes that reward parents for
giving birth to a daughter, such as Ladli in Delhi, make the benefits available only after the
daughter has turned 18, and in many cases, the beneficiary is the daughter rather than the parents.
In contrast, Devirupak directly incentivizes the parents, who start receiving the benefits as soon
as they become sterilized. If parents are myopic and discount the future, an immediate and steady
stream of benefits is more likely to be persuasive than a lump-sum payment almost two decades
later. Lastly, Devirupak’s incentive amounts are substantially larger than those being offered by
other programs, e.g. through subsidized school education or lump-sum benefits at the time of a
daughter’s marriage.
1.2.2 Sterilization
Female sterilization is the most prevalent modern method of contraception in India – 34 percent of
all currently-married women in the 15-44 age group are sterilized.23 In contrast, only 1 percent of
these women report that their husband is sterilized. The corresponding numbers for Haryana are
38 percent for women and 1 percent for men. The surgery required for sterilization is performed
for free at public health facilities and at a subsidized rate at private health centers across India.
Most sterilized couples (84 percent) undergo the procedure at government facilities.24 It must be
noted that in all states, sterilization adopters are entitled to receive a one-time incentive payment as
compensation for the income lost during the surgery. In fact, India was the first country to introduce
22Since only a small fraction of currently-married women at the end of their fertile years report being childless,
this latter effect is unlikely to be an important margin of influence on the overall fertility rate. According to DLHS-2
(2002-04), about 1 percent of currently-married women in the 40-44 age group in Haryana have never given birth.
Since this includes at least some women who are childless due to infertility, the fraction of women who remain childless
voluntarily is even lower.
23The data source for all statistics on contraception in this section is the 2007-08 District-Level Household Survey.
24Around 12 percent of sterilization users report facing any kind of health problem.
10
financial rewards for sterilization in 1952, as part of its family planning policy. However, these one-
time incentives (with a maximum of $22) are substantially smaller than the benefits offered by
Devirupak ($48 - $120 per year for 20 years). In addition, unlike Devirupak, the temporal variation
in these national incentives is common across all states and does not vary with the number and the
sex composition of children.25
1.3 Conceptual Framework
This section presents a simple model in which the optimal number and the sex composition of chil-
dren are determined by parents’ son preference, the cost of children, and the cost of sex-selection.26 I
start by examining the equilibrium in the absence of both technology for sex-determination (PSDT)
and financial incentives and then introduce them gradually in the model.
When Devirupak was announced, couples in Haryana had different family structures. Those
who had no children, one child, or two daughters are “treated” by the scheme, whereas the rest
are not. However, we cannot simply compare the future outcomes of couples with dissimilar child
compositions in 2002 and attribute the differences to variation in Devirupak’s incentives. For
example, one-son families may be more or less likely to sex-select at higher parities than daughters-
only families even in the absence of incentives. Moreover, characteristics such as son preference that
determine the child composition in 2002 are also likely to influence the effectiveness of incentives in
altering child-bearing behavior. Thus, the child composition at the start of Devirupak, although
pre-determined, is certainly not exogenous in this context.
To take this endogeneity into account, I first analyze the decision-making process in the absence
of incentives to derive the optimal strategies for different “types” of couples, where type reflects
a couple’s degree of son preference and their cost of children. Since different strategies result in
distinct outcomes, by observing a couple’s child composition at the start of Devirupak, I can deduce
the strategy they were following, and thus learn about their type. Thereafter, I examine how the
25It is possible that the real value of these national incentives varies across states (Bharadwaj (2008)). However,
this alone is not problematic since my empirical strategy also uses variation in the number and the sex composition
of older children.
26All proofs are in Appendix 1.11.
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introduction of incentives alters the optimal strategy for different types of couples. Essentially, I
compare the equilibrium outcomes for the same type of couples with and without incentives. This
ensures that my theoretical predictions can be placed in a causal empirical framework later on.
1.3.1 Model Set-up
Consider a unitary27 household comprising a couple and their children. A couple’s utility is addi-
tively separable in the number of sons, b, the number of daughters, g, and consumption, C, and
written as:
U(b, g, C) = δb+ g + V (C) (1.1)
Son preference is reflected in δ > 1. Couples maximize utility subject to their budget constraint:
C + (b+ g)c+ css 6 Y + S(b, g) (1.2)
where s is the number of pregnancies for which sex-selection takes place and cs > 0 is the fixed
cost per instance of sex-selection.28 The gender-invariant cost of a child is c > 0, which includes
the cost of child-rearing as well as the opportunity cost of having children. A couple’s exogenous
income is Y and S(b, g) is the present discounted value of sterilization payments received from
Devirupak, as a function of b and g. The price of consumption is normalized to one. There are no
spontaneous abortions or still-births. Moreover, all couples have costless access to contraception
and all pregnancies are planned.
For simplicity, I assume that the utility function is linear in consumption. Specifically, V (C) = C,
i.e. the marginal utility derived from children is independent of income and we can essentially ignore
Y . However, this does not imply that differences in socio-economic characteristics across couples
are irrelevant in this model. Instead, these characteristics affect equilibrium outcomes through
the cost of children, c, and the intensity of son preference, δ, which are the two dimensions along
27It is reasonable to abstract from intra-household bargaining issues since the husband and the wife are joint
beneficiaries in the context of Devirupak.
28Sex-selection includes prenatal sex-detection through ultrasound (or amniocentesis) and sex-selective abortion.
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which couples are allowed to differ.29 Substituting the budget constraint in the utility function and
ignoring Y yields:
U(b, g, s) = δb+ g − (b+ g)c− css+ S(b, g) (1.3)
In the absence of sex-selection, half of all pregnancies result in a male birth. If a woman opts
for an ultrasound test, then she always aborts if the fetus is female. In the absence of incentives,
it is clearly sub-optimal to not do so if an ultrasound test is costly. However, when incentives for a
girl are higher relative to a boy, it is possible that some couples might find it optimal to abort a boy
in order to receive more money. Since there is no evidence that boys are also selectively aborted in
India,30 in the interest of keeping the model tractable, I rule out this possibility.
All couples become sterilized after achieving their desired fertility, i.e. the decision about
whether and when to become sterilized is not examined separately from other fertility decisions. I
also abstract away from factors that determine which spouse becomes sterilized, since it is almost
always the wife (as mentioned previously in Section 1.2.2). Another simplifying assumption is that
the utility function is linear and separable in b and g. However, if parents desire a minimum number
of sons and follow son-biased stopping rules (Clark (2000)), or prefer to have children of both sexes,
a non-separable utility function might be more appropriate.31 Lastly, I ignore the marriage market.
The underlying reasons behind son preference could be many. Previous literature has explored
a wide range of factors such as religion, poverty, rigidly patrilineal kinship systems, absence of insti-
tutional old-age support, soil texture, and dowry payments, that might make sons more desirable.32
This disparity in desirability manifests itself not just as prenatal sex-selection, but also through
29Po¨rtner (2010), independently, uses a similar set-up to examine the relationship between sex-selective abortions,
fertility, and birth spacing.
30Jha et al. (2006) report that the second birth is slightly more likely to be a girl if the first child is a boy. However,
they do not believe that this represents male feticide and offer differential misclassification of fetal sex by ultrasound
machines as a potential explanation. Among others, Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) provide a detailed discussion of
Jha et al. (2006).
31The introduction of son-biased stopping rules (i.e. making parents more likely to stop child-bearing after a male
birth than a female birth) in the model will not alter the basic theoretical predictions. In fact, if parents desire at
least one son, the one-girl and two-girls incentives will clearly be less effective than they are in my model, and couples
will be even more likely to choose the one-boy option. A preference for a mixed sex composition would also make
Devirupak less effective since couples who have both boys and girls receive no benefits.
32Bardhan (1974), Boserup (1970), Bhaskar and Gupta (2007), Carranza (2012), Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1999),
Das Gupta (2010), Dyson and Moore (1983), Rahman and Rao (2004).
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postnatal discrimination against daughters in the provision of care and resources (Jayachandran
and Kuziemko (2011)). Recently, Bharadwaj and Nelson (2012) have shown that Indian parents
also practice sex-selective discrimination in prenatal investments. This suggests that, contrary to
my assumption, at least some couples choose not to abort even if an ultrasound test reveals that
the fetus is female. A more realistic, but more complicated, model would allow a couple’s choice
set to comprise sex-determination, sex-selective abortion, and discrimination in prenatal and post-
natal investments. I ignore these other avenues for expression of son preference and allow parents
to either sex-select or not choose sex-determination. Thus, all predictions generated by my model
refer to sex ratios at birth.
1.3.2 Equilibrium in the absence of PSDT and financial incentives
Suppose a woman can become pregnant at most twice. This is essentially a simplifying assumption
since Devirupak does not provide incentives to couples who have more than two children. When
PSDT is unavailable and there are no incentives, a couple’s decision about how many children to
have depends only on their son preference, δ, and the cost of children, c.
Proposition 1 In the absence of both PSDT and financial incentives, fertility increases in the
intensity of son preference and decreases in the cost of children.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Couples for whom children are “not costly” (i.e. c 6 1),
have two births. Among the rest, those with a high enough son preference have two children, while
the remainder forgo having children altogether. In this scenario, couples cannot guarantee a son
through sex-selection. As a result, while deciding to become pregnant, they compare the “risk” of
a daughter with the potential “benefit” from a son. They become pregnant only if daughters are
not too costly or sons are valuable enough. Note that in this case the sex ratio at birth in the
population is balanced,33 i.e. son preference manifests itself in terms of fertility in the absence of
PSDT.
33This is true even if parents follow son-biased stopping rules. In fact, son-biased stopping rules, by themselves, do
not imply male-biased sex ratios if parents are homogeneous in the probability of having a boy (Yamaguchi (1989),
Goodman (1961)). Girls might, however, still be at a relative disadvantage (despite no discrimination in care) because
they will, on average, have more siblings (Jensen (2005)). Moreover, postnatal discrimination in care might skew the
child sex ratio further.
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Proposition 1 is also informative about the heterogeneity in fertility across socio-economic
groups in the absence of PSDT. If the opportunity cost of child-bearing is lower for less educated
women, e.g. due to low potential benefits from labor force participation, Proposition 1 suggests
that they will have higher fertility compared to more educated women with the same degree of son
preference. Although the marginal utility of children does not vary by income in this model, one
way to understand how outcomes might differ for couples with different incomes in reality is the
following. Instead of normalizing the marginal utility of a girl to one, we can modify the utility
function as U(b, g, s) = δAb+Ag − c(b+ g)− cs + S(b, g), where A > 0. If income affects parents’
marginal utility of children (e.g. poorer parents may be more dependent on children for old-age
support or remittances; families with agricultural land might value children more for farm labor),
it will be translated into a higher A. In terms of Figure 1.1, this will shift the line corresponding
to 2c− 1 downwards, and the threshold corresponding to c = 1 to the right, thereby increasing the
area with two births, i.e. couples with higher marginal utility of children will have higher fertility,
given δ and c.
1.3.3 Equilibrium with PSDT and no financial incentives
Availability of PSDT expands the choice set of couples. While earlier a pregnancy necessarily
implied a birth and the choice was between a birth or no birth, this is not the case anymore. Now a
couple has three choices at each decision node: a) no pregnancy, b) pregnancy with an ultrasound
test (US), or c) pregnancy without an ultrasound test. If (b) is chosen, either a male birth or an
abortion (if the fetus is a girl) take place with equal probability. Along with son preference and the




Proposition 2 In the absence of financial incentives, the introduction of PSDT increases the sex
ratio at birth, but the effect on fertility is ambiguous.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Two types of couples are affected by the availability of
PSDT. Earlier, some high son preference couples would have had two children in an attempt to have
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sons, despite a high cost of children (Type 1). PSDT allows them to perfectly avoid giving birth
to “unwanted” daughters. Thus, fertility declines and the proportion of sons rises for these couples
(and is equal to 1). There is also a second type (Type 2) who would have opted for no births when
they could not sex-select. These “intermediate δ - high c” couples will now find pregnancies with
ultrasound tests optimal. Both fertility and the number of sons go up for these couples. The sex
ratio at birth increases for the population as a whole because Type 1 couples have fewer daughters
and Type 2 couples have more sons. Thus, this simple framework shows that the availability of
PSDT unambiguously leads to a higher sex ratio at birth, but fertility may increase or decrease.34
Additionally, I can examine the effect of changes in the cost of sex-selection using this set-up.
An increase in the cost of sex-selection, cs, e.g. through stricter enforcement of PCPNDT laws,
shifts the 1+c
′
s line to the right and the c+c
′
s line upwards in Figure 1.2. As a result, fewer couples
sex-select and the sex ratio at birth decreases. The opposite happens when it becomes cheaper to
sex-select.
Since PSDT was widely available in India much before 2002 (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)), I
expect couples with a stronger son preference and a higher cost of children to have more male-biased
sex ratios even before Devirupak. I test this prediction in Section 1.4.2 by examining heterogeneity
in the composition of children before 2002 across various socio-economic groups.
1.3.4 Effects of financial incentives when PSDT is available
For simplicity, assume that Devirupak provides monthly benefits for only one child – Rs. 500 for a
girl and Rs. 200 for a boy – for a period of 20 years, conditional on no second births. Thus, in my
model, “treatment” is limited to couples who are either childless or have one child when the scheme
is announced.35 Along with son preference and the cost parameters, the equilibrium outcomes now
also depend on the size of incentives, S(b, g). I start by examining the effect of these incentives on
34Kim (2005) derives a similar result. However, his argument relies on the relative effect of PSDT availability on
non-selective abortions, selective abortions, and births without detection. In his model, fertility rises if more selective
abortions are performed at the expense of non-selective abortions. On the other hand, if more women have selective
abortions instead of births without detection, fertility falls.
35In reality, Devirupak also provides Rs. 200 per month to couples who have two girls (and no boys). The
theoretical framework excludes them from the treatment group for computational ease.
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couples who have one child when the scheme is announced.
Proposition 3 (Couples who have one child when the scheme is announced)
(a) The introduction of incentives makes these couples less likely to have a second birth.
(b) Those who stop child-bearing have a weaker son preference than those who become pregnant
again.
(c) Second births are more likely to be male.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. In the absence of incentives, all one-child couples
would have chosen a second pregnancy (some with US and others without US). This is because
(i) utility is linear in the number of children, and (ii) these couples are not “high c - low δ” types
(who never become pregnant) since they already have a child. Introduction of one-child incentives
makes it optimal for some of these couples to not become pregnant again, resulting in 3(a). Larger
incentives for one child or a higher utility from incentives (if couples varied in terms of marginal
utility of income) will decrease the likelihood of a second pregnancy even more.
Moreover, ultrasound test is now more likely to be used for second pregnancy for two reasons.
First, there is selection into second pregnancy by relatively high son preference couples (from 3(b)),
who are more likely to use ultrasound tests even in the absence of incentives. Second, the one-child
incentives reduce the effective cost of selection for second pregnancies. If a couple finds out that
the second child is a girl and aborts, they still receive Rs. 200 or Rs. 500 through Devirupak.
Otherwise, they are guaranteed a boy who is more valuable for them than couples who stop at one
child.
This increased use of ultrasound tests for second pregnancies underlies 3(c) and also contributes
towards fewer second births in 3(a). The increase in the sex ratio at second birth is larger for a
lower cost of sex-selection, relative to the size of incentives. Ultrasound tests and abortions are
relatively cheap in India and each costs around Rs. 500 - Rs. 1,000 ($10 - $20) (Arnold et al.
(2002)). Thus, c
′
s (about Rs. 3,000 or $60) is substantially smaller than the incentive amounts.
36
In reality, one-girl couples also receive Rs. 200 if they have a second girl. This increases their utility
36In terms of Figures 1.9 and 1.10, this means that we are more likely to be in Case 1.
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from choosing the no US option and may lead to a smaller decrease in the likelihood of another
birth and a smaller increase in the probability of next birth being male, relative to one-boy couples.
Differential effect on one-boy and one-girl couples. In Proposition 3, the direction
of effects is the same for all one-child couples, irrespective of the sex of the first child, but the
magnitudes might differ. The incentive amount to stop child-bearing is larger for one-girl couples.
If the society mainly comprises couples who never choose US, I expect one-girl couples to be more
likely to not have a second child as compared to one-boy couples. In Figure 1.11 they are represented
by the ‘red’ area. These couples were following a no US strategy before the scheme and are, thus,
equally likely to have a boy or a girl at the start of the scheme. They stop child-bearing if they
have a girl but not if they have a boy. This increases the proportion of one-girl couples more than
the proportion of one-boy couples. In other words, the likelihood of a second birth decreases more
for one-girl couples. However, Proposition 2 and Figure 1.2 imply that while one-girl couples must
necessarily be those who were following the no US strategy, one-boy couples also include those
who were following the US strategy before Devirupak. These couples selected the sex of their
first birth and only the one-boy incentives are relevant for them. The ‘blue’ area in Figure 1.11
represents one-boy couples who were sex-selecting before the scheme and stop child-bearing due
to the Rs. 200 incentive, thereby contributing towards an increase in the proportion of one-boy
couples. ‘Yellow’ couples stop irrespective of the sex of their first child. If the distribution of c and
δ is such that the (mass in) ‘blue’ area is larger than the (mass in) ‘red’ area, then more couples
stop after one boy than after one girl. Note that, if at least some people select at first birth, then
there will be more one-boy couples than one-girl couples to begin with. Additionally, even in the
absence of incentives, one-boy couples are less likely to have a second birth and their second child
is more likely to be a boy because more of them choose US than one-girl couples. But after the
scheme, a denser ‘blue’ area implies that the likelihood of a second birth will decrease more for
one-boy couples.37
37In my model, couples either always sex-select or never sex-select in the absence of incentives. In reality, there is
evidence that first births in India are not selected, while higher parity births are. This could reflect a preference for
having children of both sexes or a lack of aversion for at most x daughters, both of which imply that couples start
selecting from x + 1 parity onwards. For simplicity, my model ignores both the choice of parity at which to start
selecting and an active pursuit of mixed families. However, allowing couples to desire at least one son and at most
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Similarly, under certain conditions, the likelihood that the second birth is male may increase
more for one-girl couples. The ‘blue’, ‘pink’, and ‘green’ regions in Figure 1.12 indicate couples
who change their strategy for the second pregnancy after Devirupak. ‘Pink’ couples switch to US
irrespective of their first child’s sex. However, ‘green’ (‘blue’) couples switch only if they have a
girl (boy). Since all three groups were not sex-selecting before Devirupak, they are equally likely
to have a boy or a girl at the start of the scheme. Therefore, the relative magnitude of the effect
on the sex of second birth depends on the relative valuation of Rs. 200 versus Rs. 500 and the
distribution of δ and c.
So far, apart from the incentive for one-girl couples to have a second girl which has been ignored
in the model, the theoretical predictions do not imply more female births. Any positive effect on
female births is likely to come from couples who were childless in 2002. Within this group, it
is important to distinguish childless couples who were following the US strategy and had aborted
their first girl from those who had not begun child-bearing by 2002, e.g. due to marriage after 2002.
In the absence of incentives, the former group would have aborted again if the second pregnancy
was female, but now some of them might find it optimal to choose no US. For this group, the
likelihood of remaining childless decreases and their first-born is more likely to be a girl.
Proposition 4 Childless women who previously had one abortion are more likely to give birth and
and this child is more likely to be a girl.
The above effect is driven by ‘intermediate-δ’ couples for whom the cost of children is high relative to
the cost of sex-selection (which is why they were selecting earlier), but the Rs. 500 incentive is large
enough to overcome the cost of a potential girl. Proposition 4 rests on the fact that these women
have only one more chance to become pregnant since I limit the maximum number of pregnancies
to two. In terms of testable predictions, this group can be thought of as women approaching the
end of their fertile years.
one daughter, for example, would still imply that one-boy families are more likely to stop, as long as the Rs 500
incentive does not sufficiently compensate for the “lost” son, i.e. the possibility of one-boy couples being more likely
to stop child-bearing than one-girl couples is true more generally and does not require sex-selection at first birth in
the real world.
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Next I determine the effect of incentives on couples who begin child-bearing after Deviru-
pak by solving for their optimal strategies through an exercise similar to the proof of Proposition 2,
but with incentives.38 The intuitive predictions for these couples are straightforward. For given
cost parameters, high δ couples might find it optimal to have just one child with sex-selection,
whereas low son preference couples might have one child without sex-selection. For a given degree
of son preference, the incentives will reduce fertility more for couples with a higher cost of children.
Overall, we expect lower fertility and an increased proportion of one-child families among these
couples, but the effect on the sex ratio at first birth is ambiguous and depends on the distribution
of c and δ.
The theoretical framework presented in this section clearly shows that Devirupak should de-
crease fertility in Haryana, irrespective of the composition of a couple’s children in 2002. However,
the effect on the sex ratio might not be as intended by the policymakers. The sex ratio will de-
crease only if a significant number of couples (a) have one girl in 2002 and stop child-bearing, or
(b) decrease the use of sex-selection for their first and/or second pregnancies after 2002, and then
stop child-bearing.
To summarize, my model yields the following predictions that I test in the next part of the
paper:
1. High son preference and high cost of children couples have higher sex ratios before Devirupak.
2. Devirupak reduces the probability of a second birth for couples who had one child in 2002.
3. Second births are more likely to be male for couples who had one child in 2002.
4. Childless women approaching the end of their fertile years are more likely to give birth and
this child is more likely to be a girl.
38Due to its computational complexity, this proof is omitted from the paper, but is available upon request.
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1.4 Data
I use three rounds of the National Family Health Survey of India (NFHS-1, 2, 3) and one round of the
District-Level Household Survey of India (DLHS-2) in this paper. These are nationwide, repeated
cross-sectional surveys, representative at the state-level. The NFHS rounds were conducted in
1992-93, 1998-99, and 2005-06 while DLHS-2 took place in 2002-04 (Figure 1.3). These surveys
report complete birth histories for all interviewed women, including the month and the year of birth,
birth order, mother’s age at birth, and the age at death for deceased children. They also report
contraceptive use, including the year and the month of sterilization, if applicable. I combine the
retrospective birth histories from these four cross-sections to construct an unbalanced woman-year
panel for the period 1976 - 2005.39 A woman enters the panel in her year of first marriage40 and
exits in her year of survey.
Control States
Since Devirupak was implemented at the same time throughout Haryana, I cannot use within-state
geographical variation in my empirical strategy. Instead, I include other northern and north-western
Indian states in my sample to control for all time-invariant state-specific factors that may affect the
outcome variables. Indian states exhibit substantial heterogeneity in cultural, social, and economic
factors that are considered important determinants of fertility and sex-selection decisions. These
include potentially intertwined characteristics such as son preference, kinship structures, female
autonomy, marriage customs, and cropping patterns.41 Since many of these variables are either
unobservable or do not have credible proxies, it is important to restrict my control group to states
that are similar to Haryana in these respects.
As the left panel of Figure 1.4 shows, states from north and north-west India are systematically
39It is reasonable to pool DLHS and NFHS data since they have a similar survey context in terms of selection of
respondents, modes of interviewing, and the exact questions asked. However, sample sizes are much larger for DLHS
since it is also representative at the district level. As shown in Section 1.6.7, my results do not change if only one of
these datasets is used.
40I define the year of marriage as the year of consummation for consistency across rounds.
41Bardhan (1974), Boserup (1970), Bhaskar and Gupta (2007), Carranza (2012), Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1999),
Das Gupta (2010), Dyson and Moore (1983), and Rahman and Rao (2004).
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different from rest of the country in terms of child sex ratios. This persistent regional divide has
been documented in the Indian Census reports for a long time, with mentions of son preference and
female infanticide in Punjab42 and Rajasthan appearing as early as the 1881 Census. Therefore,
I restrict my control group to the following seven (nine) states - Punjab, Rajasthan, Himachal
Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh (inclusive of Uttaranchal) and Madhya Pradesh (inclusive
of Chhattisgarh). With the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, for which data is not consistently
available, my sample states cover all of north and north-west India (right panel of Figure 1.4).
A similar strategy has been adopted by previous literature that examines the impact of policies
concerned with sex-imbalances (e.g. Stopnitzky (2012)). As Figure 1.5 shows, the average child
sex ratio for the control group of states has followed a similar trend as Haryana in the last four
decades. I also test the robustness of my findings by excluding one control state at a time and by
using the synthetic control method in Section 1.6.7.
Sample Period
Although my sample comprises a large number of pre-Devirupak years (1976 - 2002), the number of
post-program years is much smaller in comparison (2003, 2004, 2005). While additional post-years
can be useful in capturing the long-term effects of Devirupak, I restrict my sample to years before
2006 (i.e. exclude the NFHS-3 observations from 2006) to ensure that my results are not driven by
the introduction of a different scheme, Ladli, that also seeks to decrease the sex ratio in Haryana.43
I choose 1976 as the earliest year in my sample because only a few observations are available for
prior years and they do not cover all states.
Despite Ladli’s introduction on August 20, 2005, I do not exclude births that took place during
42Haryana was a part of Punjab until 1966.
43My results, however, do not change even if I include the 2006 data from NFHS-3. I also have access to the most
recent 2007-08 DLHS-3 round, but I do not include it in my main sample for the following reasons. DLHS-3 did
not collect birth or survival information for children born before January 1, 2004, making it impossible to know the
number of living children in years after 2004 for mothers who started child-bearing before 2004. This information
is crucial for my empirical strategy since future fertility and eligibility for Devirupak’s incentives are determined
by the composition of surviving children and not just the number of births. I can, however, include in my sample
women who either have zero fertility at the time of the survey, or whose first child was born after January 1, 2004
since their birth histories can be fully retrieved. Still, these women are likely to be, on average, younger and their
fertility mechanically lower than that of women surveyed in other rounds. Nevertheless, my results are robust to the
inclusion of these DLHS-3 women for whom I have the necessary information.
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September-December 2005 from my sample since they were conceived much before its announce-
ment. The only way Ladli could have affected fertility or the sex ratios in 2005 is if it decreased
the likelihood of conception or caused women who were pregnant on August 20, 2005 to selectively
abort during September-December 2005. However, any such forgone conceptions or aborted preg-
nancies,44 if carried to term, would have resulted in births only next year. Since I exclude 2006
from my sample period, ignoring them is, therefore, not an issue for my empirical strategy (in
Section 1.5). Moreover, since Ladli does not seek to reduce fertility, it is not obvious why it would
increase sex-selection in the first place.
In addition, I impose the following sample-selection criteria. First, I limit my sample to
currently-married women in the 15-44 age-group at the time of survey for consistency across
rounds.45 Second, I exclude women whose first child was born before they were 13 years old
and those who have fertility greater than 10 to prevent any composition bias since these mothers
are likely to be fundamentally different from rest of the sample. Third, I exclude women who have
had twin or multiple births since these births are mostly unplanned and do not reflect parents’ fer-
tility preferences. Fourth, I drop women whose husband’s age was below 15 or above 80 at the time
of survey.46 Finally, I exclude women who were visiting the household when the survey took place,
and were interviewed as a result, since there is no information on their actual state of residence.
My final sample comprises 3,726,289 observations for 288,483 mothers with 806,326 births over 30
years.
Lastly, DLHS-2 top-codes the year of sterilization as eight years before the survey for women
who had been sterilized for more than eight years at the time of survey. As a result, it will artificially
appear that DLHS-2 women became sterilized later than comparable women in other rounds. In
specifications where the exact year of sterilization is used, I restrict my sample to women who had
been sterilized for less than 8 years at the time of survey to address this issue.
44These abortions were most likely first- or second-trimester pregnancies since PSDT is most effective and safest
during that period (Epner et al. (1998)).
45Survey questionnaires were administered to 13-49-year old ever-married women in NFHS-1, 15-49-year old ever-
married women in NFHS-2,3, and 15-44-year old currently-married women in DLHS-2.
46My results are similar even if these observations are included.
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1.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 presents the sample means of key variables, separately for treatment and control states
before and after 2002. The average age at marriage for women in my sample is about 17 years.
Women in Haryana are more likely to belong to a scheduled caste (SC) and less likely to come
from other backward castes (OBC). In terms of religion, they are more likely to be Hindu and less
likely to be Muslim. A higher proportion of them resides in rural areas, but within rural families,
households in Haryana are less likely to own agricultural land. Based on their household wealth
index,47 women in Haryana are richer than their counterparts in the control states. Their labor
market participation rates are lower and they are also less likely to be self-employed. To ensure that
my estimates of the effects of Devirupak are not confounded by the differences in socio-economic
characteristics between Haryana and non-Haryana, I control for all these variables in my regressions.
Moreover, in some specifications I include woman fixed-effects which control for any time-invariant
heterogeneity in factors that might influence the decisions about child-bearing and sex-selection.
As previously mentioned, I also use the synthetic control method to construct a synthetic-Haryana
that closely matches Haryana in terms of pre-intervention characteristics relevant for my outcome
variables (Section 1.6.7).
Next I compare the pre-program means of variables that are likely to be affected by Devirupak.
The average rate of sterilization is higher for couples in Haryana even in the absence of Devirupak –
more than half of them report being sterilized before 2002. They have slightly fewer living children
on average, but are less likely to be childless in any year. However, the probability of having only
one child or only two girls is similar across treatment and control states. Lastly, mothers in Haryana
give birth to more sons than daughters before 2002. These differences highlight the importance of
including state fixed effects and controlling for state-specific time trends in my regression analysis.
In Section 1.6.7, I present results from a number of robustness checks to establish that my findings
are not driven by any pre-existing differences in Haryana and the control states.
47The wealth index is a categorical variable that can take three values: low-, medium-, or high-SLI (standard of
living index). Each household is assigned to one of these categories based on its wealth score. NFHS and DLHS-2
use different methodologies to compute the wealth scores. For comparability, I use the DLHS-2 method to compute
the wealth score and to define the index for NFHS.
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1.4.2 Sex-selection before Devirupak
My model suggests that couples with a stronger preference for sons and a higher cost of children are
more likely to sex-select when technology for sex-selection is available. Therefore, I expect these
couples to have fewer children and a higher proportion of sons before Devirupak (Prediction 1). As
an illustrative exercise, I examine the cross-section of women interviewed in 1998-9948 for NFHS-2
and compare the average proportion of sons and the average number of living children for various
socio-economic groups. While it is difficult to know which groups have a higher degree of son
preference a priori, previous literature49 suggests that high-caste Hindus, Sikhs, and land-owning
families are more likely to, and Muslims are less likely to prefer sons over daughters. In terms of
the opportunity cost of children, I expect more educated women from wealthy families in urban
areas to have better labor market opportunities, and hence a higher opportunity cost of children. I
divide women into overlapping socio-economic groups based on these characteristics and calculate
the average number of children and the average proportion of sons for each group.
Table 1.4 lists these groups in decreasing order of the average proportion of sons. A few broad
patterns emerge. Women who have more than primary education, who work outside the home and
who belong to Sikh, high-caste Hindu, rich, and (agricultural) land-owning households have, on
average, a higher proportion of sons and fewer living children than women who work from home,
and who belong to poor, low-caste, uneducated, landless, and Muslim families. The highest sex
ratios are reported by rural Sikh landowners, rural rich, and relatively educated high-caste Hindu
women from wealthy families in urban areas. Similarly, fertility levels are lowest for the same
socio-economic groups. This admittedly crude comparison, nevertheless, provides evidence in favor
of Prediction 1 from my model. Moreover, it reveals information about the correlations between
socio-economic characteristics and son preference that is useful when I examine the heterogeneous
effects of Devirupak later in Section 1.6.4.
48PSDT was widely available in India by 1998-99 (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)).
49Tambiah (1973), Dickenmann (1979), Oldenburg (1992), Bhat and Zavier (2003), Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010).
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1.5 Empirical Strategy
The goals of my empirical strategy are to test the predictions generated by the theoretical framework
in Section 1.3 and to estimate the causal effect of Devirupak. I exploit the quasi-experimental
nature of Devirupak’s implementation to estimate the impact of financial incentives on the number
and the sex composition of children, birth spacing, and sterilization take-up. In particular, my
identification strategy relies on three sources of variation: the year and the state of program
initiation, and differences in future incentives by the composition of pre-existing children.
Table 1.2 describes how Devirupak’s monthly incentives vary for couples in Haryana by the
composition of their pre-existing children at any point in time. Conditional on sterilization, childless
couples receive no money if they remain childless, Rs. 500 ($10) if they have a daughter, and Rs.
200 ($4) if they have either a son or two daughters. One-girl couples receive Rs. 500 ($10) if they
stop child-bearing and Rs. 200 ($4) if they have a second girl and then become sterilized. The
only way one-boy or two-girl couples can receive benefits is if they do not have any more children.
For couples who are at different points in their fertility path in 2002, Devirupak can, thus, be
considered an exogenous shock that alters their incentives for subsequent births and sex-selection
differently.
My regression analysis is based on two main specifications. First, I use a triple-differences-in-
differences (DDD) strategy to estimate Devirupak’s effect on the probability of a marginal birth
and its sex (conditional on birth). My second specification examines the scheme’s effect on the
number of living sons and daughters, as well as indicators for specific child compositions (e.g.
“only one son”) in a differences-in-differences (DD) framework. I also include woman fixed effects
in some regressions to control for all time-invariant woman-specific sources of variation in these
outcomes. One advantage of using indicators like “only one son” as outcomes (as opposed to
separate dummies for birth and child’s sex conditional on birth) is that they allow me to capture
Devirupak’s combined effect on fertility and sex-selection since these decisions are jointly made.
Taken together, these two specifications capture couples’ response to Devirupak on both “stock”
and “flow” margins of fertility.
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Given the incentive structure in Table 1.2, for the DDD specification I assign each woman to
one of the following five mutually exclusive groups based on the number and the sex composition
of her surviving children in any year: No living children (g = 1); One boy only (g = 2); One girl
only (g = 3); Two girls only (g = 4); and Other compositions (g = 5). The “treatment” groups
comprise of g = 1, 2, 3, 4, while couples in g = 5 were not affected by the scheme. For a woman i in





βgHrys ∗ Postt ∗ 1[Groupi,t−j = g] +X ′iδ + γst + θsg + ψag + φg ∗ t+ isatg (1)
where Yisatg are the outcomes of interest, such as an indicator for birth in year t; Hrys is an
indicator for residence in Haryana;50Postt equals 1 if t > 2002, and 0 otherwise; Groupi,t−j refers
to the child composition at the end of period (t − j); and Xi is a vector that includes woman i’s
years of schooling, indicators for her religion, caste, residence in an urban area, and the household
standard of living. State-year fixed effects (γst) provide full non-parametric control for state-specific
time effects that are common across groups. Age-group fixed effects (ψag) control for age-specific
group effects such as the higher likelihood of older women to be in certain groups. Lastly, I also
control for state-group effects (θsg) and group-specific time trends. The coefficients of interest, βg,
measure the effect of Devirupak on the outcome of interest for women in group g relative to group
5, before and after 2002 in Haryana, relative to other states. These coefficients are identified under
the assumption that, in the absence of Devirupak, the difference in the outcomes of women in
group g and group 5 in Haryana would have followed the same trend as this difference in control
states. I estimate specification (1) separately for j = 1, 2, and 3 to examine how the effect varies
with the length of exposure to the scheme.
It is important to note that the incentive structure of Devirupak introduces a sequence of
treatments as opposed to multiple static treatments. Consequently, conditioning on past fertility
50Since the survey only provides information about the state of residence at the time of interview, I am assuming
that a woman lived in the same state for the entire duration of her marriage. This might seem like an unreasonable
assumption, but in practice, inter-state migration in India is low and mostly consists of women relocating as a result
of marriage. I would expect migration to be even lower for women who have already given birth to their first child.
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can bias the estimates of treatment effect (Lechner and Miquel (2010)). To illustrate, if Devirupak
causes couples to be more or less likely to select the sex of their first child, then comparing future
outcomes of women whose first child was born before and after Devirupak in Haryana will lead
to biased estimates. More generally, this problem arises because the variable Groupi,t−j is affected
by the scheme when t − j > 2002. To ensure that my estimates are not biased by this selection
that occurs due to the treatment itself, I restrict my sample to t 6 2002 + j while estimating
specification (1). This guarantees that group affiliation, Groupi,t−j , is always defined using a
couple’s child composition in a pre-Devirupak year and is free of any change that takes place due
to Devirupak.
An alternative to the DDD strategy would be to estimate DD specifications similar to (1) sepa-
rately for each group g. However, group affiliation is unlikely to be random even beforeDevirupak. I
prefer specification (1) since it not only controls for all possible time-invariant group-specific sources
of variation but also allows the treatment effect to vary across groups. It also allows me to flexibly
control for state-year fixed effects.
To examine if the effects on marginal births identified by specification (1) also translate into
changes in total fertility, I estimate the following DD specification for a woman i in state s of age
a in year t:
Yisat = α+ βHrys ∗ Postt +X ′iδ + γs + ωa + θt + φs ∗ t+ isat (2)
The “stock” outcome variables for this specification are the number of living children, sons, and
daughters, as well as indicators for specific child compositions. Equation (2) includes fixed effects
for state (γs), woman’s age (ωa), year (θt), as well as state-specific linear time trends. The re-
maining variables are defined as earlier. Despite the inclusion of individual-level covariates, Xi,
the independent variables in specification (2) do not adequately control for all possible sources of
variation in outcomes within a state. In order to deal with potential biases due to these omitted
variables, I also estimate a woman fixed effects specification, (2
′
) that is otherwise similar to (2).
Yisat = α+ βHrys ∗ Postt + pii + ωa + θt + φs ∗ t+ isat (2′)
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The woman fixed effects (pii) control for any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in factors
that influence the fertility and sex-selection decisions of a woman. The coefficient of interest, β,
estimates the change in the number of children or the likelihood that a woman reports a particular
child composition before and after 2002 in Haryana, relative to control states.
Before I proceed to the results section, a few points must be noted. First, inference is based
on cluster-robust standard errors. I employ several different levels of clustering (state-year, state-
group, state) and use the most conservative standard error to determine the significance of my
estimated coefficients. Second, although I know the month in which Devirupak was introduced
(September 2002), I define Postt at the year level as t > 2002. This is because births that took
place during October - December 2002 were conceived before the scheme was initiated and are
unlikely to have been affected by it. It is improbable that mothers aborted late-term pregnancies in
these months due to the health risks involved. Third, one of the eligibility conditions of Devirupak
is that neither the husband nor the wife should be an income-tax payer. Unfortunately, my data
does not provide information on income, and hence there is no direct way of determining the
taxpayer status of a couple. However, the number of income-tax payers in India is small due to
several exemptions.51 Moreover, tax evasion is widespread. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the
income-tax status of a couple is a strictly enforced or a binding condition for eligibility. Instead, I
examine heterogeneity in the effects of Devirupak by household wealth in Section 1.6.4, using an
index based on asset ownership. Lastly, Devirupak also requires that the husband and the wife
should be less than 45 and 40 years old, respectively, on the date of sterilization, presumably to
target couples who are still in their fertile years. Since more than 80 percent of sterilized couples
undergo the operation before the wife is 30 years old, and 93 percent of births in my sample take
place before the mother is 31 years old, age is also unlikely to be a binding criterion. In Section
1.6.4 I analyze heterogeneity in the effects by woman’s age instead.




I begin by graphically describing the effect of Devirupak on the likelihood that a woman reports a
particular child composition in a year using an event-study framework. The plotted coefficients in
Figure 1.6 show the trends in the child composition of married couples in Haryana relative to other
states, after controlling for socio-economic characteristics of the woman and fixed effects for state,
year, and woman’s age.52 Since Devirupak provides incentives to couples with either one child or
two girls, the outcome variables are indicators for these categories.
There are no noticeable trends in the differential likelihood of a particular child composition
immediately before 2002. This lack of significant differences in the years prior to Devirupak
provides an important test for the validity of the identifying assumption; the trends in outcomes
across comparison groups evolve smoothly except through the change in incentives in 2002. After
2002 there is an increase in the likelihood that a woman has only one child (boy or girl), but there is
no visible change in the two-girls outcome. These trends reflect the combined effect of Devirupak
on couples who had a child in 2002 as well as those who started child-bearing after 2002. Figure 1.7
overlays the graphs for the one-child outcomes and suggests that the likelihood of having only one
son has increased more sharply, despite the higher incentive for one-girl couples.
1.6.1 Effects on Marginal Births
In this section, I test Predictions 2 and 3 from my model using specification (1). Table 1.5 presents
estimation results for two outcome variables. In Panel A, the dependent variable is an indicator
that equals one if a woman gives birth in a year, and zero otherwise. In Panel B, the sample is
restricted to years when a birth takes place, and the outcome variable is an indicator for the birth
being male. The triple-difference estimates in this table compare the change in the probability of a
marginal birth (or the likelihood of a marginal birth being male) in year t, before and after 2002, in
Haryana and non-Haryana, by the composition of children in year (t− j). In columns (1)-(3), the
sample is restricted to t 6 2003 and j = 1, i.e. the coefficients measure the effect of Devirupak in
52Specifically, Figure 1.6 plots the βk coefficients from the following regression, with 2002 as the omitted year:
Yisat =
∑2005
k=1976 βkHrys ∗ 1[Y eart = k] +X
′
i δ + γs + ωa + θt + isat.
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the first year of implementation, conditional on the child composition in year (t− 1) which is pre-
determined and not affected by the scheme. In the next three columns, I add one more post year
while simultaneously increasing the time lag used to define the past child composition. Restricting
the sample to t 6 2004 when j = 2 ensures that the lagged composition remains unaffected by the
scheme. Lastly, columns (7)-(9) use j = 3 and the entire sample period.
Prediction 2 says that couples in Haryana who had one child when Devirupak was implemented
should be less likely to have subsequent births. The same result is expected to hold for couples with
two daughters, although the model does not explicitly solve for this case. The first row of Panel
A shows that conditional on having only a son in year (t − j), couples in Haryana are less likely
to have another child after Devirupak relative to the control group. The coefficients are negative
and highly significant across all columns. Columns (3), (6), and (9) imply that the likelihood of a
subsequent birth decreases by, respectively, 2.4, 4.1, and 3.7 percentage points after Devirupak for
couples whose only child one, two, and three years ago was a boy. Although it is possible that this
decrease merely reflects a postponement of higher parity births and not necessarily a decrease in
completed fertility, the fact that couples are consistently less likely to give birth over a three-year
period suggests otherwise. As Figure 1.8 shows, a vast majority of second births following a first-
born son take place within three years of the birth of the first child, suggesting that the decrease in
marginal births I observe in Table 1.5 does not simply reflect a retiming of second births. In Section
1.6.5 I show that this decline is also accompanied by an increase in the probability of sterilization,
which is consistent with a decrease in completed fertility for couples who had one son in 2002.
However, for one-girl couples in the second row, I observe an increase in the likelihood of birth
in columns (1)-(3) and a decrease thereafter. This pattern can potentially be explained by the
presence of incentives for two girls. At the margin, the availability of two-girl incentives lowers the
cost of a second pregnancy without selection (in terms of the “risk” of a second girl) for one-girl
couples, thereby increasing the probability of a second birth. But since no incentives are available
for more than two children, I still expect to see a decrease in their completed fertility, which is
reflected in a negative coefficient after two and three years.
Parents of two girls also exhibit a decrease in marginal births, but the effect is small in the first
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year of policy implementation. For couples who were childless in year (t − j), I observe a pattern
similar to the one-girl couples. Initially, there is an increase in the likelihood of birth (for j = 1)
which turns negative in columns (4)-(9). Since there are no incentives for childless couples under
Devirupak, it encourages couples who would have remained childless in the absence of incentives
(Proposition 4) and those who had not started child-bearing by 2002 to have one child but not
more.
A comparison of coefficients in the first two rows shows that one-boy couples are more likely to
stop child-bearing as compared to one-girl couples despite a higher incentive to stop for the latter.
According to column (9), couples who had one boy in year (t − 3) are 3.7 percentage points less
likely to give birth in year t as compared to a 2.2 percentage point decrease for couples who had
one girl. This finding (along with Figure 1.11) suggests that couples in Haryana, on average, have
a strong son preference and their cost of children is high relative to the cost of sex-selection.
Next I test prediction 3 which says that conditional on having one child before the scheme,
couples who choose to have another child after the scheme should be more likely to practice sex-
selection, i.e. if there is a marginal birth, it is more likely to be male for one-child couples. This
finding is also borne out by the results in Panel B. The triple-interaction coefficients are always
positive and significant for both one-boy and one-girl couples. However, the increase is smaller for
one-girl couples relative to one-boy couples for the first two years and then becomes larger in the
third year. This pattern may also reflect that at least some one-girl couples experience a smaller
increase in the use of ultrasound technology for second pregnancies due to the availability of two-
girl incentives. This effect disappears when j = 3 suggesting that one-girl couples who select into
giving birth three years into the scheme have a very strong desire for sons which makes them 5.3
percentage points more likely to give birth to a male child as compared to one-boy couples in the
same situation.53
Recall that my model does not provide a clear prediction about the effect of Devirupak on the
sex ratio of first births. However, as shown by the coefficients in the last row of Panel B, births to
53The 5.3 percentage point figure is the difference between the one-boy and one-girl coefficients in Panel B-column
(9).
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couples who were childless at the start of Devirupak are significantly more likely to be male even
as early as the first year of implementation.54 The coefficients imply that first births in the first
year of implementation are about 4.3 percentage points more likely to be male. This translates into
an 7.8 percent increase in the probability that the first birth is male.55 Prior literature (Bhalotra
and Cochrane (2010)) finds that sex-selective abortions in India take place at higher parities and
the sex ratio at birth for first-borns is not significantly above normal. But Devirupak’s incentive
structure, in an attempt to promote a one-child norm, makes the sex-selection decision salient at
first birth in a manner similar to China’s One-Child Policy.
1.6.2 Effects on the Number and the Composition of Children
Next I estimate the effect of Devirupak on the “stock” of a couple’s children. Since Table 1.5 shows
that couples who have one child when Devirupak is announced are less likely to have another child
and this effect is stronger for one-boy couples, I expect them to be more likely to have only one
son after 2002. Similarly, I expect those who are childless in 2002 to be more likely than earlier to
report a one-child composition after 2002 since remaining childless or having more than one child
yield lower benefits. Moreover, if son preference is strong enough, these couples may prefer one son
over one daughter.
Table 1.6 reports the DD coefficients from specifications (2) and (2
′
) using indicators for specific
child compositions (Panel A) and the number of children (Panel B) as the outcome variables.
Column (1) presents the base specification with fixed effects for states and years. Column (2)
also controls for fixed effects for woman’s age, time-invariant woman-specific covariates, and state-
specific linear time trends. Column (3) adds woman fixed-effects, and therefore excludes covariates
and state fixed effects as they do not vary over time for a woman. However, not every woman in my
panel is observed both before and after 2002. The coefficients in column (3) are essentially driven
54I have also estimated specification (1) conditional on the composition in (t − 1) without restricting the sample
to years until 2003, and find a similar result for the sex ratio of first births.
55The percentage change is calculated as follows. The double-difference in the pre-post, Group1 - Group5 averages
implies that the probability of first birth being male increased in non-Haryana by 0.0093. If Haryana had experienced
the same increase as non-Haryana, its post-average for Group 1 would have been 0.5441 + 0.0093 = 0.5534, where
0.5441 is the pre-Group5 average in Haryana. The triple-difference coefficient of 0.0430, thus, represents an 7.8
percent increase.
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by the sub-sample of women who married before 2002 but were surveyed after 2002, and were hence
observed both before and after the treatment year. Although I control for a variety of individual
characteristics, these women may still be different from those who were observed either entirely
before or entirely after 2002. Thus, in order to make estimates comparable across specifications,




Panel A supports the graphical evidence presented in Figures 1.6 and 1.7. As the first row shows,
the likelihood that a couple has only one son has increased across all columns. The coefficients are
significant everywhere except in column (1). The coefficient in column (2) implies a 0.4 percentage
point or a 4.9 percent increase in the proportion of one-boy couples.56 There is also a positive
and significant increase in the one-girl outcome in column (1), but the effect disappears once other
covariates and time trends are included in column (2). When I restrict the sample to women
who are observed both before and after (“overlap sub-sample”), the coefficient becomes significant
and negative. This suggests that couples who start child-bearing after the scheme are responding
differently to the incentive for the first girl as compared to those who already have a girl in 2002.
The coefficients for the two-girls outcome are either insignificant or negative, suggesting that
the Rs. 200 ($4) incentive is not effective in inducing couples to have only two daughters. Although
we observe some decrease in the likelihood of subsequent births for two-girl couples in Table 1.5,
it is not sufficient to significantly increase the share of two-girl couples in the population. The
significantly negative coefficients in the first two columns suggest that couples who start child-
bearing after 2002 are even less likely to have two girls as compared to couples before the scheme.
The effect on the likelihood of remaining childless is mostly insignificant, except in column (2).
Since only a small percentage of married couples in Haryana remain childless, a zero effect is not
surprising. In fact, if more new couples are now sex-selecting at first parity, we expect them to
give birth later since abortion and re-conception take time. They will, therefore, remain childless
56The percentage change is calculated as follows. The pre-post difference in averages implies that the probability
of “only one boy” decreased in non-Haryana and Haryana by -0.0281 and -0.0220, respectively. If Haryana had
experienced the same decrease as non-Haryana, its post-average would have been 0.1091 - 0.0281 = 0.081. The DD
coefficient of 0.004 represents a 4.9 percent increase over the counterfactual assumption that Haryana followed the
same trend as non-Haryana.
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longer and this might explain why we see a positive and significant effect in column (2). I examine
the effect of Devirupak on the spacing of births shortly. Since Devirupak provides no incentives
for a couple to have any other composition of boys and girls,57 the coefficients in the last row of
Panel A are consistent with negative effects.
To test if the effects presented in Panel A also translate into lower fertility, I next estimate
the same specification(s) using the number of living children, sons, and daughters as the outcome
variables. Couples who already have one child or two girls in 2002 are more likely to stop child-
bearing due to the incentives, thus, for them the number of children (boys as well as girls) should
decrease. But, as shown earlier, parents of one son are more likely to stop than those who have
one or two daughters. If this is because the latter want a minimum number of sons, the decrease
in the number of boys may be less than the decrease in the number of girls. Similarly, if couples
who started child-bearing after 2002 sex-select sooner now and forgo the “unwanted” daughters to
have only one son, the decrease in the number of daughters will be larger than the decrease in the
number of sons.
The first row in Panel B of Table 1.6 shows that Devirupak has significantly decreased the
number of daughters. Apart from column (1), the coefficients are stable in magnitude and reflect
a 0.02 percentage point or a 1.9 percent reduction in the number of daughters.58 The coefficients
for the number of sons are also mostly negative but not always significant, and the magnitudes
are generally smaller than those for the number of daughters. The combined effect on the total
number of children is always negative and also significant in the first three columns. In the last
two columns, the coefficients are still meaningful, but I lose significance at conventional levels. The
coefficient of -0.023 implies an approximately 0.9 percent reduction in the number of living children
per woman.
On the whole, Table 1.6 suggests that Devirupak has caused couples to have fewer children,
but mainly in order to have just one son. The decrease in the number of children is largely driven
by a decline in the number of daughters.
57Other compositions comprise more than two children or two children with one boy and one girl.
58Calculated as Coeff
HryPre+(NHPost−NHPre) ∗ 100 where HryPre is the pre-2002 average number of daughters in
Haryana etc.
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1.6.3 Effects on Birth Timing and Spacing
Next I examine the effect of Devirupak on the timing of the first two births. To the extent that
there is greater sex-selection due to Devirupak, we expect the birth intervals to increase simply
because conception, abortion, and re-conception take time. Each abortion delays the next birth,
at the minimum, by a year (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)). On the other hand, couples may
start planning births sooner in order to hasten the receipt of benefits. To examine which of these
effects dominates, I compare the interval between marriage, first birth, and second birth before and
after 2002 in Haryana, relative to other states, using a version of specification (2). To prevent any
composition bias, I exclude women whose age at marriage was less than 13 years or whose first
child was born more than ten years after marriage.
In Panel A of Table 1.7, the dependent variables are indicators for first birth in the jth year
of marriage, where j = 0, 1, 2, 3. The reason I measure the gap in years is because DLHS-2 does
not report the month of marriage, making year the finest level at which the timing of first birth
can be measured. Before Devirupak, 20, 34, and 21 percent of first births in Haryana took place
in the first, second, and third year of marriage, respectively. After Devirupak, first births are
significantly less likely to take place in the first year of marriage and more likely to take place in
the second year. The delay becomes larger when I exclude women who were married before 2002
but gave birth to their first child after 2002 (Panel A1). These results lend support to the findings
from Table 1.5 that imply an increase in the practice of sex-selection for first-borns.
Since second births after Devirupak are more likely to be male for couples who had a child in
2002 (from Table 1.5), I also expect an increase in the interval between first and second births as a
result of greater sex-selection. I examine this in Panel B of Table 1.7 using dependent variables that
are indicators for the number of months (in multiples of twelve) between first and second births.
Unlike the month of marriage, DLHS-2 reports the month of birth so the gap between births can
be measured more precisely. I restrict the sample to women whose first birth took place before
Devirupak to avoid selection-bias due to the effect on first births. In addition, I require that the
first child is alive when the second birth takes place and I drop 72 observations where the second
child is born less than 9 months after the first birth. The coefficients indicate that second births are
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less likely to take place within 9-12 months of the first birth and more likely to occur within 12-24
months. I find similar results when I examine the effects separately by the sex of the first child
in Panels B1 and B2. These findings are consistent with Prediction 3 and Table 1.5 and indicate
increased use of sex-selection for second births as a result of Devirupak’s incentives.
1.6.4 Heterogeneity
I start by examining heterogeneity in the effects of Devirupak by a woman’s age. I divide my
sample into four age-groups and estimate specification (2) separately for each of them. The main
findings from Table 1.8 are as follows. Firstly, the overall increase in the one-boy outcome is being
mainly driven by women 25 years or younger. The coefficients are positive in the first two columns
and also highly significant in column (2). On the other hand, the effect is neither positive nor
significant for women more than 25 years old. This seems reasonable since Devirupak’s incentives
are available only for the first two births and most women give birth to their first child before
they are 25 years old. Secondly, as predicted by Proposition 4, women nearing the end of their
fertile years (30-44 age group) are significantly less likely to remain childless and more likely to
have one girl. This suggests that at the margin, the one-girl option induces women who would have
remained childless in the absence of incentives to have one daughter instead. However, since only
a small percentage of women are childless by the time they are 30-44 years old, this increase is
insufficient to result in a significant rise in the proportion of one-girl couples in Table 1.6. Thirdly,
I also observe a significant increase in the likelihood that women in the 13-20 year age-group are
childless. This is consistent with first births occurring at a later age, as suggested by Table 1.7.
Lastly, no age-group exhibits a significant increase in the likelihood of two girls. The effects on the
number of children, boys, and girls are also consistent with these compositional changes.59
Next I analyze heterogeneity in the effects of Devirupak on the one-child outcomes by socio-
economic characteristics such as caste, religion, education, wealth, landownership, and employment
status (Table 1.9). Due to differential soil texture, agricultural employment in north India is
relatively unfavorable to female labor as shown by Carranza (2012). Consequently, I expect sons
59The woman fixed effects specification (2
′
) yields very similar results.
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to be more valuable to rural families that own agricultural land. Indeed, my results show that
rural families that own agricultural land experience a significant 2.2 percentage point increase in
the one-boy outcome and a decrease in the one-girl outcome. Das Gupta (1987) and others have
also emphasized the importance of caste-religious composition in explaining gender inequality in
north India. Jat Sikhs and Jat Hindus are the dominant owner-cultivator groups in Haryana and
Punjab and have historically exhibited the most imbalanced sex ratios. Since detailed caste data
is not available, I examine how religion and broadly-defined caste affiliation interact with other
characteristics such as landownership and wealth status to further explore heterogeneity in the
effects of Devirupak. Within rural landowners, I find an even stronger increase in the one-boy
outcome for Sikhs (3.6 percentage points) and a smaller but still highly significant increase for
Hindu landowners (1.6 percentage points). The likelihood of one-girl also declines for both these
groups. In addition, medium-SLI families, urban rich, and Hindus exhibit a significant increase
in the one-boy outcome. On the contrary, I find that the likelihood of one-girl has increased
significantly for landless, low-SLI, poor SC and rural poor households. These latter results suggest
that the one-girl incentives are effective only for the financially disadvantages families. However,
since these effects are relatively small in magnitude (0.7 - 0.9 percentage points), they do not
translate into a significant increase in the proportion of one-girl couples in Haryana.
In terms of education, I find that women who have 1-5 years of education are significantly
more likely to have only one boy and significantly less likely to have only one girl. The effects for
uneducated women or those with more than 5 years of education are positive but insignificant. In
terms of employment, I find that women who work outside the home as well as unemployed women
are more likely to have only one son, although the effect is larger and more significant for the former.
On the other hand, women who work from home or are self-employed do not exhibit a significant
change in the one-boy outcome. The coefficients for the one-girl outcome are insignificant for all
employment groups. These results are not surprising since the opportunity cost of child-bearing is
likely to be higher for women who are more educated and who work outside their home. They are
also more likely to be aware of and have easier access to ultrasound and abortion clinics.
Next I examine how my estimates vary by a woman’s self-reported “ideal” proportion of sons
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to further assess the role played by son preference in determining the effectiveness of incentives.60
Self-reports of the desired number of sons and daughters may be highly correlated with actual
fertility to avoid cognitive dissonance. Unfortunately, I only have access to ex-post information on
this variable from the year of survey since my dataset is a retrospective panel.61 Nevertheless, in
the absence of better alternate measures, recent literature (Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011))
has used reported number of ideal children and sons as proxies for fertility and son preference.
Only a negligible fraction of women in my sample would ideally remain childless, while most prefer
to have two children. Among women who desire at least one child, the average ideal proportion of
sons is greater than half, reflecting positive son preference. The results in Table 1.10 show that the
increased likelihood of the one-boy outcome is being driven by women who want more than half of
their children to be sons, further highlighting the role of son preference in explaining my findings.
1.6.5 Effects on Sterilization
Since the receipt of Devirupak’s benefits is conditional on the adoption of sterilization by either
the husband or the wife, next I examine its effect on sterilization rates. Sterilization is a widely
prevalent method of contraception in India and most couples who adopt this method do so at
an early age. An average woman is 26 years old, has 3.3 children, and 1.8 sons at the time of
sterilization.62 More than 80 percent of sterilized couples get operated before the wife is 30 years
old. Couples are less likely to become sterilized if they do not have sons – only 5 percent of sterilized
couples have no sons, whereas 19 percent have no daughters. The average gap between last birth
and sterilization is 1.6 months.
To the extent that couples start receiving the benefits only after they are sterilized, I expect
sterilization rates to increase and the interval between last birth and the operation to decrease
after Devirupak. However, if the risk of mortality for infants and children is high, couples may
60Ideal proportion of sons =
idealboys+(0.5∗idealeither)
idealkids
if idealkids > 0, where idealboys is the ideal number of boys,
idealeither is the ideal number of children of either sex, and idealkids is the ideal number of total children as reported
by a woman.
61DLHS questionnaires did not collect this information. NFHS-1 only reports the ideal number of children and not
their composition. NFHS-2,3 report both.
62All summary statistics in this section are based on NFHS data.
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now wait longer to ensure that their only child survives. The under-five child mortality rate in
Haryana is about 60 deaths per 1000 live births suggesting that the survival of an only child may
be an important concern for couples deciding on when to become sterilized. This is probably why
Devirupak allows couples to wait for up to five years from the birth of their last child before getting
operated, despite the fact that almost every sterilization procedure before 2002 took place within
a year of last birth.
I assess the effect of Devirupak on sterilization behavior by comparing women interviewed
before and after 2002 in Haryana, relative to other states, conditional on their child composition.
Instead of using the woman-year panel, now I have one observation per woman and four repeated
cross-sections. The first outcome variable I look at is an indicator for the woman being sterilized
at the time of survey. However, a small number of post-Devirupak years in my sample along
with a potentially longer waiting period before sterilization implies that an indicator variable for
sterilization status at the time of survey might not fully capture the effect of Devirupak’s incentives.
It also does not take advantage of the information on the year of sterilization that my data provides.
Therefore, in addition to the sterilization dummy, I construct a second outcome variable that
captures the length of a woman’s fertile period in years. If she is sterilized at the time of survey,
this variable is equal to the number of years between marriage and sterilization, otherwise it is equal
to her marital duration at the time of survey. If Devirupak increases the probability of sterilization
for couples with eligible child compositions, then women interviewed in Haryana after 2002 should
display a higher likelihood of being sterilized and a shorter fertile period as compared to similar
women interviewed before 2002 in Haryana, relative to other states.
To examine these effects, I estimate a DDD specification similar to (1). I divide women into
four groups based on their child composition at the time of survey: one boy only, one girl only, two
girls only and the rest. In addition to the triple-interaction terms, I include fixed effects for state-
group, group-age, year of survey, marital duration, state- and group-specific linear time trends,
and controls for socio-economic characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.11 suggest that
the number of fertile years decreases and the probability of sterilization increases for women in all
three “eligible” groups. One-boy couples surveyed in Haryana after 2002 are 3 percentage points
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more likely to be sterilized relative to the control group. Columns (3) - (5) show that these results
are robust to the exclusion of NFHS data, DLHS data, as well as pre-1995 years of survey.
1.6.6 Additional Results
According to Proposition 3(b), conditional on having a child in 2002, couples who stop child-bearing
have a weaker son preference or a higher cost of children, relative to those who become pregnant
again despite the risk of losing the one-child incentives. To test this prediction, I restrict my sample
to couples who had a child in period (t−3) and compare the characteristics of those who gave birth
again in period t with those who did not, separately by the sex of the first child, before and after
2002 in Haryana, relative to control states. Table 1.12 shows that women in Haryana who had one
child in (t − 3) and stop child-bearing after 2002 are less likely to belong to land-owning, rural,
high-caste, Hindu families relative to women who have another birth. On the other hand, they are
more likely to come from poor, rural, low-caste, Hindu families. Similarly, I find that couples who
stop after one child, irrespective of its sex, are more likely to be Muslim. In addition, they are
more likely to belong to poor SC and poor OBC households and less likely to come from rich SC
families. Together, these findings lend support to Proposition 3(b) and imply that the incentives
are less likely to be effective in reducing fertility and decreasing the sex ratio for socio-economic
groups with stronger son preference or lower cost of children who have already given birth to their
first child in the absence of incentives.
1.6.7 Robustness
I conduct a number of other robustness checks to further establish that my results can be interpreted
as the causal effects of Devirupak. One concern about my empirical strategy may be that states
like Delhi and Punjab are, for various reasons, not good control groups for Haryana, e.g. Delhi is
largely an urban state, while Punjab’s population is predominantly Sikh. Although I control for
several socio-economic characteristics that might systematically vary across states in all regressions,
to ensure that the inclusion of any particular control state is not driving my results, I re-estimate
all specifications by dropping one control state at a time. Table 1.13 presents the results from this
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exercise for specification (2
′
). I continue to find a significant increase in the one-boy outcome in
all columns except when Uttar Pradesh (UP) is dropped. Since UP is the most populous state
in India, I lose significance at conventional levels likely due to a large reduction in sample size.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient is still meaningful. Moreover, in all cases I still
observe a significant decrease in the number of girls and the total number of children.63 A similar
exercise for specification (1) in Table 1.14 reinforces my earlier findings.
Next I conduct two placebo tests by first reassigning the intervention to alternate control states
and then to pre-2002 years within Haryana. If my results are truly capturing the causal effect of
Devirupak, I should not find significant effects in these placebo regressions. Table 1.15 presents
the results from the first placebo test. Since these laws are fictitious, a significant “effect” at the 5
percent level may be found roughly 5 percent of the time i.e. in 2 out of 35 regressions in Table 1.15.
There are only 3 cells where I find significant effects in the same direction as my main results in
Table 1.6 - column(3), which seems reasonable. Similarly, when I reassign the intervention to an
alternate year before 2002 in Haryana (Table 1.16), I find mostly insignificant effects, especially
for the one-boy outcome. These tests also lend support to my DD estimation strategy and make a
causal interpretation more credible.
While the large time span of my dataset allows me to control for state and group-specific time
trends, a wider time window introduces the possibility that my estimates are capturing the effect
of other government programs that also target fertility and sex ratios. Since I include year fixed-
effects in all regressions, my results are not driven by any schemes implemented by the national
government in 2002. However, it is still possible that alternate schemes specific to a control state
are confounding my results. There are two reasons why this is unlikely. First, my sample includes
only years up to 2005 while most of the Devirupak-like programs in other states were introduced
after 2008 e.g. Punjab’s Balri Rakshak Yojana began in 2009. Secondly, I have already shown that
my results are robust to the exclusion of any particular control state.
I also check if my results remain robust when only NFHS data or DLHS data is used to address
concerns about the bias introduced by any unobserved differences in data collection, or small
63Specification (2) yields similar results that are available upon request.
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variations in the sampling methodology for NFHS and DLHS. In addition, my next robustness
check excludes years before 1995 from the sample to ensure that my results are not affected by (1)
an alternate scheme, Apni Beti Apna Dhan (APAD), implemented by the Government of Haryana
in 1994,64 and (2) the 1995 break-point in the long-term trend in the availability of PSDT mentioned
in Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010). Table 1.17 presents the results from these tests. My findings
remain the same.
So far, my analysis has used 2002 as the treatment year. However, Devirupak’s rules underwent
a revision in November 2003, so it is possible that 2003 is the more relevant cut-off for defining
the Post variable. To test this and to compare the effects before and after the revision, I define
2003 as the “transition” period and redefine Post as year > 2003. Then I re-estimate specifications
(2) and (2
′
) by including Hry ∗ Transition as an explanatory variable in addition to the redefined
Hry∗Post. Table 1.18 presents the results for specification (2′). Column (2) shows that couples are
significantly more likely to have only one son not just during the transition period, but also after
that. Similarly, the number of girls also decreases significantly during both periods. Estimation
using a probit instead of a linear probability model and inclusion of additional control states, the
2006 data from NFHS-3, and the DLHS-3 data yield very similar results that are available upon
request.
Lastly, I use the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie et al. (2010) to construct a synthetic-Haryana that best approximates the relevant char-
acteristics of Haryana during the pre-treatment period. I then use the post-intervention outcomes
for this synthetic control state to approximate the outcomes that would have been observed for
Haryana in the absence of Devirupak. My donor pool comprises 1765 major Indian states. In order
to conduct the analysis at an aggregate level, I collapse my individual-level panel data into a state-
year panel. The outcome variables are the proportion of couples who have only one boy, only one
64Sinha and Yoong (2009) examine APAD and conclude that it led to reductions in the sex ratio of living children.
APAD is substantially different from Devirupak. Under the former, there is no restriction on fertility or the number
of sons; couples who have both boys and girls are also eligible to receive benefits; the incentive amounts are smaller
and available only after the daughter has turned 18; eligibility is not conditional on sterilization; and the scheme
only targets below poverty line, SC and OBC families. As a result, the variation in incentives introduced by APAD
is uncorrelated with the variation induced by Devirupak.
65In terms of the current classification of states, these represent 20 states.
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girl, or only two girls. To predict the outcome variables at the state level, I use the average years
of schooling, age, and age at marriage for women along with the proportion of women who reside
in an urban area, are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, SC, ST, and who belong to low- and high-SLI
households. Table 1.19 displays the weights assigned to each control state in the construction of
synthetic-Haryana. As Figure 1.14 shows, synthetic-Haryana closely resembles Haryana in terms
of pre-2002 prevalence of various child compositions. The estimate of the effect of Devirupak
is given by the difference between the proportion of couples with a certain child composition in
Haryana and in its synthetic version after 2002. Similar to my earlier findings, there is a noticeable
divergence in the two lines after 2002 for the “only one boy” outcome, but not for the one or two
girls outcomes. This method also supports my conclusion that Haryana experienced an increase in
the share of one-boy couples after 2002.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper explores whether financial incentives can simultaneously decrease both fertility and the
sex ratio. My theoretical model shows that decisions about fertility and sex-selection depend not
just on the cost of children but also on the degree of son preference. When son preference is strong,
rewarding couples who have only one boy may increase the sex ratio through differential stopping
behavior and sex-selection at first and second parities, despite higher incentives for a girl relative to
a boy. I find, empirically, that this is indeed what happens in the case of Devirupak. The scheme
lowers fertility, but increases the sex ratio at birth.66 Thus, an understanding of the strength of
son preference in the society is crucial for the design of an optimal scheme.
This paper presents the first comprehensive analysis of a broadly-targeted financial incentives
program that attempts to induce parents to give up sons entirely by “compensating” them sub-
66It is worth pointing out that Devirupak is different from the One-Child Policy despite similar outcomes. The
One-Child Policy is aimed at lowering fertility and until the recent relaxations, it has not explicitly targeted the
sex ratio. In comparison, Devirupak proactively seeks to achieve both a one-child norm and a lower sex ratio. The
modified “1.5-Child Policy” allows parents of one girl to have a second child of either sex, which essentially shifts the
decision to sex-select from first to second parity while potentially increasing fertility. Under Devirupak, there are
no incentives for couples who have both a boy and a girl. The only way parents can have more than one child and
receive benefits is by having two daughters.
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stantially in return. I find that a subsidy worth ten months of average household consumption
expenditure is insufficient to achieve this objective in Haryana. My results have the following pol-
icy implications. First, the one-boy incentives being offered by Devirupak are sufficient to make
couples forgo unwanted daughters. Second, if a lower sex ratio is also desired, it may be prefer-
able to not incentivize couples to have only sons. Third, the targeting of such programs can be
improved. Since sex-selection is practiced more frequently by socio-economic groups that have a
strong preference for sons and a high cost of children, policies that attempt to alter the behavior
of these groups might be more successful.
More research is needed on the optimal design of incentives that can lower both fertility and
the sex ratio. Ultimately, the fertility-sex ratio trade-off will persist unless son preference weakens.
Das Gupta et al. (2003) suggest that the recent decline in sex ratios in South Korea can be explained
by a change in social norms. Even if optimal incentives are able to alter behavior in the short run,




Figure 1.1: Equilibrium in the absence of PSDT and incentives
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium with PSDT and without incentives
Figure 1.3: Timing of Survey Rounds
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Figure 1.4: Statewise Child (0-6) Sex Ratio in India - Treatment and Control States
NOTES: The left panel shows the state-wise distribution of the child (0-6) sex ratio using 2011 Census data. The
right panel shows Haryana and the control states included my sample.
Figure 1.5: Child (0-6) Sex Ratio in Haryana and Control States
NOTES: For control states, a simple average of state sex ratios has been plotted. Source: Census of India.
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Figure 1.6: Differential Trends in Child Composition, Haryana vs Non-Haryana, before and after
2002
NOTES: This figure plots the βk coefficients from the following regression, with 2002 as the omitted year:
Yisat =
∑2005
k=1976 βkHrys ∗ 1[Y eart = k] + X
′
i δ + γs + ωa + θt + isat. Dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 1.7: Differential Trends in Child Composition, Haryana vs Non-Haryana, before and after
2002
NOTES: Same as Figure 1.6.
1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Devirupak ’s Incentive Structure
Rupees per month Present Discounted Value
One girl (no boys) 500 ($10) $1800
One boy (no girls) 200 ($4) $715
Two girls (no boys) 200 ($4) $715
NOTES: The exchange rate used is $1 = Rs. 50. The present discounted value is calculated @ 3 percent per annum.
50
Figure 1.8: Months between First and Second Birth if First Child is a Boy
NOTES: This figure plots the distribution of the interval (in months) between a woman’s first two births if the first
child is a boy and is alive at the time of the second birth.
Table 1.2: Variation in Incentives by the Composition of Prior Living Children
Monthly benefits receivable upon sterilization if:
↓ Prior living No more births One more girl One more boy Two more girls
children (1) (2) (3) (4)
Childless 500 200 200
One girl 500 200
One boy 200
Two girls 200
NOTES: This table shows the monthly incentive receivable by couples who are childless (first row), have one girl
(second row), one boy (third row), or two girls (fourth row) if they become sterilized without any more births (1),
after giving birth to one more girl (2), one more boy (3), or two more girls (4). No benefits are available for couples
with any other child composition.
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Table 1.3: Sample Means Before and After Devirupak, 1976-2005
Non-Haryana Haryana
Post = 0 Post = 1 All Post = 0 Post = 1 All
Woman-Year Panel
Characteristics:
Wife’s age at survey 34.28 30.56 34.00 34.39 30.56 34.12
Husband’s age at survey 35.52 31.78 35.23 35.64 31.65 35.36
Wife’s age at marriage 16.93 17.47 16.98 17.40 17.87 17.43
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.22
Other Backward Castes (OBC) 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.29 0.28 0.29
Hindu 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.90
Muslim 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.04
Sikh 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Urban 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.30
Own agricultural land, if rural 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.56 0.49 0.56
Wife’s years of schooling 3.25 4.14 3.32 3.65 5.18 3.76
Husband’s years of schooling 6.56 7.14 6.60 7.12 7.94 7.18
Low HH Std of Living 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.18 0.13 0.18
Medium HH Std of living 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.45 0.47 0.45
High HH Std of Living 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.40 0.37
Woman employed 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.25 0.26
Works from home (if employed) 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.15
Self-employed (if employed) 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.09
Ideal number of children 2.79 2.42 2.76 2.56 2.25 2.54
Ideal number of boys 1.43 1.19 1.40 1.39 1.17 1.37
Ideal number of girls 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.93 0.86 0.92
Ideal proportion of boys 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.23
Outcome Variables:
Couple Sterilized 0.42 0.33 0.42 0.53 0.40 0.52
Birth dummy 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.21 0.10 0.20
# Living children 2.30 2.74 2.34 2.24 2.46 2.26
# Living sons 1.20 1.43 1.22 1.19 1.33 1.20
# Living daughters 1.10 1.31 1.12 1.05 1.13 1.06
Is Childless 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.14
Has only one boy 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11
Has only one girl 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09
Has only two girls 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Births only
Birth is male 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.54
Mother’s age at birth 22.79 23.99 22.83 22.24 22.90 22.26
N(women) 265,296 23,187
N(births) 718,200 28,356 746,556 57,793 1,977 59,770
NOTE: Post = 1 if year > 2002, and 0 otherwise. Means for OBC exclude NFHS-1 because no information is
available for this variable. The ideal number of children (reported by a woman), schooling, landownership, wealth
index, and sterilization rates are measured at the time of survey. The employment variables are from NFHS data.
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Table 1.4: Sample Means Before Devirupak, NFHS-2
Socio-economic Category Proportion of sons N # Living Children N
Rural Sikh Landowner 0.5781 658 2.25 718
Sikh 0.5716 1,452 2.36 1,608
Urban Poor 0.5616 648 3.10 722
Rural Rich 0.5556 1,783 2.34 2,020
Rich 0.5543 6,906 2.32 7,672
Urban Rich 0.5538 5,123 2.31 5,652
> 6 years of education 0.5532 7,124 1.94 8,279
Rich, Educated, High-caste, Urban Hindu 0.5510 2,494 1.96 2,751
High-caste 0.5496 12,279 2.63 13,651
Rural High-caste Hindu Landowner 0.5494 4,966 2.76 5,571
1-5 years of education 0.5460 3,783 2.79 4,212
OBC 0.5456 6,720 2.94 7,468
Hindu 0.5448 22,117 2.80 24,686
Rural Landowner 0.5447 13,066 2.90 14,692
Works outside home 0.5441 7,165 3.15 1,846
Employed by others 0.5437 7,590 3.13 8,271
Rural Landless 0.5427 4,676 3.06 5,158
SC 0.5424 4,764 3.03 5,355
Rich SC 0.5422 636 2.63 720
Uneducated 0.5410 14,727 3.29 16,089
Works from home 0.5330 1,665 3.00 1,846
Poor SC 0.5378 2,504 3.24 2,790
Poor 0.5359 10,845 3.18 12,078
Poor, Uneducated, SC, Rural Hindu 0.5347 1,905 3.39 2,098
Rural Poor 0.5342 10,197 3.18 11,356
Muslim 0.5281 2,146 3.43 2,390
ST 0.5235 2,280 3.05 2,578
NOTE: This table reports the sample averages for various socio-economic categories using NFHS-2 data for the 8
sample states. Rich and Poor stand for high and low-SLI, respectively. High-castes are those who are not SC, ST, or












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Effect of Devirupak on the Number of Children and their Sex Composition
Coefficients of Hry * Post
Overlap sub-sample
↓ Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Only one boy = 1 0.0061 0.0040** 0.0081** 0.0063* 0.0088***
[0.0036] [0.0019] [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0022]
Only one girl = 1 0.0037** 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0078** -0.0057***
[0.0013] [0.0010] [0.0034] [0.0032] [0.0017]
Only two girls = 1 -0.0037*** -0.0016* 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0007
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0017] [0.0013] [0.0013]
No children = 1 0.0044 0.0097** -0.0071 0.0056 0.0044
[0.0041] [0.0042] [0.0101] [0.0082] [0.0045]
Other compositions = 1 -0.0105* -0.0125*** -0.0009 -0.0040 -0.0068*
[0.0087] [0.0034] [0.0060] [0.0046] [0.0039]
Panel B
# Girls -0.1277** -0.0271** -0.0392** -0.0278* -0.0244**
[0.0428] [0.0117] [0.0153] [0.0150] [0.0119]
# Boys -0.0897* -0.0268** -0.0176 0.0047 -0.0056
[0.0432] [0.0086] [0.0152] [0.0117] [0.0082]
# Children -0.2174** -0.0539** -0.0568* -0.0232 -0.0300
[0.0859] [0.0198] [0.0303] [0.0261] [0.0188]
Year FE x x x x x
State FE x x x
Age FE x x x x
Covariates x x
State Trends x x x x
Woman FE x x
N 3,723,443 3,723,443 3,726,289 1,786,395 1,786,001
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specifications (2) and (2
′
). Each cell corresponds to a different
regression. Overlap sub-sample refers to women who were interviewed after, but were married before 2002. The most
conservative cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. Other variables as defined in Table 1.5. *** 1%, ** 5%,
* 10%.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Devirupak on the Timing of First and Second Births
A. Years b/w Marriage & 1st birth = 0 1 2 3
Hry ∗ Post -0.0298** 0.0432** -0.0131 -0.0034
[0.0132] [0.0182] [0.0122] [0.0095]
N 220,159 220,159 220,159 220,159
A1. Drop if Y OM 6 2002 & Y OB > 2002
Hry ∗ Post -0.0231 0.0047 0.0297** 0.0119*
[0.0165] [0.0105] [0.0108] [0.0060]
N 214,478 214,478 214,478 214,478
B. Months b/w 1st & 2nd births = 9-12 12-24 24-36 36-48
Hry ∗ Post -0.0127* 0.0297* 0.0338 -0.0225
[0.0055] [0.0131] [0.0269] [0.0195]
N 1,68,340 1,68,340 1,68,340 1,68,340
B1. 1st birth is male
Hry ∗ Post -0.0093* 0.0429* 0.0368 -0.0141
[0.0055] [0.0221] [0.0342] [0.0153]
N 85,680 85,680 85,680 85,680
B2. 1st birth is female
Hry ∗ Post -0.0161* 0.0188 0.0303 -0.0326
[0.0090] [0.0128] [0.0229] [0.0290]
N 82,660 82,660 82,660 82,660
State FE x x x x
Year FE x x x x
Covariates x x x x
Age at Marriage FE x x x x
Age at 1st birth FE x x x x
State Trends x x x x
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specification (2). The most conservative cluster-robust standard
errors are in brackets. Other variables as defined in Table 1.5. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 1.8: Effect of Devirupak on Child Composition, by Woman’s Age
Woman’s age in years: 6 20 21-25 26-30 30-44
Coefficients of Hry * Post
↓ Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Only one boy = 1 0.0052 0.0102** -0.0030 -0.0016
[0.0071] [0.0037] [0.0028] [0.0012]
Only one girl = 1 -0.0075 -0.0010 0.0024 0.0043**
[0.0067] [0.0034] [0.0016] [0.0004]
Only two girls = 1 -0.0048* 0.0016 -0.0080** -0.0005
[0.0022] [0.0024] [0.0019] [0.0005]
No Children = 1 0.0396* 0.0022 -0.0010 -0.0016*
[0.0156] [0.0062] [0.0017] [0.0008]
Other Compositions = 1 -0.0326** -0.0130 0.0096+ -0.0006
[0.0076] 0.0080] [0.0045] [0.0011]
# Girls -0.0404** -0.0187* 0.0226 0.0221
[0.0129] [0.0077] [0.0165] [0.0175]
# Boys -0.0437** 0.0040 0.0410* -0.0040
[0.0142] [0.0120] [0.0165] [0.0080]
# Children -0.0841** -0.0147 0.0636* 0.0181
[0.0252] [0.0165] [0.0274] [0.0218]
N 909,095 1,085,109 836,377 892,862
State FE x x x x
Year FE x x x x
Covariates x x x x
Age FE x x x x
State Trends x x x x
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specification (2). The most conservative cluster-robust standard






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.10: Effect of Devirupak, by Ideal Proportion of Sons Reported at Survey
Ideal Proportion of Sons
↓ Dependent Variables 6 0.5 > 0.5
Only one boy = 1 -0.0013 0.0225**
[0.0033] [0.0080]
Only one girl = 1 -0.0108** 0.0058
[0.0040] [0.0082]
Only two Girls = 1 -0.0066** -0.0034
[0.0020] [0.0037]
No children = 1 0.0235** -0.0189**
[0.0053] [0.0051]
Other compositions =1 -0.0049 -0.0060
[0.0044] [0.0101]
N 433,356 252,817
State FE x x
Year FE x x
Covariates x x
Age FE x x
State Trends x x
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specification (2). Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.
Sample is restricted to NFHS-2,3. Ideal proportion of sons =
idealboys+(0.5∗idealeither)
idealkids
if idealkids > 0, where idealboys
is the ideal number of boys, idealeither is the ideal number of children of either sex, and idealkids is the ideal number
of total children, as reported by a woman. The most conservative cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets.
Other variables as defined in Table 1.5. ** 1%, * 5%, + 10%.
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Table 1.11: Effect of Devirupak on Sterilization and the Number of Fertile Years
Sterilized = 1
# Fertile Years All NFHS only DLHS only Y OS > 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hry*Post*One Boy -0.0603+ 0.0302** 0.0127 0.0398** 0.0131*
[0.0348] [0.0035] [0.0090] [0.0094] [0.0056]
Hry*Post*One Girl -0.0890* 0.0290** 0.0307* 0.0419** 0.0193**
[0.0333] [0.0051] [0.0114] [0.0126] [0.0051]
Hry*Post*Two Girls -0.1998** 0.0203** 0.0206* 0.0310** 0.0049
[0.0355] [0.0030] [0.0097] [0.0064] [0.0041]
N 247,669 247,669 74,021 173,648 221,192
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients from a version of specification (1) estimated using repeated cross-sections
of women. The number of fertile years is equal to the marital duration until survey for unsterilized women, and equal
to the marital duration until sterilization for sterilized women. Y OS stands for the year of survey. Each column
corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions control for state trends, group trends, covariates, and fixed
effects for state x group, age x group, Y OS, and marital duration. The most conservative cluster-robust standard
errors are in brackets. Post = 1 if year of survey > 2002, and zero otherwise. Other variables as defined in Table
1.5. ** 1%, * 5%, + 10%.
Table 1.12: Differences in Characteristics of Couples Who Stop After One Child and Those Who
Do Not
Dependent Variable 1st child is a girl 1st child is a boy
Woman is - Hry ∗ Post ∗ Stop Hry ∗ Post Hry ∗ Post ∗ Stop Hry ∗ Post
Poor, Rural, SC, Hindu 0.0252*** -0.0077 0.0194*** -0.0100
[0.0038] [0.0069] [0.0066] [0.0093]
Land-owning, Rural, High-caste, Hindu -0.0163+ 0.0128 -0.0220* 0.0268
[0.0087] [0.0151] [0.0110] [0.0194]
Muslim 0.0154** -0.0175** 0.0207** -0.0115*
[0.0039] [0.0046] [0.0038] [0.0054]
Poor SC 0.0160** 0.0021 0.0044 0.0040
[0.0025] [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0043]
Rich SC -0.0237** 0.0005 -0.0128** 0.0160**
[0.0061] [0.0051] [0.0048] [0.0049]
Poor OBC 0.0137*** -0.0145** 0.0157*** -0.0140
[0.0030] [0.0057] [0.0044] [0.0091]
N 285,261 328,890
NOTES: This table reports the DD and DDD coefficients from a version of specification (2). The most conservative
cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. The main effect of Stop is included, but not reported. Other variables
as defined in Table 1.5. ** 1%, * 5%, + 10%.
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1.10 Appendix A: Devirupak ’s Rules before November 2003
Under the original set of rules, couples were divided into two categories: i) those married before
Devirupak, i.e. before September 25, 2002, had to register their intent to undergo sterilization before
January 26, 2003 in order to be eligible; and ii) couples married on or after September 25, 2002 had
to register and state that their first child would not be born before two years of marriage and that
their second child would not be born until two years after the birth of their first daughter. This
condition was aimed at increasing the space between births. In addition, the couple was required to
undergo sterilization immediately after birth in order to receive benefits. If the beneficiary couple
underwent re-canalization for whatever reason, they were required to refund the benefits received
until then, along with interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum. These rules were revised in
November 2003 in order to make the scheme simpler. Under the new set of rules, eligibility does
not depend on the year of marriage or birth spacing.
1.11 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Since the maximum number of pregnancies is two, a couple has three
choices: zero, one or two children. I solve for the equilibrium by backward induction. Conditional
on having one child, a couple can either choose to stop child-bearing (Stop) or have a second child
(Birth). The difference between utility from Birth and Stop is independent of the sex of their first
child, and is given by:
∆U = U(Birth)− U(Stop) = 0.5 + 0.5δ − c
If δ > 2c− 1, then U(Birth) > U(Stop). Otherwise, Stop is preferred over Birth.
Since δ > 1 and c > 0, there are three possible scenarios:
Case 1: c 6 1 =⇒ 2c− 1 6 1 6 δ =⇒ ∆U > 0.
Case 2: c > 1 and δ > 2c− 1 =⇒ ∆U > 0.
Case 3: c > 1 and δ < 2c− 1 =⇒ ∆U < 0.
The same choices are optimal at the first decision node, i.e. the decision about the first pregnancy.
In equilibrium, Case 3 couples have no children and the rest have two children. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let U(Stop) denote utility if a couple stops child-bearing after their
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first pregnancy. Utility from a second pregnancy with and without an ultrasound test is given by:
U(US) = U(Stop) + 0.5(δ − ca − c)− cu (1.4)
U(NoUS) = U(Stop)− c+ (1 + δ)/2 (1.5)
If δ > c+ c
′
s, then US  Stop. If δ > 2c− 1, then No US  Stop. If c < 1 + c
′
s, then No US  US.
Case 1: c 6 1 =⇒ c < 1 + c′s =⇒ No US  US. Also, c 6 1 =⇒ 2c − 1 6 1 6 δ =⇒ No
US & Stop. These couples choose a second pregnancy with US.
Case 2: 1 < c 6 1 + c′s =⇒ No US & US. If δ > 2c− 1 > 1, they choose a second pregnancy
without US and if δ 6 2c− 1, they stop child-bearing.
Case 3: c > 1 + c
′
s =⇒ US  No US. If δ > c+ c
′
s, they choose a second pregnancy with US
and if δ 6 c+ cs, they stop child-bearing.
The same choices are optimal at the first decision node i.e. the decision about the first pregnancy.
Thus, couples in Case 1 choose two pregnancies without US. In Case 2, δ < 2c − 1 couples never
become pregnant, and the remaining choose two pregnancies without US. In Case 3, couples with
δ 6 c+ cs never become pregnant and those with δ > c+ c
′
s choose two pregnancies with US. 
Proof of Proposition 3: This proof has two parts. Part 1 analyzes the effect of Devirupak on
couples who had one boy in 2002. Part 2 examines couples who had one girl in 2002.
Part 1: One-boy couples
Three types of couples can possibly have one boy (and no girl) when the scheme starts:
Type A: c 6 1
Type B: 1 < c 6 1 + c′s and δ > 2c− 1
Type C: c > 1 + c
′
s and δ > c+ c
′
s.
In the absence of the scheme, all three types would have chosen a second pregnancy – Types
A and B without US and Type C with US. After the scheme, they face the same three choices
as earlier, but with incentives. Let f(X) denote the present discounted value of Rs. X per month
for 20 years. The additional utility from each option, conditional on already having a boy, is as
follows:
∆U(US) = −cu + 0.5(−ca + f(200)) + 0.5(δ − c)
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∆U(noUS) = 0.5 + 0.5δ − c
∆U(Stop) = f(200)
If c > 1 + c
′
s − f(200), then US  No US. If δ < 2c − 1 + 2f(200), then Stop  No US. If
δ < c+ c
′
s + f(200), then Stop  US.
For Type C couples, US  No US even after the incentives. But those with c + c′s < δ <
c+ c
′
s + f(200) will switch from US to Stop. The remaining Type C couples will continue with US
as before. Thus, for Type C couples as a whole, fertility and the number of sons decrease.
The proportion of sons remains the same (equal to 1) since they were going to have only
boys even without the incentives.
For Types A and B, there are two scenarios:
Case 1: 1 + c
′
s − f(200) < 1, i.e. c
′
s < f(200). Type A couples with c < 1 + c
′
s − f(200)
still prefer no US to US. They Stop if δ < 2c − 1 + 2f(200), otherwise continue with no US
as before. Type A couples with 1 + c
′
s − f(200) < c < 1 prefer US over no US. They Stop if
δ < c + c
′
s + f(200), otherwise choose US. Similarly, for all Type B couples, US  No US. They
Stop if δ < c+ c
′
s + f(200), otherwise opt for US. Thus, some Type A and all Type B change their
optimal strategy. Fertility falls and the proportion of sons rises for both Types A and
B. Moreover, their second child is more likely to be a boy because some of them now
opt for US.
Case 2: 1 + c
′
s − f(200) > 1, i.e. c
′
s > f(200). In this case, all Type A couples still prefer no
US to US. If δ < 2c− 1 + 2f(200), they Stop, otherwise continue with no US as before. For Type
B couples with 1 < c < 1 + c
′
s − f(200), no US is preferred over US. If δ > 2c− 1 + 2f(200), they
continue with no US. However, if 2c−1 < δ < 2c−1+2f(200), they Stop. For the remaining Type
B couples, US is now preferred over no US ; they Stop if δ < c+ c
′
s + f(200), otherwise choose US.
Fertility falls and the proportion of sons rises for both Types A and B. Moreover, the
second child for Type B couples is more likely to be a boy because some of them now
choose US.
These findings can be summarized as follows:
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Type Fertility Proportion of sons 2nd birth is male
c
′
s < f(200) c
′
s > f(200)
A – + + No change
B – + + +
C – No change No change
Figure 1.9 illustrates the new equilibrium choices. Couples in the yellow region stop child-
bearing after the scheme, i.e. fertility declines for them. Their proportion of sons increases since
some of them were earlier following a no US strategy and may have had a girl. Couples in the blue
region switch from no US to US for their second pregnancy. For them, fertility decreases and their
second child is more likely to be a boy, i.e. the proportion of sons rises. The remaining couples
with one boy continue with their original strategy.
In both Cases 1 and 2, the incentive increases the probability that couples who had one boy in
2002 stop child-bearing. Moreover, it encourages some high son preference couples to switch from
no US to US in case of a second pregnancy. This is because the incentive reduces the net cost
of selection. Both these effects are stronger when f(200) is larger relative to c
′
s. Moreover, larger
incentives for one child or a higher utility from incentives (if couples varied in terms of marginal
utility of income), decrease the likelihood of a second pregnancy, for given cost parameters and son
preference.
How do couples who stop child-bearing differ from those who become pregnant again? Within
Type C, those with δ < c+ c
′
s + f(200) stop and the rest become pregnant again. Thus, for a given
c (and c
′
s), couples who have a second birth will have a stronger son preference than those who
choose Stop. The same is true for Types A and B. 
Part 2: One-girl couples
Two types of couples can possibly have one girl when the scheme starts:
Type A: c < 1
Type B: 1 < c < 1 + c
′
s and δ > 2c− 1
In the absence of incentives, both types would have chosen a second pregnancy without US. The
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Figure 1.9: Effect on couples who had one son and no daughters in 2002
NOTES: Couples in the yellow region stop child-bearing. Those in blue have a second child, who is more likely to be
male than in the absence of incentives. For expositional purposes, the left panel has been drawn under the assumption
that 1 > f(200)− c′s and the right panel assumes that 1 > f(200). However, neither is necessary for Proposition 3.
additional utility from the three available choices, conditional on already having a girl, is as follows:
∆U(Stop) = f(500)
∆U(US) = −cu + 0.5(δ − c) + 0.5(−ca + f(500))
∆U(noUS) = 0.5 + 0.5δ − c
If c > 1 + c
′
s − f(500), then US  No US. If δ < 2c − 1 + 2f(500), then Stop  No US. If
δ < c+ c
′
s + f(500), then Stop  US.
Case 1: 1+c
′
s−f(500) < 1, i.e. c
′
s < f(500). If c < 1+c
′
s−f(500), No US  US. Stop is chosen
if δ < 2c− 1 + 2f(500), otherwise Type A couples continue with No US. If 1 + c′s− f(500) < c < 1,
US  no US. These Type A couples choose Stop if δ < c + c′s + f(500), otherwise they switch to
US. Type B couples also prefer US to no US now, and choose Stop if 2c− 1 < δ < c+ c′s + f(500),
and otherwise switch to US. Note that stopping at one girl implies a decrease in the proportion of
sons because these couples were following a no US strategy earlier. Fertility decreases for both
types. The proportion of sons declines for some Type A couples (c < 1 + c
′
s − f(500)),
but the effect is ambiguous for the remaining Type A couples (1 + c
′
s − f(500) < c < 1)
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and all Type B couples. This is because the couples who choose Stop experience a decline in the
proportion of sons, but those who have a second child with US have a larger proportion of sons.
Case 2: 1 + c
′
s − f(500) > 1, i.e. c
′
s > f(500). For Type A couples, No US  US. They choose
to Stop if δ < 2c− 1 + 2f(500), otherwise they continue with No US. The same holds for Type B
couples with c < 1 + c
′
s − f(500). But Type B couples with c > 1 + c
′
s − f(500) now prefer US
over No US. They Stop if δ < c+ c
′
s + f(500), otherwise change to US. Fertility decreases for
both types. The proportion of sons declines for Type A, but the effect is ambiguous
for Type B couples.
These findings can be summarized as follows:
Type Fertility Proportion of sons 2nd birth is male
c
′
s < f(500) c
′
s > f(500) c
′
s < f(500) c
′
s > f(500)
A – +/– – + No change
B – +/– +
Figure 1.10 illustrates the new equilibrium choices for one-girl couples. Those in the yellow
region stop child-bearing, i.e. fertility declines for them. Couples in the blue region were earlier
going to have a second child without US, but now opt for an US. For them, fertility decreases and
their second child is more likely to be a boy. 
Figure 1.10: Effect on couples who had one daughter and no sons in 2002
NOTES: Couples in the yellow region stop child-bearing. Those in the blue region have a second child who is more
likely to be male than in the absence of incentives.
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Who is more affected? One-boy versus one-girl couples
In Figure 1.11, couples in the yellow area stop child-bearing due to the incentives irrespective
of the sex of their first child. Those in the red area stop if they already have a girl when the scheme
starts, but not if they have a boy. Since both these groups were following a no US policy, they
are equally likely to have a boy or a girl in 2002. Thus, their fertility and the sex ratio decrease
and the likelihood that they have only one girl rises. Couples in the blue area stop child-bearing at
one boy. However, the one-girl incentives are inconsequential for them since their optimal choice
is to only have boys. Thus, their fertility declines and the likelihood that they have only one boy
increases, but there is no effect on their sex ratio. If the society mostly comprises high δ - high c
couples, it is possible that the dominant effect is an increase in the proportion of one-boy couples,
among those who had one child when the scheme began.
Figure 1.11: Likelihood of second birth Figure 1.12: Sex of second birth
Proof of Proposition 4: In the absence of incentives, childless women who previously had
one abortion (c > 1 + c
′
s and δ > c+ c
′
s for them) would have continued with their US strategy. As
a result, they would have either remained childless or had a boy at the end of their fertile period.
After Devirupak, their utilities from the three options are:
∆U(Stop) = 0
∆U(US) = −cu + 0.5(δ − c+ f(200))− 0.5ca
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∆U(noUS) = 0.5(δ + f(200)) + 0.5(1 + f(500))− c
Since δ > c+ c
′
s− f(200) for these couples, US  Stop. If c > 1 + c
′
s + f(500), US  No US. Thus,
couples with 1 + c
′
s < c < 1 + c
′
s + f(500) switch from US to no US. They are now less likely to
remain childless and more likely to have a daughter than earlier. Figure 1.13 indicates them in
blue. 
Figure 1.13: Effect of Incentives on Childless Couples with a Previous Abortion
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1.12 Appendix C: Additional Tables and Figures
Table 1.13: Robustness Check: Control States Excluded (DD)
Control State Excluded
HP MP UP Punjab Rajasthan Delhi Gujarat All
Dependent Variables ↓ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Only one boy = 1 0.0084** 0.0089** 0.0054 0.0090** 0.0077* 0.0084** 0.0084** 0.0081**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.0038]
Only one girl = 1 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0009
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.0034]
Only two girls = 1 0.0008 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0005 0.0009 0.001 0.0007
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.0017]
No children = 1 -0.0081 -0.0115 0.0017 -0.0075 -0.0059 -0.0084 -0.0082 -0.0071
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.0101]
Other compositions = 1 -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0041 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0009
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.0060]
# Girls -0.0375** -0.0409*** -0.0417*** -0.0403** -0.0391** -0.0393** -0.0370** -0.0392**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.0153]
# Boys -0.015 -0.0195 -0.0208 -0.018 -0.019 -0.0177 -0.0144 -0.0176
[0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.0152]
# Children -0.0525* -0.0603* -0.0625** -0.0583* -0.0581* -0.0570* -0.0514* -0.0568*
[0.031] [0.031] [0.027] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.0303]
N 3,541,365 2,923,437 2,589,858 3,455,069 3,207,381 3,567,661 3,368,726 3,726,289
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specification (2
′
) when control states are excluded one at a time.
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression. The most conservative cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.15: Placebo Test: Reassign Intervention to Alternate States (DD)
Dependent Variables → No Children = 1 One boy = 1 One girl = 1 Two girls = 1 Other compositions = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HP ∗ Post -0.0179 0.0027 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0152+
[0.014] [0.008] [0.007] [0.002] [0.008]
MP ∗ Post -0.0163 0.0022 0.0042 0.0018 0.0081
[0.010] [0.006] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006]
UP ∗ Post 0.0267* -0.0091 -0.0059 -0.0027 -0.0089
[0.011] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006]
Punjab ∗ Post -0.0047 0.0105+ 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0074
[0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.001] [0.008]
Rajasthan ∗ Post 0.0082 -0.0022 0.0021 -0.002 -0.0061
[0.009] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004]
Delhi ∗ Post -0.0277+ 0.0029 0.0035 0.0032+ 0.0181**
[0.016] [0.010] [0.008] [0.002] [0.006]
Gujarat ∗ Post -0.0106 0.0027 0.0011 0.0028* 0.0039
[0.009] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005]
N 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients for State ∗ Post from specification (2′) where State is an indicator for
residence in a comparison state. Each cell corresponds to a separate regression. The most conservative cluster-robust
standard errors are in brackets. Other variables as defined in Table 1.5. Post = 1 if year > 2002, and zero otherwise.
** 1%, * 5%, + 10%.
Table 1.16: Placebo Test: Reassign Intervention to Alternate Years (DD)
Dependent Variables → No Children = 1 One boy = 1 One girl = 1 Two girls = 1 Other compositions = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hry ∗ Post1991 0.0005 -0.0061** -0.0012 0.0016 0.0052
[0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008]
Hry ∗ Post1992 0.0034 -0.0028 0.0003 0.0015 -0.0025
[0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007]
Hry ∗ Post1993 0.0062 -0.0029 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0053
[0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008]
Hry ∗ Post1994 0.0106 -0.0016 0.0007 -0.000 -0.0097
[0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007]
Hry ∗ Post1995 0.0123 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0108
[0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008]
Hry ∗ Post1996 0.0160* -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0003 -0.0103
[0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008]
Hry ∗ Post1997 0.0173* -0.0013 -0.0029 -0.0019 -0.0112
[0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007]
Hry ∗ Post1998 0.0156* 0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0123*
[0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006]
Hry ∗ Post1999 0.0118 0.0026 -0.002 -0.0018 -0.0106*
[0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005]
N 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specification (2
′
). Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.
The most conservative cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. PostT = 1 if year > T , and zero otherwise.
Other variables as defined in Table 1.5. ** 1%, * 5%, + 10%.
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Table 1.17: Effect of Devirupak Using Alternate Sub-samples of Data (DD)
Dependent Variables ↓ NFHS only DLHS only Year>1995
(1) (2) (3)
No Children = 1 0.0009 -0.0106 -0.0170**
[0.0131] [0.0108] [0.0062]
One boy = 1 0.0169** 0.0059* 0.0072**
[0.0064] [0.0023] [0.0013]
One girl = 1 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0004
[0.0065] [0.0038] [0.0046]
Two girls = 1 -0.0051* 0.0025 0.0025
[0.0024] [0.0018] [0.0015]
Other compositions = 1 -0.0128+ 0.0032 0.0069
[0.0064] [0.0065] [0.0042]
N 1,059,937 2,666,352 1,898,671
NOTES: This table reports the DD coefficients from specification (2
′
). Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.
Post = 1 if year of survey > 2003, and zero otherwise. Other variables as defined in Table 1.5. ** 1%, * 5%, + 10%.
Table 1.18: Effect of Devirupak Using Different Cut-off Dates
Dependent Variables → No children One Boy One Girl Two Girls Rest # Children # Girls # Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hry ∗ Post ∗ Transition -0.0055 0.0077** -0.0012 0.00002 -0.001 -0.0659** -0.0442*** -0.0218
[0.0102] [0.0039] [0.0038] [0.0016] [0.0056] [0.0290] [0.0148] [0.0144]
Hry ∗ Post -0.0084 0.0085** -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0487 -0.0349** -0.0138
[0.0116] [0.0042] [0.0037] [0.0018] [0.0068] [0.0328] [0.0162] [0.0169]
N 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289 3,726,289
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients for a version of specification (2
′
). Each column corresponds to a separate
regression. Transition indicates the year 2003. Post = 1 if year of survey > 2003, and zero otherwise. Other
variables as defined in Table 1.5. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 1.19: State Weights in Synthetic-Haryana
Weight for outcome variable
State One boy only One girl only Two girls only
Andhra Pradesh 0 0 0
Assam 0 0 0
Bihar 0 0 0
Delhi 0 0.070 0.011
Gujarat 0 0 0
Himachal Pradesh 0.081 0.057 0
Jammu & Kashmir 0 0 0
Karnataka 0 0 0
Kerala 0 0 0
Maharashtra 0 0 0
Madhya Pradesh 0 0 0
Orissa 0 0 0
Punjab 0.106 0.231 0.510
Rajasthan 0 0.636 0.197
Tamil Nadu 0.016 0 0
Uttar Pradesh 0.798 0.006 0.282
West Bengal 0 0 0
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Figure 1.14: Trends in Child Composition, Haryana vs Synthetic-Haryana, before and after 2002
NOTES: This figure displays the likelihood of various child compositions in Haryana and its synthetic counterpart
during the period 1991-2005. The outcome variables are the share of women who report having only one boy, only
one girl, and only two girls in any state-year. The predictor variables are average years of schooling, age, and age at
marriage for women, along with the proportion of women who reside in an urban area, are Hindu, Muslim, Christian,
SC, ST, and who belong to low- and high-SLI households. The corresponding weights assigned to each state in the
donor pool are reported in Table 1.19.
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Chapter 2
Tariff Reform, Fertility, and Child
Survival
S Anukriti and Todd J. Kumler1
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also thank David Blakeslee, Ritam Chaurey, Pierre-Andre´ Chiappori, Lena Edlund, Eric Edmonds, Naihobe Gonzalez,
Amit Khandelwal, Brian Kovak, Corinne Low, Dilip Mookherjee, Arvind Panagariya, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Debraj
Ray, Bernard Salanie´, Rohini Somanathan, Hyelim Son, Christine Valente, and Eric Verhoogen for their valuable
comments. This paper benefitted greatly from presentations at the 2012 Population Association of America Annual
Meetings, the 2011 NEUDC Conference, the Delhi School of Economics, and Columbia University.
2.1 Introduction
Several developing countries, including India, have increasingly become more open to international
trade. While theory predicts that free trade enhances total welfare, trade liberalization can also
result in short- and medium-term adjustment costs. In particular, workers in formerly-protected
industries may face lower wages or reduced employment opportunities as the economy reallocates
across regions and sectors in response to trade liberalization. The removal of tariff barriers in India
in 1991 has been shown to cause slower reductions in poverty in affected rural districts (Topalova
(2010)). As a result, these districts also experienced slower improvements in children’s schooling
and smaller declines in child labor (Edmonds et al. (2010)). Our study examines whether changes
in trade policy also affect fertility behavior and investment in children’s health.
India’s trade liberalization in the early 1990s provides a good context for such an exercise.
The policy reform was externally imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response
to a severe balance of payments crisis, which we argue was an exogenous shock to industry-level
tariffs in India. Moreover, the resulting changes in tariff- and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were quite
large in magnitude. In the manufacturing sector, the average tariff declined from 117 percent to
39 percent and the share of imports covered by NTBs fell from 82 percent to 17 percent between
1990-1991 and 1999-2000 (Gupta and Kumar (2008)). Following an identification strategy used
by Topalova (2010) and others, we exploit heterogeneity in the pre-reform industrial composition
of Indian districts, combined with differences in tariff cuts by industry, to identify districts that
were more or less exposed to trade liberalization. We then estimate the effect of this differential
exposure on fertility, sex ratios at birth, and infant mortality.
There are several channels through which trade liberalization can affect fertility and child health
outcomes. Standard of living is the most obvious one. Topalova (2010) finds evidence for a relative
decrease in wages in impacted industries and a relative increase in poverty in Indian districts more
exposed to trade reform.2 To the extent that negative income shocks and poverty are linked to
investments in children’s health3 and parents’ decisions about the number and the sex-composition
2Although, using state-level data, Hasan et al. (2006-07) conclude that greater exposure to trade openness is not
associated with slower reduction in poverty in rural India. For a more detailed discussion, we refer the reader to
Topalova (2010).
3See, for example, Strauss and Thomas (1998), Strauss and Thomas (2008), Case (2001), Case (2004) for South
Africa, Paxson and Schady (2005) for Peru.
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of their children (see, for instance, Edlund and Lee (2009) and Chung and Gupta (2007)), we
expect the adjustment costs associated with tariff cuts to influence fertility decisions. Secondly,
more open trade may influence relative commodity prices in an economy and, hence, consumption
levels (Porto (2007)). Changes in the amount and the type of food (and nutrients) consumed
by the mother and her children due to differences in dietary preferences across districts could
affect child health outcomes, in general, and infant mortality, in particular (Cutler et al. (2006)).
Additionally, structural adjustments resulting from trade liberalization may change the relative
demand for female labor (Katz and Murphy (1992), Kucera (2001), and Kucera and Milberg (2000)),
or the gender wage gap (Wood (1991) and Black and Brainerd (2004)) and, thus, influence fertility
through the female labor force participation channel. Similarly, if parents’ decisions about the
sex-composition of children are influenced by the relative economic values, any effect of trade
liberalization on the demand for female labor could also influence the sex ratio at birth (Qian
(2008)).
Using retrospective birth histories, we find that the effects of tariff reform differ by socio-
economic status. Lower-caste, uneducated, and less wealthy women are significantly more likely to
give birth in districts that are relatively more exposed to tariff declines. These births are also more
likely to be female. Moreover, they are significantly less likely to die within one, six, and twelve
months of birth. On the other hand, mortality for girls born to upper-caste, more educated, and
wealthier mothers increases significantly. These high-status women are also less likely to give birth
and more likely to give birth to boys, but the effects are not as strong as the mortality results.
Based on the evidence from recent empirical literature about the effects of trade liberalization,
we distinguish between three potential mechanisms that could explain our findings - relative increase
in poverty, gains in relative female bargaining power, and higher returns (to parents) from daughters
relative to sons due to better economic opportunities. Our findings suggest that parents from
socially disadvantaged groups are investing more in daughters in two ways. First, they exhibit a
greater relative demand for daughters, which results in more girls being born, likely due to reduced
use of sex-selective abortions. Secondly, they take better care of the daughters – conditional on
being born, infant mortality for low-status girls decreases. Low-status boys do not benefit equally
either because their potential earning opportunities have not increased as much, or due to limited
occupational mobility for low-status men (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009)). It is possible that
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low-status parents strategically choose not to over-invest in their sons so that they continue to
participate in the traditional occupational networks of lower-caste men (Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2006)).
Our paper contributes to a large empirical literature4 that examines the costs and the benefits
of freer trade and a smaller one that focuses on the Indian experience.5 Most papers in the field of
international economics have focused on the effects of liberalization on outcomes such as produc-
tivity, industrial composition, and wage inequality. However, it is equally important to examine
the implications of these macroeconomic changes for individuals’ decisions about fertility and in-
vestments in health and human capital to develop a broader understanding of the distributional
effects of more open trade. Despite methodological shortcomings, existing literature suggests that
trade openness has not unambiguously benefited everyone (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007a)). Any
resulting differential effects on fertility and child health outcomes can potentially play an important
role in exacerbating or combating socio-economic inequalities. Our paper is also related to a vast
literature on the determinants of child well-being and the sex-composition of children in developing
countries.6 Lastly, our ability to control for state-specific time trends and mother fixed-effects in
the regression analysis makes our identification more robust than previous literature on the effects
of tariff reform on household and individual outcomes.
In Section 2, we provide a brief summary of the Indian trade reform. In Section 3, we outline
our empirical methodology and describe the data. Section 4 presents the empirical estimates of the
relationship between tariffs and various outcomes of interest. Section 5 discusses the underlying
mechanisms and Section 6 concludes the paper.
4Trefler (2004) on the United States and Canada, Hanson (2007) on Mexico, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007b) on
Colombia, and Kovak (2012) on Brazil, and the following review papers: Tybout (2003), Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2007a), and Harrison et al. (2011).
5Edmonds et al. (2010), Topalova (2010), Hasan et al. (2009), and Hasan et al. (2006-07).
6Since beginning work on this paper, we have become aware of another study, Chakraborty (2012), analyzing
the impact of the Indian trade liberalization on sex ratios in India. Our paper differs from hers in a number of
ways. First, she uses birth histories from the 1999 National Family Health Survey of India (NFHS), a much smaller
dataset than ours, the 2002-2004 District-Level Household Survey of India (DLHS). Second, while her measure of
trade exposure is similar to ours, she only includes tariffs in the manufacturing sector; we include tariffs in all traded
industries, including agriculture, the main sector of employment for rural India. Finally, our empirical strategies
differ significantly; we believe our empirical specifications and larger sample size allow us to better isolate the causal
effect of trade liberalization on fertility outcomes.
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2.2 India’s Trade Liberalization
We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on household fertility decisions and children’s health
in the context of India’s 1991 trade reform. Faced with a balance of payments crisis in August
1991, the Indian government embarked on several major economic reforms as conditions of an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. Included among these requirements was a unilateral
reduction in the overall level and the dispersion of import tariffs as well as the removal of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs), such as import licensing.
The period after the IMF bailout, therefore, marks a sharp break in Indian trade policy. The
maximum tariff fell immediately from 400 percent to 150 percent, with later revisions bringing
the maximum tariff to approximately 45 percent by 1997 (Hasan et al. (2006-07)). Meanwhile, the
average tariff fell from 80 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 1996 and the standard deviation of tariffs
declined by 50 percent (Topalova (2010)). NTBs also fell, with the proportion of goods subject to
quantitative restrictions receding from 87 percent in 1987 to 45 percent by 1994 (Topalova (2010)).
In addition to the sharp decline in trade protection, the 1991 episode possesses several important
features that are valuable for our analysis. Since the policy reform was imposed as part of the IMF
bailout, the tariff cuts were largely unanticipated by firms and households in India. As other
commentators have observed, the removal of trade barriers was implemented swiftly as a form of
“shock-therapy” and was not part of any pre-existing development plan (Bhagwati (1993), Goyal
(1996)). It is, therefore, unlikely that our results are driven by any adjustments in fertility in
anticipation of these reforms.
The quick initiation of the liberalization episode also reduces concerns about industries with
greater political influence or higher productivity shaping the structure of the tariff reform in a way
that would undermine our empirical strategy (described in detail in the following Section). Topalova
(2007) finds that industry-level tariff changes are uncorrelated with several proxies of an industry’s
political influence prior to the Indian reform, such as the number of employees, proportion of
skilled workers, and industrial concentration. Previous studies also find no correlation between an
industry’s future tariffs and its productivity before 1991 or productivity growth during 1989-1997
(Topalova (2004)). Finally, tariff changes through 1997 were spelled out in India’s Eighth Five
Year plan (1992-1997), suggesting little room for manipulation of tariffs based on political economy
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concerns during this time period.
It must be noted that, like Edmonds et al. (2010), we ignore changes in NTBs, primarily due
to data availability issues. Thus, our results measure the effect of only one important dimension
of the trade reform, i.e. the tariff cuts. The exclusion of NTBs is potentially harmful for our
empirical strategy if the trends in NTBs were in the opposite direction as compared to tariffs. But
as mentioned by Edmonds et al. (2010), there is a positive correlation in tariffs and NTBs during
our sample period. Thus, our results are biased only to the extent that some of the effects we assign
to tariff cuts may have instead been caused by the removal of NTBs.7
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Measuring Exposure to Tariff Reduction
The impact of trade liberalization on a developing economy, such as India, can be felt through many
channels. The availability of cheaper imported final goods can be welfare-improving for consumers,
while the reduction in tariffs on intermediate inputs can increase firm productivity. Although a
decrease in consumer prices could certainly influence fertility behavior, this effect will be common
across all households in India. On the other hand, an increase in supply of cheaper imported
products that compete with domestic goods can reduce employment and wages at domestic firms.
Like many other papers in the literature, our measure of tariff protection emphasizes this latter
effect of trade openness on employment.
National tariff protection varies across industries and over time in India. Moreover, there is
substantial heterogeneity in the industrial composition of Indian districts prior to 1991. Therefore,
depending on their industrial composition of employment at the time of reform, some Indian dis-
tricts experienced relatively larger reductions in trade protection than others. Following Topalova
(2010) and others, our identification strategy relies on this comparison to estimate the causal effect
of tariff reform.
Specifically, we interact the national nominal ad-valorem tariff faced by industry i in year t
, tariffit, with the share of employment in industry i and district d in 1991, empshare
1991
id , to
7Edmonds et al. (2010) also argue that despite incomplete removal of NTBs by 1997, the volume of imports
increased in response to tariffs cuts suggesting that the latter were a significant and important part of the reform.
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empshare1991id × tariffit (2.1)
Since the employment shares are based on a district’s industrial composition before the initiation of
trade liberalization, our tariff measure is free of any endogenous changes in employment composition
that take place due to the removal of tariff barriers.
Even though tariff cuts took place across a wide range of industries, certain industries, such as
cereals and oilseeds production, were non-traded, i.e. only the government was allowed to be an
importer of goods in these industries.8 Consequently, tariffdt assigns a zero tariff to the non-traded
industries for the entire time period. This implies that districts with higher levels of employment
in the non-traded sector in 1991 will mechanically have lower tariffdt (Hasan et al. (2006-07)).
Since a large proportion of non-traded employment is in the cereal and oilseeds sectors, and workers
in these industries tend to be poor rural farmers, this introduces a negative correlation between
poverty and tariffdt.
Previous studies have addressed this concern by constructing a second measure of district tariffs
that only depends on employment in traded industries (Hasan et al. (2006-07), Topalova (2007),
Topalova (2010)). We follow the literature and create this measure as follows, where emp1991id is the










The only difference between the two measures of tariff protection in (1) and (2) is that the latter
excludes employment in non-traded industries while constructing weights for industry-level tariffs.
The traded tariff measure is, therefore, independent of the proportion of workers in the non-traded
sector and is uncorrelated with initial poverty levels within a district.
2.3.2 Data
We use data from the second round of the District-Level Household Survey (DLHS-2) of India. The
DLHS-2 surveyed 507,000 currently-married women (aged 15 - 44 years) from 620,000 households
8Other non-traded industries during our sample period were services, trade, transportation, and construction.
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in 593 districts during March 2002 - October 2004. This survey includes a complete retrospective
birth history for every woman interviewed, containing information on the month and the year of
child’s birth, birth order, age of the mother at birth, and the age at which the child died, if the
child is deceased.
Since we focus on district as the geographical unit of interest, ideally we would like to know the
district in which a birth takes place. However, DLHS-2 only includes district of residence identifiers
at the time of survey. As a result, we assume that all births to a woman take place in her district of
residence at the time of survey. This implicitly assumes that mothers do not migrate to a different
district after initiating child-bearing. While this might appear to be an unreasonable assumption,
in practice, inter-district migration in India is low and mostly consists of women relocating as a
result of marriage. Using National Sample Survey (NSS) data, Topalova (2010) shows that only
three to five percent of women moved across districts within the last ten years. We expect this
number to be even smaller for women who have already given birth to their first child. In addition,
this assumption is problematic only if the measurement error induced by it varies, systematically,
with our measures of district-level tariff protection.
We focus our analysis on rural areas within Indian districts. Topalova (2010) finds an insignifi-
cant relationship between tariff protection and poverty in urban areas of Indian districts, which she
attributes to pre-existing trends in poverty and the presence of other reforms in addition to trade
liberalization that impacted urban areas. Due to concerns of simultaneous reforms and pre-existing
trends in urban areas, we focus on rural areas only.
We restrict our sample to the 1987-1997 time period. There are two reasons for this. First,
1987 is the earliest year for which we have tariff data. Second, the tariff changes during 1992-1997
were spelled out in India’s Eighth Five Year Plan, so they are unlikely to have been influenced by
political economy decisions. After 1997, however, industry-level tariffs are negatively correlated
with the industry’s current productivity (Topalova (2004)), suggesting that these latter changes
may be endogenous to an industry’s performance. For this reason, we only focus on years up to
1997. Figure 2.2.1 shows the evolution of nominal national industry-level ad-valorem tariff during
1987-1997. Average tariff fell from about 95 percent in 1987 to about 30 percent in 1997.
We impose three additional sample-selection criteria. First, we only include births for whom
the mother’s age at birth was between 13 and 40. Second, we exclude birth parities of 11 or higher.
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We use these restrictions due to the small number of births to women outside of the 13-40 age
range and the small number of births with parity above 10. However, our results are not sensitive
to the exclusion of these observations. The DLHS questionnaires were also administered to women
who were visiting the household at the time of the survey. Since there is no information on their
permanent district of residence, we exclude them from our analysis. Our final sample comprises
464,916 births to 269,661 women in 408 districts.
The district-level tariff data comes directly from Topalova (2010). Industry- and district-wise
employment data comes from the 1991 Census of India while tariff data at the six-digit level was
collected by Petia Topalova from the Indian Ministry of Finance publications. The rainfall data
used later comes from the annual district-level precipitation time series created by Ram Fishman
using Indian Meteorological Department database.
2.3.3 Regression Framework
The question of interest in this paper is how the removal of tariff barriers influences households’
fertility decisions and children’s health outcomes. In particular, we investigate whether reductions
in tariff protection faced by a woman (based on her district of residence) impact the probability
that she gives birth in a year, the sex ratio of these births, and their mortality rates. Our regression
framework is similar to Edmonds et al. (2010) and Topalova (2010) and compares women (births)
in districts that were more or less exposed to tariff cuts.
We start by reshaping the retrospective birth data to create a woman-year panel and construct
a dummy variable, birthmdt, that equals one if a woman m in district d gives birth in year t, and
is otherwise zero. Then, we estimate the following base specification using ordinary least-squares
(OLS):
birthmdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Xmdt + γd + τt + δst+ mdt (2.3)
The main regressor of interest, tariffdt, represents the level of tariff protection assigned to a women
based on her district of residence. Although the variation in tariffdt occurs at the district-level,
we also control for a vector of individual covariates, Xmdt, that may impact the outcome variables,
including indicators for a woman’s age in year t, the number of previous births, the household’s
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caste9 and religion.10 Inclusion of district fixed-effects, γd, controls for time-invariant differences
across districts while year fixed-effects, τt, control for any India-wide shocks that may influence our
outcomes. The inclusion of year fixed-effects also highlights that our empirical strategy does not
estimate the overall effect of trade liberalization on fertility, sex ratios at birth, or mortality, since
any economy-wide impact on consumer prices or productivity will be captured by the year-effects.
Since our data spans all years between 1987 and 1997, we also include linear state-specific time
trends in our regressions.
The sex ratio and mortality regressions are run using the retrospective panel of births. The
base OLS specification is similar to (3):
yimdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Ximdt + γd + τt + δst+ imdt (2.4)
where i indexes a child born to mother m in district d and year t. For mortality regressions, the
outcome is an indicator variable for whether a child dies before Q months of birth, where we allow
Q to equal one, six, or twelve months.11 For the sex ratio regressions, the outcome is an indicator
variable that equals one if the child is male, and zero otherwise. The remaining controls are the
same as in (3).
Since a large majority (89 percent) of women in our sample report giving birth to more than
one child during the time period we study, we also run specifications with mother fixed-effects:
birthmdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Xmdt + τt + φm + mdt (2.5)
yimdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Ximdt + τt + φm + imdt (2.6)
where γm represents the mother fixed-effect and controls for all unobserved, time-invariant hetero-
geneity across women that could influence her fertility decisions. Xmdt and Ximdt now include just
the indicators for number of previous births and woman’s age in year t. By including mother fixed-
effects, we are essentially comparing the birth outcomes for the same woman under different levels
of tariff protection in her district. Our ability to control for state-specific time trends and mother
fixed-effects makes our identification more robust than previous literature. A positive (negative)
9Caste categories are scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), other backward caste (OBC), and general caste.
10Religion categories are Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, and Others.
11Infant mortality is defined as death before age 1, while child mortality usually refers to death before age 5.
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β1 implies that tariff decline is associated with a decrease (increase) in the outcome of interest,
relative to the national trend.
The coefficient β1 is identified under the assumption that changes in our tariff measure are
uncorrelated with district-specific, unobserved time-varying shocks (or mother-specific, unobserved
time-varying shocks in (5)-(6)) that influence fertility, sex ratios, and infant mortality. Since we
interact a district’s pre-reform industrial composition with national changes in industry tariffs to
construct tariffdt, any source of bias would have to be correlated with both pre-reform industrial
composition and national tariff changes by industry. Like Topalova (2010), Edmonds et al. (2010)
and others, we assume that this is not the case. Nevertheless, we test the validity of this assumption
by checking that our results are robust to the inclusion of other observable district-specific, time-
varying shocks, such as rainfall shocks.
For our sex ratio regressions, t refers to the year of conception, instead of the year of birth.
Since an ultrasound test, followed by an induced abortion, are believed to be the primary channel
through which parents exercise control over the sex of their births in India during our sample period
(Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)), and these technologies are most effective and safe during the first
or second trimesters of birth (Epner et al. (1998)), district-level tariff protection during the year
of conception is more relevant for explaining the effect of trade reform on sex ratios at birth. We
define the year of conception as the year nine months prior to the month of birth, thereby implicitly
assuming that no birth is premature.
One concern is that tariffdt may be correlated with the pre-reform size of a district’s non-
traded sector and, hence, correlated with its initial level of poverty. If this is the case, OLS
estimates in specifications (3)-(6) will be biased. We deal with this issue by using traded tariff,
tradedtariffdt as an instrument for tariffdt. Figure 2.2 plots both these measures for our sample
period. Since non-traded industries are automatically assigned a zero tariff for all years, the average
tariff measure is, by construction, substantially lower than the average traded tariff measure. While
tradedtariffdt declined from about 88 percent to 31 percent, tariffdt decreased from about 7
percent to 2 percent during 1987-1997. There is a significant correlation between the two measures
(first-stage regression estimates presented later) and they both exhibit a sharp downward trend.12
12The only exception is an increase in tariffs from 1992 to 1993. Due to measurement error concerns, we also run
regressions that exclude the data for 1993. Our results remain the same and are available upon request.
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Moreover, tradedtariffdt is independent of the baseline proportion of workers in the non-traded
sector and therefore, uncorrelated with initial poverty levels within a district. This validates the
use of traded tariff as an instrument.
Next, we look at the time trends in fertility, the sex ratio at birth, and infant mortality in India
during our study period. The total fertility rate declined from 4.1 in 1987 to 3.3 in 1997 (Figure 2.3).
The male-female sex ratio in the 0-6 age group has been rising rapidly (Figure 2.4), especially since
the 1980s. Increased availability of technology for sex-selection combined with declining fertility
and a strong preference for sons are widely believed to be the causes for this growing sex-imbalance
in the child population. According to DLHS-2 data, under-5 mortality in rural India fell from 127
deaths per 1000 live births in 1987 to 95 deaths per 1000 live births in 1997. As Figure 2.5 shows,
infant mortality has been declining over time. Mortality before age 1 is much higher than mortality
during ages 1-4. Mortality for girls is larger during ages 1-4. It is important to keep in mind that
our identification strategy does not estimate the causal impact of tariff reductions in explaining
these aggregate trends. Instead, we estimate the effect of tariff reductions on deviations from the
trend. Table 2.2.1 provides a description of the socio-economic characteristics of our sample.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Fertility
We begin by looking at the effect of changes in district-level tariff exposure in a year on the
probability that a woman gives birth in that year.13 Column (1) in Table 2.2 presents the baseline
results controlling for district and year fixed-effects. In Column (2) we also control for mother’s years
of schooling, indicators for mother’s age in that year, her number of previous births, household’s
caste and religion. In Column (3) we add state-specific linear time trends. Finally, Column (4)
controls for mother fixed-effects. In all specifications, robust standard errors are clustered at the
district level and district-level sampling weights are used.14
The OLS results in Panel A indicate a positive and significant relationship between our district-
13Throughout this paper, we use the term fertility to indicate probability of birth in a given year. A higher
probability of birth does not necessarily imply higher completed fertility. It is possible that our results capture
changes in the timing of births rather than changes in overall fertility levels.
14The unweighted regressions yield very similar results, which are available upon request.
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level tariff measure and the probability that a woman gives birth. While the coefficient becomes
insignificant and small when we include state-specific linear time trends in Column (3), the results
remain significant, and increase five-fold, when we include mother fixed-effects (Column (4)). These
positive coefficients suggest that women in districts more exposed to trade liberalization (i.e. a
relative decline in our tariff measure) witnessed a relative decrease in fertility.
However, for reasons previously described, changes in the tariff measure utilized in Panel A
may be negatively correlated with a district’s initial poverty level. If women in initially poorer
districts also experience relatively smaller declines in fertility over our time period for reasons
unrelated to trade liberalization, OLS will overestimate the causal effect of tariff protection on
fertility. We, therefore, instrument for our tariff protection measure using traded tariff protection,
which is uncorrelated with the size of the non-traded sector, as previously argued. Panel B of
Table 2.2 shows the first-stage regression of a district’s tariff measure on a district’s traded tariff
protection. In all specifications, traded tariff has a significant and strong first-stage impact on
district tariff protection, indicating that traded tariff is a strong instrument for district tariff.15
When we use traded tariff as an instrument (Panels C and D of Table 2.2), district tariff
protection in a year has a negative effect on the probability that a woman gives birth in that year,
although we lose significance when mother fixed-effects are included. The fact that our coefficient
of interest changes sign when instrumenting for district tariff protection suggests that including
non-traded industries in the tariff measure introduces a significant upward bias, likely due to the
correlation between initial poverty and changes in the tariff measure. The reduced form coefficient
of traded tariff is also negative throughout and mostly significant (except in the mother fixed-effects
specification).
The IV coefficients indicate that the Indian trade reform had a substantial effect on fertility – a
woman living in a district that experienced the average decline in tariff protection of 7 percentage
points was between 0.6 percentage points (Panel C, Column 1) and 1.2 percentage points (Panel
C, Column 3) more likely to give birth in a given year.16
15The first stage F-statistic is large in all specifications.
16Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the IV results for urban areas and we find a similar increase in the likelihood
of birth in response to tariff cuts. Coefficients are negative and significant across all four specifications.
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2.4.2 Sex Ratio at Birth
Having established that a reduction in a district’s relative tariff exposure leads to an increased
probability of birth in rural India, we turn our attention to the sex-composition of these births.
The sex ratio at birth (SRB) deviates from the natural SRB if female fetuses are terminated more
frequently than male fetuses due to less prenatal care or sex-selective abortions. In India, prenatal
sex-determination is illegal, but widely prevalent, leading to a large number of female fetuses being
aborted. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) estimate that approximately 480,000 sex-selective abortions
took place in India annually during 1995 - 2005. Trade liberalization can affect the SRB by (a)
changing the demand for sex-selective abortions due to changes in the relative demand for sons, (b)
changing the demand for sex-selective abortions due to changes in parents’ ability to afford prenatal
sex determination and abortion resulting from changes in income, (c) through income shocks which
impact fetal viability differentially based on the sex of the fetus (Trivers and Willard (1973)),17 or
(d) through greater access to sex-determination technology via imports of ultrasound machines, for
example.18
Sex-determination can be effectively performed through an ultrasound test around 12 weeks
of gestation or through amniocentesis around 8-9 weeks of gestation. If a mother has an induced
abortion, it is likely to take place during the first or second trimester of pregnancy. This suggests
that the relevant tariff variable to examine the effect of trade liberalization on the sex of a birth
is not the tariff at the time of birth, but the tariff during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.
Therefore, we use tariff in the district of birth in the year of conception as the explanatory variable
for all sex ratio regressions.
Using the retrospective panel of births, Table 2.3 presents the results from OLS and IV regres-
sions of an indicator for male birth on district-level tariff during the year of conception.19 The
OLS coefficients in Panel A show that a child born in a district with a relative decline in tariff
protection during the year of conception is less likely to be a boy ; but the effect is not significant
17The Trivers-Willard hypothesis suggests that negative shocks to the fetal environment make births less likely to
be male.
18Changes in prenatal sex-determination technology, however, are likely to impact the entire country, or at least
all districts within a state similarly. Since our measure of tariff protection varies at the district level, this channel is
unlikely to explain our results.
19Each cell indicates a separate regression. As before, all regressions use district-level sampling weights and robust
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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at conventional levels. Panels B, C, and D present the IV regression estimates. The first stage
coefficients of traded tariff are positive and highly significant throughout. The IV and reduced
form coefficients of district tariff in the year of conception are always positive, but only significant
when we include the mother fixed-effects.20 For a district with the average decline in tariffs of 7
percentage points, column (3) in Panel C suggests that the likelihood of a male birth decreases by
0.6 percentage points. Thus, the reduction in trade protection seems to have caused some relative
improvements in the probability of a female birth in rural Indian districts more exposed to tariff
declines, although the overall effects are not highly significant.21
The fact that we find significant results when we control for mother fixed-effects and not without
them highlights the importance of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in factors that influence
decisions about sex-selection. Apart from the monetary cost of prenatal sex-detection and sex-
selective abortion, unobserved subjective son preference is likely to be an important factor in
parents’ decisions about sex-selection. Although in specifications without mother fixed-effects we
control for some observable socio-economic characteristics that are likely to be correlated with
son preference, for example religion, it is possible that they do not fully capture the unobserved
heterogeneity across women. In Section 4.4, we present evidence for heterogeneity in the effects on
the sex ratio at birth across socio-economic groups.
2.4.3 Infant Mortality
Next, we examine the effect of tariff decline on infant mortality. Following the same format as
before, Table 2.4 presents results from OLS (Panel A) and IV regressions (Panels B and C) of
indicators for whether a child dies within one, six, or twelve months of birth on district-level tariff
protection. Across all specifications, the OLS coefficient estimates in Column (1) are negative and
mostly significant, indicating that a larger decline in tariff protection within a district is associated
with a relative increase in infant mortality within one, six, as well as twelve months of birth.
The coefficients are similar in magnitude and significance when we add controls such as mother’s
age fixed-effects, indicators for previous births, and fixed-effects for religion and caste in Column
20However, the coefficients for non-mother fixed-effects specifications are also significant when we use alternate
levels of clustering, e.g. district-year. Here, we report results with more conservative standard errors, which in our
case are obtained from clustering at the district level.
21Table A.1 in the Appendix shows that the effects on SRB in urban areas were in the same direction, but
insignificant even for the mother fixed-effects specification.
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(2). When we add state-specific linear time trends to our regressions in Column (3), we lose
significance. But, the coefficients remain significant when we add fixed-effects to control for any
unobserved time-invariant characteristics of a mother.
The magnitude of our coefficient estimates increases as we change our outcome variable from
mortality within one month of birth to mortality within six months to twelve months of birth.
The fact that we find significant results on mortality within the first month of birth for some
specifications suggests that trade liberalization also influences parents’ ability to invest in the
health of a child while in-utero.22 However, the increase in the magnitude of the coefficients as we
look at mortality within six and twelve months implies that trade liberalization prevents families
from making the necessary investments in a child’s health to prevent infant death even after birth.23
Moreover, the estimated effects are economically significant. For example, our coefficient esti-
mate of -0.118 in Column (4), Panel C3 of Table 2.4 indicates that, relative to other districts, a
district that experienced the average decline in tariff protection of 7 percentage points witnessed
an increase in infant mortality within twelve months of birth of 0.8 percentage points – about a 9
percent increase with respect to the baseline (1987) mortality within a year of birth in all districts
(9 percent).
In Table 2.5, we interact the tariff measure with a dummy for the child being male to test if
the effect on mortality differs by child’s sex. Previous research on the Trivers-Willard Hypothesis
indicates that male children are less likely to survive relative to females in harsher environments
(Almond and Edlund (2007)). If a decline in tariff protection increases poverty and decreases health
investments in pregnant women or newborn children, we might expect trade liberalization to have
a greater effect on mortality rates of male children. The main effect of our tariff measure suggests
that there is a significant (except in column (3)) increase in mortality within twelve months of
birth for girls.24 The coefficient of the interaction term is positive everywhere, suggesting a smaller
effect on boys. However, the interaction term is significant only in Column (4). According to the
coefficients in Column (4), in a district that experienced the average decline in tariff protection of
22Investments in health while in-utero are also likely to be affected by the tariff in the year of conception. In order
to examine this channel, we also run regressions using tariff in the year nine months prior to the year of birth as
the explanatory variable. The tariff coefficients are negative but not always significant and smaller in magnitude in
comparison to the coefficients in Table 2.4.
23We find no significant effect on any mortality outcome for urban areas in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
24Similar results are obtained for mortality within one and six months of birth and are available upon request.
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7 percentage points, girls witnessed an increase in infant mortality within twelve months of birth
of 1.6 percentage points as opposed to boys for whom mortality within twelve months increased by
a much lower 0.1 percentage points. These effects are consistent with prior evidence on postnatal
neglect and discrimination in care against girls in India. To the extent that parents are able to
exercise their preference for male children at the prenatal stage through sex-selection, an increase
in sex-selective abortions can lead to a decline in relative female mortality (Lin et al. (2010)). But
if poverty makes sex-selection less affordable, then we may expect the pattern we observe: a lower
sex ratio at birth, but higher relative female mortality. As we show in the next section, there is
substantial heterogeneity in the effects on infant mortality across socio-economic groups.
2.4.4 Robustness
One potential concern with our identification strategy is the presence of other time-varying district-
specific omitted variables. Since our tariff exposure index varies at the district-year level, we cannot
include district-year fixed-effects to prevent this omitted variable bias. We check the robustness
of results presented in the previous sections by controlling for district-level annual rainfall shocks.
Annual fluctuations in rainfall are an important determinant of economic outcomes in agriculture-
dependent developing countries, such as India.25 We re-estimate our main specifications by also
including as an explanatory variable an indicator that is equal to one if the district experiences a
rainfall shock in a given year, and zero otherwise. We define a rainfall shock as a deviation of more
than 30 percent from historic annual mean precipitation in the district. The point estimates on
tariff measures in all specifications remain consistent with our previous results (with similar signs,
magnitudes, and significance). These results are available upon request.
2.5 Mechanisms
So far, our results suggest that relative declines in tariffs in rural Indian districts lead to a significant
increase in the probability of birth and the likelihood of these births being female, although the
latter effect is significant only for the mother fixed-effects specification. Moreover, the likelihood
that a child dies within one, six or twelve months of birth significantly increases. Next, we explore
25Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Townsend (1994), Jayachandran (2006).
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the mechanisms underlying these results.
We attempt to distinguish between three potential channels: 1) poverty, 2) female bargaining
power, and 3) relative returns from daughters. Unfortunately, our data does not contain informa-
tion on household income, consumption expenditure, wages, or mother’s labor force participation
status, making it difficult to directly test for the aforementioned causal channels. As a second best
approach, we examine heterogeneity in effects by the socio-economic characteristics of mothers to
provide suggestive evidence about the causal mechanisms underlying our main results. This ap-
proach is based on the premise that the three channels mentioned above should affect our three
outcome variables differently, thus helping us deduce the underlying mechanisms. Moreover, it is
also possible that mechanisms differ across socio-economic groups. Before we proceed to the re-
gression results, we first discuss the expected effect on our outcome variables through each of these
three channels.
Topalova (2010) shows that districts more exposed to trade liberalization witnessed a relative
increase in poverty. Households that suffer a negative income shock due to tariff cuts may be
less able to afford modern birth control methods and sex-selective abortions, causing an increase
in births, especially female births.26 In addition, the supply of free or subsidized contraception
may decline if government finances decline as a result of trade liberalization. Moreover, if poverty
impacts the probability that a child survives to adulthood or the likelihood that a child is male,
households may choose to increase fertility if decisions about the number and the sex-composition
of children are jointly made. Poverty can also lead to increases in infant mortality if families reduce
investments in infant health as a result of a decline in income. Furthermore, if the additional girls
born as a result of the increase in poverty and the resulting inability to plan fertility are viewed as
“unwanted,” we would expect the increase in infant mortality to be higher for daughters relative
to sons. Thus, if the relative increase in poverty from trade reform is the underlying channel, we
are likely to observe an increase in fertility, a decrease in the sex ratio at birth, and an increase
in infant mortality, more so for girls. On the other hand, if poverty decreases as a result of trade
reform, we expect the opposite effects, i.e. lower fertility, a higher sex ratio at birth, and lower
infant mortality rates.
Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010) show that a NAFTA-related decrease in tariffs increased intra-
26Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) show that wealthier families in India are more likely to practice sex-selection.
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household bargaining power of women in Mexico. They believe this is due to two reasons. First,
technology-upgrading by firms in response to trade liberalization makes physically demanding skills
less important in blue-collar jobs. As a result, the relative wage and employment of women improves
in blue-collar occupations, as shown by Juhn et al. (2012). Second, trade reform leads to growth
which is concentrated in initially female-intensive industries, and thus benefits women in these
industries relatively more if male and female labor are imperfect substitutes. If intra-household
bargaining is the primary channel through which trade reform affects fertility and infant mortality,
then we expect to see lower fertility due to higher opportunity cost of childbearing (Chiappori
et al. (2002), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)), and lower mortality due to higher relative income
of mothers. However, it is not clear which direction the sex ratio at birth would change in. For
a given degree of son preference, a higher opportunity cost of “unwanted” children for working
mothers might cause greater sex-selection and, thus, result in higher sex ratios at birth. Women
in the labor force may also have a lower search cost of accessing prenatal sex-determination and
abortion.
Lastly, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) find that the new economic opportunities resulting from
globalization are mainly benefitting lower-caste girls in India. Despite increases in returns to non-
traditional white-collar occupations, lower-caste parents continue to educate their sons in local
language schools (that lead to traditional blue-collar jobs) in order to continue benefitting from
caste-based networks. However, historically, lower-caste girls have not participated in these caste-
based occupational networks due to low labor market participation, and are, hence, not constrained
by them. As a result, lower-caste parents continue to channel boys into traditional occupations
despite higher returns in more modern jobs, but their daughters benefit as a result of these improved
employment opportunities. In a similar vein, Jensen and Miller (2011) show that parents in rural
India strategically try to prevent sons from migrating to urban areas to take advantage of better
income opportunities because they want them to work on the farm. They find large gains in
education for girls but not much for boys in response to greater employment opportunities in urban
areas. They conclude that these results are driven by changes in returns (to parents) from sons
and daughters. In our context, an increase in the relative demand for daughters, due to a relative
increase in returns to parents from girls, would imply that lower-caste parents should now be more
likely to give birth to daughters, who might also experience a decrease in mortality. In other words,
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the increase in female births in this scenario is driven by more “wanted” girls, unlike the poverty
channel where more “unwanted” girls are born due to reduced affordability of sex-selection or lower
opportunity cost of children. If the decrease in female mortality is sufficiently large, we will also
observe an overall decrease in mortality across all births. The impact on the likelihood of birth
depends on the extent to which parents substitute between sons and daughters in the short- and
the long-run.
The following table summarizes the predictions discussed above. So far, our main findings
appear consistent with the increased poverty channel, although the sex ratio at birth results are
weak. Armed with these predictions, we now turn to analyzing heterogeneity in our effects across
three dimensions – household’s caste, mother’s education level, and household’s wealth index – to
distinguish between these potential mechanisms.
Expected effect on:
Channel Birth Sex Ratio at Birth Mortality
↑ Poverty + – +
↑ Female bargaining power – Unclear –
↑ Relative returns to daughters Unclear – –
2.5.1 Heterogeneous Effects
We begin our examination of heterogeneity with a household’s caste. We divide our sample into four
categories - scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), other backward caste (OBC), and general
caste - and interact our tariff variable with indicators for these categories. Table 2.6 presents these
results for the birth dummy, male birth dummy, and mortality within twelve months. General
caste is the omitted category. For the following discussion, we focus on column (3) which includes
state-specific linear time trends. Panel A shows that the interaction terms are negative and highly
significant for SC and OBC mothers, implying that lower-caste women experience a significantly
larger increase in the probability of birth relative to upper-caste mothers. For upper-caste women,
the effect on fertility is either positive (i.e. fertility decreases for them) or not significantly different
from zero in column (3). Thus, our overall findings for fertility seem to be driven mainly by
higher fertility for lower-caste mothers. There are no significant differences in our sex ratio results
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across caste groups, however. The fertility effects are consistent with either the poverty or the
returns channel working for the lower-caste households. Scheduled and other backward castes have
historically been more economically and socially disadvantaged in India. A relative increase in
poverty levels is, therefore, likely to affect them more strongly than upper-caste households. But,
as the mortality results show, the effect on mortality due to tariff cuts is significantly smaller for
births to lower-caste mothers, relative to general castes, which is inconsistent with the increased
poverty channel.27Moreover, when we separate the effect on mortality by child’s sex in Table 2.7, we
find that the lower mortality results for SCs and OBCs are completely driven by girls. Upper-caste
girls, on the other hand, experience a rise in mortality.
In Table 2.8 we repeat the same exercise by mother’s education level. We divide women into
three categories - uneducated women, those with 1-5 years of schooling, and women with more than
5 years of schooling. Column (3) in Panel A shows that there is no effect on the likelihood of birth
for “more educated” mothers. But, births increased significantly and the probability that these
births are male decreased significantly for uneducated mothers. For mortality within a year of
birth, we observe a similar pattern as our caste results. For uneducated mothers, there is a relative
decrease in mortality, whereas more educated mothers experience an increase. When we split the
mortality results by child’s sex in Table 2.9, we find a pattern similar to Table 2.7. There are no
significant effects on boys, but girls born to uneducated mothers experience a relative decrease in
mortality whereas girls born to mothers with more than primary education experience a relative
increase in mortality. To the extent that lower-caste women are likely to have a lower educational
attainment, these results together highlight the possibility of gains for girls born to lower-status
parents from tariff reductions through a relative increase in returns on the labor market.
To further explore the mechanisms, we next examine how our effects vary by the wealth index
of the household. DLHS combines information on ownership of durables, type of toilet facility,
cooking fuel, housing, source of lighting, and drinking water to calculate a standard of living score
for each household. On the basis of these scores, households are divided into three categories:
low, medium, and high standard of living (SLI) households. Ideally, we would like to know the
household wealth score for each year in our sample period. But, unfortunately, since we create
27Another possibility is that lower-caste households actually benefit from tariff cuts and experience a relative
decrease in poverty which lowers mortality. But in that case, we would not expect to see their fertility increase, which
is what we find in Panel A.
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our birth and woman panels retrospectively from a single cross-section, we know a household’s
wealth category only at the time of survey. To the extent that trade reform affects standards of
living, the wealth index variable is not exogenous. However, if most households move within a
wealth category, and not across categories (e.g. a high-SLI family becoming low-SLI) due to tariff
reduction, this comparison is still informative. With these caveats in mind, Panel A in Table 2.2.10
shows that the higher fertility and the decreased likelihood of a birth being male are mainly driven
by low-SLI families. In fact, medium- and high-SLI families experience a significant decrease in the
likelihood of birth. Unlike the weak effects in Table 2.3, there is a significant decrease in the sex
ratio at birth for relatively poorer, low-SLI families and a slightly significant increase for the high-
SLI households in response to the tariff decline. The magnitude of this effect is remarkably similar
across all specifications and suggests that in districts with an average relative decline in tariff of 7
percentage points, the sex ratio at birth decreases by 1.6 percentage points in low-SLI households.
Yet again, the mortality results suggest that the effects for low-SLI women are potentially driven by
the returns channel. Mortality decreases for births to low-SLI women, but increases for high-SLI
families.
2.5.2 Supporting Evidence
Next, we utilize data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) of India to shed further light on
potential mechanisms. If a relative change in the returns from children on the labor market is
an underlying channel for our previous findings, we also expect differential changes in educational
investments by socio-economic status in response to tariff cuts. To test this, we follow Edmonds
et al. (2010) and estimate the effect of tariff cuts on schooling and child labor outcomes of 10-14
year old children in rural Indian districts using the 43rd (1987-88) and the 55th (1999-00) rounds of
the NSS Employment-Unemployment survey. Edmonds et al. (2010) find that schooling increased
and child labor declined at a slower rate in districts that were relatively more exposed to tariff
cuts. We extend their analysis and examine heterogeneity in these outcomes by the caste of the
household.28 Since the 43rd round does not distinguish between OBC and general castes, we divide
the sample into three categories - SC, ST, and the rest. Table 2.2.11 presents the IV estimates for
the effects of tariff reform on an indicator for the child being in school (School) and five categories of
28The NSS does not provide information on mother’s education or the household wealth status.
96
work. Work is an indicator for a child’s principal activity status being work-related29, irrespective
of her school attendance status. Work only indicates that the child’s principal activity is work and
she does not attend school. Market work implies that the child works as a regular salaried/ wage
employee, a casual wage laborer, in a household enterprise (farm or non-farm), or as a beggar.
Domestic work indicates that the child’s principal activity is domestic work. Lastly, Idle refers to
children who neither work nor attend school.
Table 2.2.11 shows that the estimates presented in Edmonds et al. (2010) exhibit substantial
heterogeneity by caste and are consistent with our previous findings. Panel A30 shows that SC
children in districts relatively more exposed to tariff reform are significantly more likely to be in
school, relative to children from OBC and general castes. The overall effect on schooling for SC
children is also positive. In addition, columns (2) - (4) show that SC children are less likely to
work, both relative to the excluded category as well as overall, as tariffs decrease. We also observe
a significant decrease in the likelihood of an SC child being Idle in response to the reform. On
the other hand, general and OBC children are significantly less likely to be in school when tariffs
decrease relatively in their districts. However, the effects on work categories for these non-SC and
non-ST children are not significant. These results are consistent with tariff declines resulting in
a relative increase in the returns from lower-caste children, relative to general and OBC children.
However, further disaggregation of the sample by child sex in Panels B and C does not reveal
differential effects for SC boys and girls.
In addition, we assess the relative returns channel by examining the effect of tariff cuts on adult
employment in a manner similar to Table 2.4 in Edmonds et al. (2010). These results are presented
in Table 2.2.12. The outcome variable is the number of days worked in the last year. Column (1)
shows that tariff declines are associated with a significant decrease in the number of days worked
for SC and ST men relative to non-SC and non-ST men. Overall, the latter group experiences a
significant increase in the number of days spent in wage work in response to tariff cuts, but the
total effect for SC men is not large. On the other hand, in column (2), there is a significant increase
in the number of days worked for SC and ST women, relative to other women as well as overall,
29This includes the following categories of work: regular salaried/ wage employee, casual wage laborer, begging,
work in a household enterprise, and domestic work.
30In Table 2.2.11 Panel A, we do not control for the sex of the child since it is also affected by the tariff cuts.
However, the results remain the same when we control for child sex.
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as tariffs decrease. For non-SC and non-ST women we observe a decrease in employment, albeit
the coefficient is not significant. These results are consistent with trade liberalization increasing
(decreasing) the returns for lower-caste (upper-caste) females, relative to males, in turn causing
lower-caste (upper-caste) parents to give birth to more (fewer) girls and investing more (less) in
them.
2.5.3 Discussion
To sum up, we see substantial differences in how trade liberalization has affected women and
children across social strata. Broadly, we find that low socioeconomic status women experience an
increase in fertility which is driven by more female births. Since we also observe a relative decrease
in mortality for their daughters, we interpret this as a higher demand for daughters by low-status
families. The same does not hold for high-status women. There is some evidence that they have
fewer children, driven by fewer girls, and we find strong evidence that girls born to high-status
mothers fare worse in terms of higher mortality. Mortality rates for boys, however, do not seem to
be significantly affected by the trade reform, irrespective of their parents’ socio-economic status.
Thus, there appears to be a strong gender component to the effects of trade liberalization. If
tariff reforms have improved earning opportunities for women in blue-collar occupations, as recent
literature suggests, we would expect the gains to be derived by girls born to low-status families.
We find some suggestive evidence that low-caste women work more and low-caste men work less
relative to upper-caste women and men when tariffs decreases. To the extent that upper-caste and
more educated women in India are less likely to participate in blue-collar occupations, we do not
expect girls in high-status families to benefit from the new labor market opportunities in relatively
blue-collar jobs as much as low-status women. Moreover, if returns from more skilled jobs have
increased mainly for men in India, high-status families will prefer to have more sons. As supporting
evidence, we find that there is an increase in the number of days worked for non-SC and non-ST
men in districts experiencing a relative decrease in tariffs.
The effects of trade reform on fertility and child health outcomes that we find do not suggest
that there has been an increase in the relative bargaining power for women. Lastly, the apparent
increase in valuation of girls in low-status families and decrease in high-status families in response
to trade reform can also be due to differential returns from children on the marriage market instead
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of or in addition to returns on the labor market (Edlund and Lee (2009)).
2.6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes whether India’s trade liberalization, beginning in 1991, affected fertility, infant
mortality, and sex ratios at birth. To identify the impact of this trade policy shock, we compare
rural districts more exposed to tariff cuts to rural districts less exposed to tariff cuts. Previous
research using a similar empirical strategy finds that districts subject to greater reductions in tariffs
experience slower declines in poverty as well as slower increases in school enrollment ((Topalova
(2010), Edmonds et al. (2010)). We find that lower-caste, less educated, and less wealthy women in
districts with a higher relative trade reform exposure are more likely to give birth and these births
are more likely to be female. Moreover, infant mortality (within one, six, and twelve months of
birth) decreases for these girls. In contrast, girls born to upper-caste, more educated, and wealthier
mothers experience relatively higher mortality. They are also less likely to be born.
It is important to emphasize that these results do not suggest that trade liberalization leads
to overall increases or decreases in fertility, sex ratios, or infant mortality.31 However, our results
do confirm that removal of trade barriers has important distributional consequences along these
dimensions, especially for girls. Data limitations prevent us from conducting a more rigorous
analysis of the exact channels through which tariff cuts affect individuals’ decisions about fertility
and investments in children, but we highlight the potential role played by differential returns from
children that vary by socio-economic status and child sex.
31We also note that this paper only examines the effect of tariff reductions and ignores removal of non-tariff barriers.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Average Industry-level Tariff
NOTE: This figure plots the yearly averages of nominal, national, industry-level ad-valorem tariffs using data provided
by Petia Topalova.
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Figure 2.2: Average District-level Tariff and Traded Tariff, by Year
NOTE: This figure plots the yearly averages of the district-level tariff and traded tariff measures used in this paper.
District-year data on both measures was provided by Petia Topalova. Tariff is constructed as the district-specific
employment weighted sum of industry-specific national tariffs. Traded tariff is constructed in a similar way, but only
uses employment in traded sectors within a district. District-level employment shares in 1991 are used as weights.
More details are available in Section 3.1.
Figure 2.3: Total Fertility Rate in India, by Year
SOURCE: Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Govt. of India (accessed from Indiastat)
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Figure 2.4: Child Sex Ratio (0-6) in India, by Year
SOURCE: Census of India
Figure 2.5: Infant mortality in Rural India, by Year of Birth and Sex
NOTE: This figure plots the average proportion of children who died before age 1, during ages 1-4 and before age 5,
by year of birth and sex. All-India sample weights used. Data source is DLHS (2002-04).
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Rural Sample, 1987 and 1997
Variable 1987 1997
Panel of Births
Birth is male 0.517 0.521
Parity of birth 2.34 2.96
Mother’s age at birth 21.04 23.28





Scheduled Caste 0.18 0.19
Scheduled Tribe 0.19 0.22
Other Backward Caste 0.38 0.38
Died within one month of birth 0.06 0.05
Died within 6 months of birth 0.08 0.06
Died within 12 months of birth 0.09 0.07
Low HH Wealth Index 0.60 0.67
Medium HH Wealth Index 0.30 0.25






NOTES: This table presents summary statistics for the earliest (1987) and the latest (1997) years included in our
rural sample. All regressions include every year during 1987-1997.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Tariff Reduction on the Probability of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
Tariff in YOB 0.129*** 0.104*** 0.009 0.581***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.109]
B. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.203*** 0.212***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.026] [0.030]
F-stat 48.16 48.19 61.55 49.86
C. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.081 -0.118** -0.172*** -0.108
[0.054] [0.055] [0.048] [0.118]
D. Reduced form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.018* -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.023
[0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.025]
N 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x
Covariates x x x
State-specific linear trends x
Mother FE x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. Each cell constitutes a separate regression. Columns (2) - (4) include
indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years
of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been
clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Tariff Reduction on Probability that a Birth is Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
Tariff in YOC 0.078 0.080 0.074 0.035
[0.050] [0.050] [0.053] [0.101]
B. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOC 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.187*** 0.182***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.025] [0.028]
F-stat 42.45 42.47 54.94 42.44
C. IV
Tariff in YOC 0.097 0.097 0.085 0.314***
[0.066] [0.066] [0.075] [0.113]
D. Reduced form
Traded Tariff in YOC 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.057**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.025]
N 449,065 449,065 449,065 449,065
District FE x x x
YOC FE x x x x
Covariates x x x
State-specific linear trends x
Mother FE x
NOTES: YOC stands for the year of conception - defined as the year nine months prior to the month of birth. Each
cell constitutes a separate regression. Columns (2) - (4) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number
of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years of schooling and household’s religion and caste
dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use
district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
105
Table 2.4: The Effect of Tariff Reduction on Infant Mortality
Mortality in 1 month (1) (2) (3) (4)
A1. OLS
Tariff in YOB -0.035** -0.041** -0.010 -0.023
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.039]
B1. Reduced form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.009 -0.011* -0.002 -0.015
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011]
C1. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.045 -0.052* -0.012 -0.080*
[0.028] [0.029] [0.031] [0.047]
Mortality in 6 months
A2. OLS
Tariff in YOB -0.046** -0.054*** -0.010 -0.036
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.043]
B2. Reduced form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.011* -0.013* -0.002 -0.020
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012]
C2. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.055* -0.064* -0.011 -0.106**
[0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.054]
Mortality in 12 months
A3. OLS
Tariff in YOB -0.052** -0.063*** -0.016 -0.041
[0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.046]
B3. Reduced form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.014* -0.016** -0.003 -0.022
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013]
C3. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.067* -0.076** -0.017 -0.118**
[0.036] [0.037] [0.039] [0.058]
First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.193*** 0.185***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.025] [0.028]
F-stat 42.85 42.88 58.23 43.14
N 473,430 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x
Covariates x x x
State-specific linear trends x
Mother FE x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. Each cell constitutes a separate regression. All regressions include
indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) - (4) include indicators for mother’s
age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years of schooling and
household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the
district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
106
Table 2.5: IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Child’s Gender
Mortality in 12 months (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff in YOB * Boy 0.071 0.063 0.063 0.212***
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.066]
Tariff in YOB -0.104** -0.109** -0.049 -0.226***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.047] [0.068]
N 473,430 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x
Covariates x x x
State-specific linear trends x
Mother FE x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. Each column constitutes a separate regression. Columns (2) - (4)include
indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years
of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. The main effect of Boy is included in all specifications, but
not reported. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions
use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 2.6: IV Estimates: By Caste
A. Birth=1 (1) (2) (3)
Tariff in YOB * SC -0.449*** -0.362*** -0.293***
[0.096] [0.085] [0.078]
Tariff in YOB * ST -0.730*** -0.731*** -0.614***
[0.147] [0.142] [0.125]
Tariff in YOB * OBC -0.250*** -0.211*** -0.039
[0.077] [0.069] [0.061]
Tariff in YOB 0.191** 0.126* -0.019
[0.078] [0.072] [0.062]
N 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834
B. Boy=1
Tariff in YOC * SC 0.031 0.035 0.041
[0.138] [0.138] [0.140]
Tariff in YOC * ST 0.083 0.081 0.162
[0.154] [0.154] [0.162]
Tariff in YOC * OBC -0.036 -0.034 -0.051
[0.113] [0.113] [0.115]
Tariff in YOC 0.093 0.092 0.072
[0.097] [0.097] [0.103]
N 449,065 449,065 449,065
C. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * SC 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.200**
[0.081] [0.080] [0.080]
Tariff in YOB * ST -0.127 -0.131 0.044
[0.085] [0.086] [0.075]
Tariff in YOB * OBC 0.138** 0.136** 0.073
[0.058] [0.058] [0.060]
Tariff in YOB -0.136*** -0.142*** -0.085
[0.052] [0.052] [0.055]
N 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Covariates x x
State-specific linear trends x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. General caste households are
the excluded group. The main effects of SC, ST, and OBC are included in all regressions but not reported. Columns
(2)-(3) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Column (2) also includes mother’s
years of schooling and household’s religion dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered
at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 2.7: IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Caste and Child’s Sex
Mortality in 12 months Girls Boys
Tariff in YOB * SC 0.346*** 0.072
[0.114] [0.103]
Tariff in YOB * ST 0.011 0.083
[0.109] [0.105]
Tariff in YOB * OBC 0.217*** -0.052
[0.084] [0.081]
Tariff in YOB -0.171** -0.014
[0.078] [0.075]
N 227,881 245,549
District FE x x
Year FE x x
Covariates x x
State-specific linear trends x x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. General caste households are the excluded group. The main effects of
SC, ST, OBC are included in all regressions but not reported. All regressions include indicators for mother’s age at
birth, number of previous births, mother’s years of schooling and household’s religion dummies. Robust standard
errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights.
*** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 2.8: IV Estimates: By Mother’s Education
A. Birth=1 (1) (2) (3)
Tariff in YOB * Uneducated -0.138** -0.396*** -0.351***
[0.067] [0.069] [0.065]
Tariff in YOB * 1-5 years 0.309*** 0.102 0.068
[0.081] [0.065] [0.064]
Tariff in YOB -0.080 0.060 0.034
[0.060] [0.053] [0.056]
N 1,354,769 1,354,769 1,354,769
B. Boy=1
Tariff in YOC * Uneducated 0.305** 0.292** 0.287*
[0.143] [0.142] [0.151]
Tariff in YOC * 1-5 years -0.152 -0.161 -0.138
[0.188] [0.187] [0.187]
Tariff in YOC -0.091 -0.082 -0.132
[0.125] [0.124] [0.141]
N 277,601 277,601 277,601
C. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Uneducated 0.207*** 0.258*** 0.181***
[0.066] [0.067] [0.066]
Tariff in YOB * 1-5 years -0.068 -0.044 -0.056
[0.071] [0.071] [0.072]
Tariff in YOB -0.173*** -0.216*** -0.147**
[0.056] [0.058] [0.063]
N 290,653 290,653 290,653
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Covariates x x
State-specific linear trends x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. Women with more than 5 years
of education are the excluded group. The sample is restricted to women above age 20 at the time of survey. The
main effects of education groups are included in all regressions but not reported. Columns (2)-(3) include indicators
for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Column (2) also include household’s caste and religion
dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use
district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 2.9: IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Mother’s Education and Child’s Sex
Mortality in 12 months Girls Boys
Tariff in YOB * Uneducated 0.256*** 0.110
[0.087] [0.082]
Tariff in YOB * 1-5 years -0.070 -0.058
[0.110] [0.103]
Tariff in YOB -0.169** -0.122
[0.085] [0.079]
N 139,491 151,162
District FE x x
Year FE x x
Covariates x x
State-specific linear trends x x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. Women with more than 5 years of education are the excluded group. The
sample is restricted to women above age 20 at the time of survey. The main effects of education groups are included
in all regressions but not reported. All regressions include indicators for mother’s age at birth, number of previous
births, and household’s caste and religion dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered
at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 2.10: IV Estimates: By Household Wealth Index
A. Birth=1 (1) (2) (3)
Tariff in YOB * Low SLI -0.835*** -0.768*** -0.614***
[0.097] [0.090] [0.072]
Tariff in YOB * High SLI 0.066 0.014 0.012
[0.051] [0.046] [0.047]
Tariff in YOB 0.366*** 0.301*** 0.167***
[0.054] [0.052] [0.049]
N 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834
B. Boy=1
Tariff in YOC * Low SLI 0.239** 0.234** 0.222*
[0.110] [0.111] [0.120]
Tariff in YOC * High SLI -0.247 -0.245 -0.263*
[0.150] [0.150] [0.151]
Tariff in YOC -0.022 -0.018 -0.026
[0.097] [0.097] [0.103]
N 449,065 449,065 449,065
C. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Low SLI 0.201*** 0.217*** 0.195***
[0.054] [0.054] [0.053]
Tariff in YOB * High SLI 0.078 0.046 0.047
[0.063] [0.063] [0.064]
Tariff in YOB -0.197*** -0.212*** -0.142***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.046]
N 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Covariates x x
State-specific linear trends x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. Medium SLI households are the
excluded group. The main effects of High SLI and Low SLI are included in all regressions but not reported. Columns
(2)-(3) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Column (2) also includes mother’s
years of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.12: IV Estimates: Adult Employment by Caste (NSS Data)
Men Women
Days worked in the last year (1) (2)
Tariff * SC 329.303*** -736.672***
[57.392] [87.187]





NOTES: Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. The main effects of SC
and ST are included in all regressions but not reported. Sample is restricted to adult men and women in the 25-50
age-group. Other controls in this regression are the same as in Table 2.4 of Edmonds et al. (2010). *** 1%, **5%,
*10%.
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Table 2.13: IV Estimates: Urban India
Birth = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
A1. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.305*** 0.315***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.026] [0.029]
F-stat 108.05 108.3 134.23 118.72
B1. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.100** -0.141*** -0.151*** -0.230*
[0.049] [0.047] [0.051] [0.127]
N 895,134 895,134 895,134 895,134
Boy = 1
A2. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOC 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.285*** 0.279***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.023] [0.022]
F-stat 111.27 111.56 147.64 158.02
B2. IV
Tariff in YOC -0.040 -0.033 0.060 -0.251
[0.110] [0.110] [0.122] [0.155]
N 186,953 186,953 186,953 186,953
C1. Mortality in 1 month
Tariff in YOB -0.012 -0.009 0.003 -0.013
[0.034] [0.034] [0.036] [0.052]
C2. Mortality in 6 months
Tariff in YOB -0.030 -0.027 -0.020 -0.025
[0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.055]
C3. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB -0.033 -0.030 -0.017 -0.038
[0.038] [0.039] [0.040] [0.059]
C4. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.291*** 0.283***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.023]
F-stat 105.37 105.63 130.03 149.57
N 198,400 198,400 198,400 198,400
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x
Covariates x x x
State-specific linear trends x
Mother FE x
NOTES: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. Each cell constitutes a separate
regression. Columns (2) - (4) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns
(2) and (3) also include mother’s years of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard
errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights.
*** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Chapter 3
Sex Ratios, Schooling, and the
Marriage Market
S Anukriti1
1I am grateful to Pierre-Andre´ Chiappori, Janet Currie, Lena Edlund, Todd Kumler, Bentley MacLeod, Cristian
Pop-Eleches, Bernard Salanie´, Lesley Turner, and Till von Wachter for helpful feedback. I also thank the Columbia
University Economics Department for funding access to the Indian National Sample Survey data.
3.1 Introduction
In the past few decades, increased availability of ultrasound technology has led to a sharp rise in the
male-female sex ratio at birth in several Asian countries. This paper examines the differential effect
of imbalances in the sex ratio at birth on pre-marital investments in schooling, marital matching,
and post-marital outcomes for men and women in India.
There are many channels through which fluctuations in the sex ratio at birth can affect pre-
marital investments in schooling. First, scarcity of women in the population may change marriage
and labor market returns from education. Consequently, forward-looking parents may strategically
alter investments in their children’s schooling as the sex-imbalance grows. In the context of second-
generation American immigrants, Lafortune (2011) finds that worse marriage market conditions
caused men and women (in highly endogamous groups) to increase investment in education. Sec-
ond, girls born after prenatal sex-selection becomes feasible are also likely to be more “wanted”
than those who are born before, if parents substitute postnatal discrimination with sex-selective
abortions. Hu and Schlosser (2011) find a negative association between the sex ratio at birth and
the prevalence of malnutrition among girls in India. Similarly, Lin et al. (2010) find that legal-
ization of abortion in Taiwan decreased excess female child mortality. Third, greater sex-selection
may differentially affect the family size girls are born into, relative to boys (Jensen (2005)). This is
because fertility and sex ratios are jointly determined and greater sex-selection may be associated
with lower fertility (Anukriti, 2013). Fourth, access to sex-selection may increase the likelihood that
girls are born in families with lower socio-economic status if mating is non-random and parents
value grandchildren (Edlund (1999)), thereby worsening the outcomes for females.
Fluctuations in the sex ratio at birth may also affect the likelihood and the timing of marriage
as well as the match quality through changes in the size and the characteristics of the mating pool.
Abramitzky et al. (2011), Angrist (2002), and many other papers find that an imbalance in the
marriage market sex ratio improves marriage outcomes for the scarcer sex. Post-marital outcomes,
such as labor force participation, may also change. The labor market effects could be a direct
result of the adjustments in educational attainment, but may also be driven by changes in the
distribution of intra-household bargaining power resulting from altered matching outcomes. Most
prior literature on sex ratios and marriage markets focuses on societies and time periods where
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social norms about marriage are quite different from the Indian context. This is the first paper to
examine the consequences of biased sex ratios on marital outcomes in a developing country with
highly endogamous marriage markets.
I use repeated cross-sectional data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) and the National
Family Health Survey (NFHS) of India and a triple difference-in-difference type estimation strategy
similar to the one adopted by Hu and Schlosser (2011). India exhibits substantial variation in the
sex ratio at birth over time and across states. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) and Hu and Schlosser
(2011) show that the variation in sex ratios at birth over time can be explained by differential access
to sex-selection technology. In the absence of reliable annual births data, I construct retrospective
sex ratios at birth by pooling the NSS rounds. To the extent that several outcomes of interest in
this paper are likely to operate through the marriage market, I also construct sex ratios that vary
across endogamous caste-religious groups, in addition to the state and the year of birth.
My results show that an increase in the sex ratio at birth is associated with a decrease in
educational attainment for women relative to men. This finding is reflected in reduced school
attendance rates for 5-14 year old girls as well as in primary and secondary school completion
rates for 15-60 year old women. These results are strongest for lower-caste Hindu families who
are less likely to practice sex-selection and, hence, more likely to have daughters in the first place.
Moreover, age at marriage decreases (increases) for women (men) and they are more likely to marry
older men as sex ratios increase. Since men typically marry younger women, this also implies an
increase in the spousal age gap. Women born in higher sex ratio at birth environment are also less
likely to participate in the labor force, relative to men. The labor market effects are mainly driven
by married women. Together, these results suggest that increases in the sex ratio at birth lead to
“improvements” in women’s position on the marriage market. However, to what extent decreases
in educational attainment, age at marriage, and labor force participation are welfare-improving in
the long-run is unclear.
Section 2 describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results. Section
4 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Data and Construction of Sex Ratios at Birth
The data used in this paper come from two sources - the NSS Employment Unemployment Survey
and the NFHS. I use six quinquennial rounds from the NSS (38th, 43rd, 50th, 55th, 60th, and 66th)
conducted in 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94, 1999-00, 2004-05, and 2009-10. These are nationwide, repeated
cross-sectional, household surveys, representative at the state level. They include information on
household characteristics like size, caste, religion, monthly per capita expenditure, and detailed
demographic particulars for each household member, including age, sex, marital status, educational
attainment, school attendance, and labor force participation status. However, the NSS does not
report age at marriage and spousal characteristics for married individuals. Therefore, in addition
to the NSS, I use three rounds of the NFHS that were conducted in 1992-93, 1998-99, and 2005-06
to examine the effect on marital outcomes.
Since the Census of India takes place once every ten years and birth registration is not widespread,
the annual number of male and female births have to be estimated using survey data. I use data
from the NSS to construct retrospective estimates of the sex ratio at birth. First, I deduce the year
of birth for an individual using information on the reported age at the time of the survey.2 Next, I
pool individual data from all six rounds of the NSS and collapse them at the appropriate level to
construct estimates of the total number of males and females in each cell.3 I use the 7-year moving
average of the ratio of the number of male births to female births as a measure of the sex ratio at
birth. However, all results are robust to using alternate smoothing procedures.
For most of the paper, the sex ratio at birth is defined and constructed at the state-year level
(similar to Hu and Schlosser (2011)). Although the NSS can be used to construct district-level
estimates, I use state as the relevant geographic level for the following reasons. First, state is the
more appropriate geographic dimension for defining the marriage market (which is likely to be an
important explanatory channel for my findings) in India. Second, both data sources used in this
paper do not report an individual’s place of birth. Consequently, I assume that the place of birth
is the same as the place where the interview was conducted. This assumption is especially likely to
2The NSS does not provide the year of birth.
3The relevant sampling weights are used when data is collapsed to the cell-level.
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be violated for married women due to the practice of patrilocal exogamy.4 The measurement error
would, however, be smaller for state-level sex ratios since it is more likely that a woman is married
in the same state than in the same district. In general, inter-state migration is quite low in India -
for example, less than 4% of the population in 2001 had moved across states in the last ten years
according to the Census data.
Indian marriages are also highly endogamous, both in terms of caste (jati) and religion. Accord-
ing to the 2005 India Human Development Survey, only 4.4% of women were married to a spouse
from a different caste. Using responses to matrimonial advertisements in a Bengali newspaper, ?
find evidence in favor of a strong preference for in-caste marriage - for example, the bride’s family
is willing to trade-off the difference between no education and a master’s degree in the prospec-
tive husband to avoid marrying outside their caste. In addition to this “horizontal” preference for
same-caste marriages, inter-subcaste marriages are governed by strict rules of hierarchy. Although
caste is primarily a Hindu phenomenon, the notion of caste-based hierarchy remains well-preserved
among many other religious groups in India. In the 2009 National Sample Survey, 31% of Sikh
households identified themselves as belonging to a Scheduled Caste (SC).5 Lastly, inter-religious
marriages are far less common than inter-caste marriages.
Therefore, in addition to the state and the year of birth, I also define sex ratios at birth by
caste-religious groups. Since detailed subcaste-level data is not available, I divide the sample into
twelve broadly-defined “endogamous” groups using a classification system recognized in the Indian
Constitution. The Constitution of India recognizes certain castes, Scheduled Castes (SC), and
tribes, Scheduled Tribes (ST), as historically disadvantaged. In addition, the Government of India
has classified a large group of castes and communities as “Other Backward Classes” to reflect their
social and economic disadvantage. I interact these caste groups with the four largest religious
groups in India to create twelve endogamous categories - General caste Hindus, SC Hindus, OBC
Hindus, ST Hindus, General caste Muslims, OBC Muslims, General caste Sikhs, SC Sikhs, OBC
Sikhs, General caste Christians, OBC Christians, and ST Christians. Some categories, such as
ST Muslims and ST Sikhs, are excluded because very few individuals belong to these groups. For
the construction of sex ratios by these endogamous groups as well as for subsequent regression
4Most migrants in India are women relocating at the time of marriage.
5The Census of India also allows Sikhs and Buddhists to be classified as Scheduled Castes.
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analyses based on the NSS data, the sample is restricted to the 55th, 61st, and 66th rounds of the
NSS because the earlier rounds (38th to 50th) do not distinguish between OBC and general caste
households.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3.1 presents the summary statistics for the NSS data disaggregated by rounds. The sample
comprises 26 states and more than 3 million observations. Roughly 48% of the sample is female. To
examine the effects on schooling, I create two sub-samples: 5-14 year old children and 15-60 year
old adults. The year of birth ranges from 1969-2004 for the children’s sample and from 1923-1994
for adults. Average age at the time of the survey is 23 years. About 38% of the individuals reside
in a rural area, 78% are Hindus, and 15% belong to a scheduled caste. The sex ratio at birth (at
the state-year level) has steadily increased over time - from 1.048 in the 38th round to 1.084 in the
66th round. Children in the 5-14 age-group comprise 12% of the sample. Among them, 69% of the
girls and 81% of the boys report attending school at the time of the survey. The school attendance
rates have increased for both sexes over time and the gap in schooling has decreased from 21% in
1983 to 2% in 2009-10. Among 15-60 year old individuals, females are more likely to be married
and have lower educational attainment as reflected in the gap between literacy and the primary
and the secondary school completion rates. They are also less likely to participate in the labor
force, but conditional on being in the labor force, the difference in employment rates in not large.
Figure 3.3.1 plots the constructed (state-year) sex ratio at birth by year for India as a whole.
Until the early 1980s, the sex ratio at birth was close to the natural rate, i.e. 1.05. Thereafter, the
population has increasingly became more male-biased. Since the sex ratio has been constructed
from retrospective population data, it is likely to suffer from measurement errors due to differential
mortality and migration by sex. As a robustness check, Figure 3.3.1 also plots the sex ratio of
0-year old population as reported in the decennial Census of India. The Census methodology for
constructing single year age population returns has changed significantly over time and is also likely
to suffer from measurement error.6 Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the NSS sex ratio at birth
6For example, in the 1971 Census, the state-level tabulations were made on the basis of a 10 percent sample of
individual slips for rural and a 20 percent sample for urban areas. In the 1981 Census, the numbers were calculated
based on a 20 percent sample of enumeration blocks, while the 1991 Census used a 10 percent sample of individual
slips. Since the 2001 Census, enumeration has been done on a 100 percent basis.
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follows a similar trend as the Census ratio, although the former appears to be systematically larger
than the Census estimates.
Figure 3.3.2 exhibits the substantial state-level variation in the sex ratio at birth (both levels
and trends). The sex-imbalance in north and north-west India is, in general, much larger than
south and east India. However, it is not the case that all states within the same region exhibit
the same pattern. For example, Himachal Pradesh has a much lower sex ratio at birth than its
neighbors, Haryana and Punjab. Figure 3.3 describes the time variation in the sex ratio at birth
by caste for Hindus. While all groups experienced a sharp increase during the early 1980s, the
sex ratio appears to have returned to the normal level for the lower caste groups (SC and OBC).
However, the upper or general castes continue to exhibit sex ratios significantly above 1.05.
3.2.3 Regression Specifications
The regression framework seeks to isolate the differential effect of sex ratio imbalances on pre-marital
investments, marital matching, and post-marital outcomes of males and females. My identification
strategy utilizes the (presumably exogenous) variation in the sex ratio at birth within states, over
time, and across endogamous caste-religious groups caused by the variation in the timing and the
prevalence of prenatal sex-selection.
For an individual i in state s born in year t and of age a at the time of the survey, my first
specification is:
Yista =α+ β(Rst ∗ Femalei) + γRst + θs + σt + ωFemalei +X ′iδ + ψa
+ ρsFemalei + λtFemalei + piaFemalei + φst+ ista
(3.1)
where Yista is the outcome of interest, Rst is the sex ratio at birth for state s in year t, and Femalei
indicates that individual i is female. The vector Xi includes dummy variables for religion (Hindu,
Muslim, Sikh, Christian), caste (SC and ST), and residence in a rural area. In addition, I include
fixed effects for state (θs), year of birth (σt), and age at the time of the survey (ψa). Sex-specific
time-invariant differences across states (for example, in the degree of son preference) are captured
by the term ρsFemalei. Sex-specific year of birth effects (λtFemalei) control for differential all-
India trends for males and females. Lastly, I also include state-specific time trends to take into
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account differential trends across states that are common for males and females. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the state-level.
The coefficient γ captures the effect of changes in the sex ratio at birth on males while β
measures the differential effect on females relative to males born in the same state and year. All
results are robust to the replacement of the main effect of Rst and the state-specific time trends with
state-year of birth fixed effects. This ensures that my findings are not driven by any unobservable
state-time varying factors.
In addition, I also exploit variation in sex ratios by endogamous caste-religious groups to further
isolate the effects operating through the marriage market channel. The second specification is as
follows:
Yistca = α+ β(Rstc ∗ Femalei) + γRstc + ωFemalei + θs + µt + νc + ψa +X ′iδ
+ φst + σct + ρsFemalei + pitFemalei + ηcFemalei + λaFemalei + istca
(3.2)
In specification (2), the sex ratio at birth, Rstc, has been computed separately for each state, year,
and caste-religious group, but otherwise the methodology remains the same. The covariates vector,
Xi, comprises an indicator for residence in a rural area. In addition to the fixed effects included in
specification (1), now I also control for caste-religion fixed effects (νc), interaction fixed effects for
state-year (φst), caste-year (σct), and sex-specific caste-religious group fixed effects (ηcFemalei).
Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
The effects on educational attainment are measured through four outcome variables. The first
variable is an indicator that equals one if a child in the 5-14 age-group reports attending school.
However, this variable does not adequately reflect completed education. Therefore, in addition, for
adults (in the 15-60 age-group) I construct dummy variables for literacy, completion of primary
schooling, and completion of secondary schooling. I also examine the effects on age at marriage,
age and educational attainment of the spouse, and labor force participation rate for adults.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Effects on Schooling
Table 3.3.2 presents the estimates for the effects of changes in the sex ratio at birth on educational
outcomes using specification (1) and data from the NSS. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is
restricted to children in the 5-14 year age-group and the outcome variable is an indicator that
equals one if the child attends school, and zero otherwise. Columns (3)-(8) examine the impacts
on the educational attainment of older individuals who are likely to have completed schooling by
the time of the survey. The sample is restricted to the age-group 15-60 years. The three outcome
variables are indicators for being literate, completion of primary schooling, and completion of
secondary schooling. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) include fixed effects for state, year of birth,
their interactions with the sex of the individual, and state-specific linear time trends. In addition,
columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) also control for individual covariates (caste, religion, and residence
in a rural area) and sex-specific fixed effects for age at the time of the survey.
The coefficient of the interaction between SRB and Female, β, is negative and highly significant
in columns (1) and (2). This implies that girls born in states and years with a higher sex imbalance
are significantly less likely to attend school when they are 5-14 years old, relative to boys born in
the same state and year. The overall effect for girls (given by β+γ) is also negative suggesting that
an increase in prenatal sex-selection over time is associated with a decrease in the likelihood that
a girl attends school as compared to similar girls in the same state who are born in years with a
lower sex ratio at birth. The interaction coefficient in column (2) implies that a one unit increase in
the sex ratio at birth is associated with a 30 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a girl
attends school, relative to a boy. The average sex ratio at birth increased from 1.048 for individuals
surveyed in the 38th round to 1.084 for individuals surveyed in the 66th round, thereby decreasing
a girl’s relative likelihood of attending school by 1 percentage point. For states like Punjab, where
the sex ratio at birth increased by almost 20 percentage points from the 38th to the 66th round,
this translates into a 6 percentage point decrease (for a sample mean of 0.774). For boys, the effect
is positive, not significant, and smaller in magnitude than girls.
Similarly, the coefficients of the interaction terms are negative and significant for columns (3) -
(6) suggesting that 15-60 year old women born in states and years with higher sex ratios at birth
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are less likely to be literate and to complete primary schooling, relative to men born in the same
state-year. There is no significant difference in the secondary schooling completion rate as shown
by columns (7) and (8). The overall effects for females are also negative for literacy and primary
school completion. Similar to columns (1) and (2), the effect on males is not significantly different
from zero. The interaction coefficients in columns (4) and (6) translate into a 0.45 percentage point
and 0.39 percentage point relative decrease, respectively, in the literacy and primary completion
rates for women who experienced the average increase in the sex ratio at birth. For states like
Punjab, the decreases are larger (2.6 and 2.29 percentage points respectively).The findings in Table
3.3.2 continue to hold when data from the NFHS are used instead of the NSS. The NFHS results
are presented in Table 3.8.
Table 3.3 presents the results from specification (2). For each outcome variable, two sets of
results are reported. In addition to fixed effects for state, year of birth, caste-religious group, age,
rural dummy, and interaction fixed effects for sex-state, sex-caste, and sex-year of birth, columns
(1), (3), (5), and (7) include fixed effects for state-year of birth and caste-year of birth, which
are replaced by state-specific and caste-religious group specific linear time trends in the remaining
columns. Like Table 3.3.2, the interaction terms are negative across all columns, but only significant
in case of children’s school attendance rates.
Unlike Hu and Schlosser (2011), who find that the malnutrition rate for girls decreases as the
sex ratio at birth increases, I find that the female educational attainment worsens relative to males.
This result cannot be explained by an improvement in the desirability of girls born after prenatal
sex-selection becomes available. My findings are more consistent with the marriage market channel
that suggests lower pre-marital investments by the scarcer sex (similar to Lafortune (2011)). The
inferior educational outcomes for females can also be explained if girls are more likely to be born in
low-status families after ultrasound technology becomes available. However, this second mechanism
is not consistent with the findings of Hu and Schlosser (2011).
To explore the underlying channels further, next I split the sample by religious affiliation and
re-estimate specification (1) for each group separately to examine heterogeneity in the effects on
schooling. These results are presented in Table 3.4. The earlier results in Table 3.3.2 appear to be
mainly driven by Hindus and Sikhs. In Panel A, the likelihood of attendance falls by 37 percentage
points for Hindu girls relative to Hindu boys (whose attendance rates significantly increase) when
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SRB increases by one unit. Sikh children also show the same pattern of effects, but the coefficients
are not significant, likely due to much smaller sample sizes. There is no significant effect for Muslims
and Christians. Similarly, in Panel B, literacy and primary completion rates decrease significantly
for Hindu and Sikh women, relative to men in these religious groups. These findings are consistent
with prior evidence that the practice of prenatal sex-selection is more prevalent among Hindus
and Sikhs. Next, in Table 3.5, I further divide the Hindu sample into various castes. Column (5)
includes both general and OBC groups since earlier NSS rounds (38th to 50th) do not distinguish
between OBC and general caste households. Columns (3) and (4) are based only on the 55th, 61st,
and 66th rounds. Both Panels A and B show that the overall decrease in educational attainment
of Hindu females in Table 3.4 is driven by lower-caste families. For upper-caste or general caste
Hindu women, there is an increase in literacy as well as primary and secondary completion rates
overall as well as relative to men. On the other hand, upper caste Hindu men experience worse
schooling outcomes. The coefficients for upper-caste Hindu children in Panel A are insignificant,
however.
These differential effects by caste cannot be explained by potential changes in the characteristics
of families into which girls are born. It is possible that the desirability channel is at work for upper-
caste families (who are more likely to practice sex-selection) while the marriage market channels
are operative for the lower-caste families. It is also important to note that the effects on general
caste Hindu women are different from those observed for general caste Hindu girls. However, the
time-period covered by the adult sample (1923-1994) is not the same as that of the children’s sample
(1969-2004). As shown by Figure 3.3, the sex ratios for general castes and lower castes diverged
around the mid-1990s. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) also point out that a structural break in
the diffusion of ultrasound technology occurred in 1995. A better understanding of the underlying
channels is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3.2 Effects on Marriage
In this section, I examine the effects of being born in a higher sex ratio environment on the timing
of marriage as well as the age and the educational attainment of the spouse, conditional on being
married at the time of the survey. These regressions are based on data from the NFHS since the
NSS neither reports the year of marriage nor provides information about spousal characteristics.
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Moreover, the first two rounds of the NFHS only interviewed women, whereas NFHS-3 interviewed
both men and women. Since my empirical strategy compares men and women, I restrict the sample
to NFHS-3 in this section. Table 3.6 presents the estimates for specifications (1) and (2) with age
at marriage as the outcome variable. Columns (1) and (2) use the entire NFHS-3 sample. In order
to further examine heterogeneity in effects by caste and religion, columns (3) - (6) split the sample
by religion, and columns (7) - (10) further split the Hindu sample by caste, for specification (1).
Overall, the age at marriage increases for men and decreases for women. This result is consistent
with an improvement in (worsening of) women’s (men’s) position on the marriage market due to
their relative scarcity (abundance). In the first two columns, the coefficient of SRB is positive and
significant. The interaction term is negative but loses significance at conventional levels in column
(2). Hindus and Sikhs exhibit a similar pattern as column (1) and among Hindus, the interaction
coefficient is significant only for the SC sample. These findings are consistent with the results in
Tables 4 and 5. The coefficients in column (1) approximately translate into a 2-year increase and a
1-year decrease in the age at marriage for men and women, respectively for a unit increase in the
sex ratio at birth.
In Table 3.7, the outcome variables are the age and the years of education of the spouse.
Columns (1) and (2) show that an increase in the sex ratio of birth is associated with men mar-
rying younger and less educated women (except in column (4)), although the coefficients are not
significant. For women, the age of the husband increases as women become more scarce but the
interaction coefficient is only significant when the sex ratio at birth is calculated at the state-year
level (column (1) ). Since men typically marry younger women, the age effects in Tables 6 and 7
suggest that an increase in the sex ratio at birth is associated with a larger spousal age gap.
3.3.3 Effects on Labor Force Participation
Lastly, I compare the effects of changes in the sex ratio at birth on labor force participation rates
of men and women using the NSS data. Column (1) in Table 3.8 shows that women are relatively
less likely to participate in the labor force when the sex ratio at birth increases. Men, on the
other hand, are more likely to be in the labor force. These effects could be driven by the effects
on educational attainment shown earlier. It is also possible that women’s improved position on
the marriage market increases their bargaining power within household leading to reduced labor
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supply (and increased leisure) for them. In columns (2) - (5), I find that this result holds for Hindu
men and women. Muslim women also experience a relative decrease in labor force participation,
but unlike Hindus, the effect on men is not significant. Among Hindus, all caste groups exhibit the
same pattern, but the effects are the largest for SC individuals. Endogamous sex ratios at birth
yield qualitatively similar results, but the coefficients are not significant and are available upon
request.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper examines how imbalanced sex ratios differentially affect pre-marital investments in
schooling, marital matching, and labor force participation rates of Indian men and women. I
exploit the variation in the sex ratio at birth caused by changes in the availability of technology
for prenatal sex-selection along with differential exposure due to endogamous marriage markets to
estimate these effects. My results suggest that a relative scarcity of women improves their position
in the marriage market as reflected in decreased pre-marital investments in education, lower age at
marriage, older spouses, and lower labor force participation rates, relative to men. On the other
hand, there is an increase in the educational attainment (albeit insignificant), age at marriage, and
the labor force participation rate, and a decrease in wife’s age for men, suggesting that the more
abundant sex invests more pre-maritally in order to attract a match and also fares worse in terms
of the outcomes on the marriage market as well as post-marriage.
However, this paper is not without its limitations. First, in constructing the sex ratio at birth,
I have ignored the fact that, typically, men marry younger women. To the extent that expectations
about the marriage market are an important explanatory mechanism for my findings, it may be
better to construct sex ratios by taking into account the average spousal age gap. Second, in the
absence of better data, the sex ratios have been constructed using retrospective birth data. Any
sex-specific differentials in mortality and migration rates are likely to introduce measurement error
in the key variable of interest. In future work, I plan to construct more robust measures of marriage
market sex ratios to address these concerns. Lastly, although the results presented in this paper
paint a consistent picture, it is not a complete or perfectly causal picture. A better understanding
of the effects of large-scale population imbalances also requires an examination of the effects on
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other outcomes and margins of adjustment, such as dowries, fertility, and expenditure patterns,
among others.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in the Sex Ratio at Birth, India
NOTES: NSS plots the 7-year moving average of the sex ratio at birth constructed from pooled NSS data. Census
refers to the sex ratio at age 0 using single year age returns from the Census of India. The horizontal line reflects the






























































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Trends in the Sex Ratio at Birth for Hindus, by Caste
NOTES: This graph plots the 7-year moving average of the sex ratio at birth constructed from pooled NSS data. SC
stands for Scheduled Castes and OBC represents Other Backward Classes. Only rounds 55, 61, and 66 have been
used since earlier rounds do not distinguish between OBC and General castes. The horizontal line reflects the natural
male-female sex ratio at birth, equal to 1.05.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics, NSS
Round 38th 43rd 50th 55th 61st 66th All
Year of survey 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10
N 574,259 607,327 514,281 536,013 543,176 411,737 3,186,793
Hindu 0.791 0.788 0.803 0.784 0.766 0.766 0.784
Muslim 0.138 0.137 0.116 0.139 0.137 0.141 0.135
Sikh 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.022 0.025
Christian 0.043 0.045 0.052 0.048 0.067 0.069 0.053
Scheduled Caste 0.148 0.139 0.149 0.156 0.160 0.159 0.151
Scheduled Tribe 0.094 0.098 0.100 0.101 0.120 0.122 0.105
Rural 0.336 0.331 0.369 0.374 0.338 0.615 0.383
Sex Ratio at birth 1.048 1.052 1.062 1.074 1.081 1.084 1.066
Age at survey 21.910 22.409 23.279 23.581 24.203 25.435 23.353
Female 0.485 0.483 0.481 0.484 0.487 0.485 0.484
Children: 5-14 years
N 76,294 77,076 61,528 66,943 66,466 47,561 395,868
Female 0.470 0.465 0.463 0.470 0.471 0.464 0.467
Attends school (for girls) 0.479 0.573 0.705 0.749 0.842 0.888 0.688
Attends school (for boys) 0.686 0.743 0.831 0.841 0.899 0.908 0.808
Adults: 15-60 years
N 337,650 368,112 326,137 342,474 355,508 283,067 2,012,948
Female 0.490 0.489 0.487 0.489 0.494 0.493 0.490
Females
Married 0.850 0.836 0.820 0.808 0.798 0.782 0.816
Literate 0.361 0.422 0.502 0.558 0.615 0.702 0.521
Primary or above 0.279 0.333 0.409 0.468 0.518 0.696 0.444
Secondary or above 0.085 0.121 0.175 0.216 0.226 0.321 0.187
In labor force 0.302 0.289 0.337 0.320 0.367 0.247 0.312
Employed 0.948 0.947 0.956 0.956 0.939 0.945 0.948
Males
Married 0.693 0.682 0.670 0.662 0.659 0.651 0.670
Literate 0.636 0.692 0.744 0.773 0.818 0.864 0.751
Primary or above 0.514 0.572 0.629 0.670 0.717 0.860 0.654
Secondary or above 0.186 0.238 0.310 0.346 0.358 0.459 0.312
In labor force 0.862 0.849 0.846 0.837 0.842 0.813 0.842
Employed 0.951 0.949 0.962 0.955 0.954 0.971 0.957
NOTES: The sex ratio at birth refers to the the 7-year moving average of the sex ratio at birth constructed from































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Effects on Educational Outcomes, by Religion
Hindu Muslim Sikh Christian
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Children: 5-14 years
Attends school
SRB * Female -0.3683*** 0.0820 -0.1991 0.0116
[0.0917] [0.1538] [0.2000] [0.0467]
SRB 0.1304* -0.1170 0.0585 0.0064
[0.0744] [0.1130] [0.0978] [0.0438]
N 617,735 120,624 18,363 40,041
B. Adults: 15-60 years
Literate
SRB * Female -0.1749** -0.1465 -0.2460* -0.0386
[0.0721] [0.1629] [0.1424] [0.0864]
SRB 0.0189 0.0043 -0.0291 0.0120
[0.0439] [0.0642] [0.0736] [0.0432]
Primary and above
SRB * Female -0.1394* -0.1122 -0.3685* -0.0216
[0.0744] [0.1315] [0.2071] [0.0939]
SRB -0.0081 -0.0639 0.0123 -0.0203
[0.0450] [0.0819] [0.0937] [0.0718]
Secondary and above
SRB * Female -0.0112 0.1116** -0.2940 0.0265
[0.0392] [0.0499] [0.2437] [0.0712]
SRB 0.0116 0.0603 -0.0898 0.0419
[0.0507] [0.0600] [0.0930] [0.0598]
N 1,589,572 251,255 52,064 111,482
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients β and γ from specification (1). SRB stands for the male-female sex ratio
at birth. Female is equal to one if the child is a female, and zero otherwise. Each column corresponds to a different
regression. The control variables included are same as in column (2) of Table 3.3.2, except religion indicators. Robust
standard errors are in brackets are have been clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.5: Effects on Educational Outcomes among Hindus, by Caste
SC ST OBC General General/OBC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Children: 5-14 years
Attends school
SRB * Female -0.4717*** -0.2243 -0.2108** -0.0964 -0.3586***
[0.1107] [0.1464] [0.0988] [0.0576] [0.0895]
SRB 0.0383 0.1497 0.0148 0.0744 0.1440*
[0.1175] [0.1226] [0.0961] [0.0526] [0.0788]
N 121,373 55,518 110,744 78,387 443,354
B. Adults: 15-60 years
Literate
SRB * Female -0.4380*** -0.3986** -0.3021** 0.1989** -0.1109
[0.1320] [0.1639] [0.1139] [0.0735] [0.0668]
SRB 0.0717 0.0751 -0.0789 -0.1101*** 0.0168
[0.0805] [0.0777] [0.0710] [0.0355] [0.0418]
Primary
SRB * Female -0.3091** -0.2312* -0.2931** 0.2074*** -0.1136*
[0.1227] [0.1346] [0.1237] [0.0629] [0.0629]
SRB 0.0155 0.051 -0.0697 -0.0806** 0.0019
[0.0734] [0.0620] [0.0755] [0.0362] [0.0452]
Secondary
SRB * Female -0.0121 -0.0251 -0.0464 0.1667*** -0.0232
[0.0499] [0.0485] [0.0774] [0.0556] [0.0386]
SRB 0.0037 0.0173 -0.0135 0.0039 0.0277
[0.0467] [0.0297] [0.0956] [0.0532] [0.0616]
N 281,648 130,525 303,330 263,666 1,185,972
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients β and γ from specification (1). The sample is restricted to Hindus. SRB
stands for the male-female sex ratio at birth. Female is equal to one if the child is a female, and zero otherwise.
Each column corresponds to a different regression. The control variables included are same as in column (2) of Table
3.3.2, except religion and caste covariates. Robust standard errors are in brackets are have been clustered at the state






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: Effects on Match Quality
Age of spouse Education of spouse
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SRB * Female 2.9873** 0.1451 -0.2182 0.1057
[1.1419] [0.1159] [0.9331] [0.1176]
SRB -1.0355 -0.1101 -0.1562 0.0589
[0.9340] [0.0845] [0.5859] [0.1051]
N 123,365 112,557 126,448 115,309
Endogamous SRB X X
NOTES: Columns (1) and (3) report the coefficients β and γ from specification (1) and columns (2) and (4) report
the same coefficients for specification (2) using NFHS-3 data. All covariates, interaction and main fixed effects are
included in all regresions. The sample is restricted to individuals older than 14 years. SRB stands for the male-female
sex ratio at birth. Female is equal to one if the child is a female, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abadie, A., A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller (2010): “Synthetic Control Methods for Com-
parative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program,” Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 105, 493–505.
Abadie, A. and J. Gardeazabal (2003): “The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of
the Basque Country,” The American Economic Review, 93, 113–132.
Abramitzky, R., A. Delavande, and L. Vasconcelos (2011): “Marrying Up: The Role of Sex
Ratio in Assortative Matching,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 124–157.
Abrevaya, J. (2009): “Are There Missing Girls in the United States? Evidence from Birth Data,”
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1, 1–34.
Aguayo-Tellez, E., J. Airola, and C. Juhn (2010): “Did Trade Liberalization Help Women?
The Case of Mexico in the 1990s,” NBER Working Paper 16195.
Ahlawat, N. (2009): “Missing Brides in Rural Haryana: A Study of Adverse Sex Ratio, Poverty
and Addiction,” Social Change, 39, 46–63.
Almond, D. and L. Edlund (2007): “Trivers-Willard at Birth and One Year: Evidence from US
Natality Data 1983-2001,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 274, 2491–2496.
——— (2008): “Son Biased Sex Ratios in the US 2000 Census,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5681–5682.
Almond, D., L. Edlund, and K. Milligan (2011): “O Sister, Where Art Thou? The Role of
Son Preference and Sex Choice: Evidence from Immigrants to Canada,” NBER Working Paper
15391.
Angrist, J. (2002): “How do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from
America’s Second Generation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 997–1038.
Anukriti, S. (2013): “The Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-off: Unintended Consequences of Financial
Incentives,” .
Arnold, F., S. Kishor, and T. Roy (2002): “Sex-selective Abortions in India,” Population and
Development Review, 28, 759–785.
Banerjee, A. and T. Piketty (2005): “Top Indian Incomes, 1922-2000,” World Bank Economic
Review, 19, 1–20.
Bardhan, P. (1974): “On Life and Death Issues,” Economic and Political Weekly, 9, 1293–1304.
Bedi, A. S. and S. Srinivasan (2009): “Girl Child Protection Scheme in Tamil Nadu: An
Appraisal,” Economic and Political Weekly, XLIV, 10–12.
Bhagwati, J. (1993): India in Transition: Freeing the Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
142
Bhalotra, S. and T. Cochrane (2010): “Where Have All the Young Girls Gone? Identification
of Sex Selection in India,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 5381.
Bharadwaj, P. (2008): “Fertility and Rural Labor Market Inefficiencies: Evidence from India,”
Unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego.
Bharadwaj, P. and L. K. Nelson (2012): “Discrimination Begins in the Womb - Evidence of
Sex Selective Prenatal Investments,” Journal of Human Resources (forthcoming).
Bhaskar, V. (2011): “Sex Selection and Gender Balance,” American Economic Journal: Microe-
conomics, 3, 214–244.
Bhaskar, V. and B. Gupta (2007): “India’s Missing Girls: Biology, Customs, and Economic
Development,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23, 221–238.
Bhat, P. and A. Zavier (2003): “Fertility Decline and Gender Bias in Northern India,” Demog-
raphy, 40, 637–657.
Black, S. E. and E. Brainerd (2004): “Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization on
Gender Discrimination,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57, 540–559.
Boserup, E. (1970): Woman’s Role in Economic Development, Earthscan.
Bowles, S. and S. Polania-Reyes (2012): “Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Sub-
stitutes or Complements,” Journal of Economic Literature, 50, 368–425.
Buch, N. (2006): The Law of Two Child Norm in Panchayats, Concept Publishing Company.
Carranza, E. (2012): “Soil Endowments, Production Technologies and Missing Women in India,”
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5974.
Case, A. (2001): “Health, Income, and Economic Development,” Annual World Bank Conference
on Development Economics, 221–241.
——— (2004): Does Money Protect Health Status? Evidence from South African Pensions, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, vol. Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, chap. 8, 287–312, 1 ed.
Chakraborty, T. (2012): “Impact of Industrialization on Relative Female Survival: Evidence
from Trade Policies,” Unpublished manuscript.
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002): “Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation,
and Household Labor Supply,” Journal of Political Economy, 110, 37–72.
Chung, W. (2007): “The Relation of Son Preference and Religion to Induced Abortion: The Case
of South Korea,” Journal of Biosocial Science, 39, 707–719.
Chung, W. and M. D. Gupta (2007): “The Decline of Son Preference in South Korea: The
Roles of Development and Public Policy,” Population and Development Review, 33, 757–783.
Clark, S. (2000): “Son Preference and Sex Composition of Children: Evidence from India,”
Demography, 37, 95–108.
Cohen, A., R. Dehejia, and D. Romanov (2012): “Financial Incentives and Fertility,” Review
of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).
Cutler, D., A. Deaton, and A. Lleras-Muney (2006): “The Determinants of Mortality,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 97–120.
143
Das Gupta, M. (1987): “Selective Discrimination Against Female Children in Rural Punjab,
India,” Population and Development Review, 13, 77–100.
——— (2010): “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction
of Son Preference and Its Unraveling,” Asian Population Studies, 6, 123–152.
Das Gupta, M., A. Ebenstein, and E. J. Sharygin (2010): “China’s Marriage Market and
Upcoming Challenges for Elderly Men,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5351.
Das Gupta, M. and L. Shuzhuo (1999): “Gender Bias in China, South Korea and India 1920-
1990: The Effects of War, Famine and Fertility decline,” Development and Change, 30, 619–652.
Das Gupta, M., J. Zhenghua, L. Bohua, X. Zhenming, W. Chung, and B. Hwa-Ok
(2003): “Why is Son Preference So Persistent in East and South Asia? A Cross-country Study
of China, India and the Republic of Korea,” Journal of Development Studies, 40, 153–187.
Dickenmann, M. (1979): Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior, North Scituate, MA:
Duxbury Press, chap. Female Infanticide, Reproductive Strategies, and Social Stratification: A
Preliminary Model.
Dre`ze, J. and R. Khera (2000): “Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from Homicide
Data,” Population and Development Review, 26, 335–352.
Dubuc, S. and D. Coleman (2007): “An Increase in the Sex Ratio of Births to India-born Moth-
ers in England and Wales: Evidence for Sex-Selective Abortion,” Population and Development
Review, 32, 328–332.
Dyson, T. and M. Moore (1983): “On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and Demographic
Behavior in India,” Population and Development Review, 9, 35–60.
Ebenstein, A. (2010): “The “Missing” Girls of China and the Unintended Consequences of the
One Child Policy,” The Journal of Human Resources, 45, 87–115.
——— (2011): “Estimating a Dynamic Model of Sex Selection in China,” Demography, 48, 783–811.
Ebenstein, A. Y. and E. J. Sharygin (2009): “The Consequences of the Missing Girls of
China,” The World Bank Economic Review, 23, 399–425.
Edlund, L. (1999): “Son Preference, Sex Ratios and Marriage Patterns,” The Journal of Political
Economy, 107, 1275–1304.
Edlund, L. and C. Lee (2009): “Son Preference, Sex Selection and Economic Development: The-
ory and Evidence from South Korea,” Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion
Paper No. 0910-04.
Edlund, L., H. Li, J. Yi, and J. Zhang (2007): “Sex Ratios and Crime: Evidence from China’s
One Child Policy,” IZA Discussion Paper 3214.
Edmonds, E. V., N. Pavcnik, and P. Topalova (2010): “Trade Adjustment and Human
Capital Investments: Evidence from Indian Tariff Reform,” American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 2, 42–75.
Epner, J. E. G., H. S. Jonas, and D. L. Seckinger (1998): “Late-term Abortion,” The
Journal of American Medical Association, 280, 724–729.
Goldberg, P. and N. Pavcnik (2007a): “Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing
Countries,” Journal of Economic Literature, XLV, 39–82.
144
Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2007b): Globalization and Poverty, University of Chicago
Press and the NBER, chap. The Effects of the Colombian Trade Liberalization on Urban Poverty.
Goodkind, D. (1996): “On Substituting Sex Preference Strategies in East Asia: Does Prenatal Sex
Selection Reduce Postnatal Discrimination?” Population and Development Review, 22, 111–125.
Goodman, L. (1961): “Some Possible Effects of Birth Control on the Human Sex Ratio,” Annals
of Human Genetics, 25, 75–81.
Goyal, S. K. (1996): “Political Economy of India’s Economic Reforms,” Institute for Studies in
Industrial Development (ISID) Working Paper.
Gupta, P. and U. Kumar (2008): “Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality: Evidence From
India,” Review of Development Economics, 12, 291–311.
Hanson, G. H. (2007): Globalization and Poverty, University of Chicago Press and the NBER,
chap. Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico, 417–456.
Harrison, A., J. McLaren, and M. McMillan (2011): “Recent Perspectives on Trade and
Inequality,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5754.
Hasan, R., D. Mitra, and P. Ranjan (2009): “Trade Liberallization and Unemployment:
Evidence from Indian States,” Unpublished manuscript.
Hasan, R., D. Mitra, and B. P. Ural (2006-07): “Trade Liberalization, Labor-Market Insti-
tutions, and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Indian States,” Indian Policy Forum, 3, 71–122.
Hu, L. and A. Schlosser (2011): “Prenatal Sex Selection and Girls’ Well-Being: Evidence from
India,” Unpublished manuscript.
Jayachandran, S. (2006): “Selling Labor Low: Wage Responses to Productivity Shocks in De-
veloping Countries,” Journal of Political Economy, 114.
Jayachandran, S. and I. Kuziemko (2011): “Why Do Mothers Breastfeed Girls Less Than Boys:
Evidence and Implications for Child Health in India,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126,
1485–1538.
Jensen, R. (2005): “Equal Treatment, Unequal Outcomes? Generating Sex Inequality through
Fertility Behavior,” unpublished manuscript, Harvard University.
Jensen, R. and N. Miller (2011): “Keepin’ ’em Down on the Farm: Old Age Security and
Strategic Underinvestment in Children,” Unpublished manuscript.
Jha, P., R. Kumar, and N. Dhingra (2006): “Sex Ratio in India, Author’s Reply,” Lancet,
367, 1727–1727.
Juhn, C., G. Ujhelyi, and C. Villegas-Sanchez (2012): “Men, Women, and Machines: How
Trade Impacts Gender Inequality,” NBER Working Paper 18106.
Katz, L. F. and K. M. Murphy (1992): “Changes in Relative Wages 1963 - 1987: Supply and
Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 35–78.
Kaur, R. (2004): “Across-Region Marriages: Poverty, Female Migration and the Sex Ratio,”
Economic and Political Weekly, 39, 2595–2603.
——— (2010): “Khap Panchayats, Sex Ratio and Female Agency,” Economic and Political Weekly,
XLV, 14–16.
145
Kim, J. (2005): “Sex Selection and Fertility in a Dynamic Model of Conception and Abortion,”
Journal of Population Economics, 18, 41–67.
Kovak, B. K. (2012): “Regional Effects of Trade Reform: What is the Correct Measure of Liber-
alization?” Unpublished manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University.
Kucera, D. (2001): “Foreign Trade of Manufactures and Men and Women’s Employment and
Earnings in Germany and Japan,” International Review of Applied Economics, 15, 129–149.
Kucera, D. and W. Milberg (2000): “Gender Segregation and Gender Bias in Manufacturing
Trade Expansion: Revisiting the Wood Asymmetry,” World Development, 28, 1191–1210.
Kumar, D. (1983): “Male Utopias or Nightmares?” Economic and Political Weekly, 18, 61–64.
Lafortune, J. (2011): “Making Yourself Attractive: Pre-Marital Investments and the Returns
to Education in the Marriage Market,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (forth-
coming).
Laroque, G. and B. Salanie´ (2012): “Does Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives?”
Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper 0708-15.
Lechner, M. and R. Miquel (2010): “Identification of the Effects of Dynamic Treatments by
Sequential Conditional Independence Assumptions,” Empirical Economics, 39, 111–137.
Li, H., J. Yi, and J. Zhang (2011): “Estimating the Effect of the One-Child Policy on the Sex
Ratio Imbalance in China: Identification Based on the Difference-in-Differences,” Demography,
48, 1535–1557.
Li, H. and H. Zheng (2009): “Ultrasonography and Sex Ratios in China,” Asian Economic Policy
Review, 4, 121–137.
Lin, M.-J., J.-T. Liu, and N. Qian (2010): “More Missing Women, Fewer Dying Girls: The
Impact of Abortion on Sex Ratios at Birth and Excess Female Mortality in Taiwan,” NBER
Working Paper 14541.
Milligan, K. (2005): “Subsidizing the Stork: New Evidence on Tax Incentives and Fertility,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 539–555.
Munshi, K. and M. Rosenzweig (2006): “Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World:
Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy,” American Economic Review,
96, 1225–1252.
——— (2009): “Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and Growth,”
Unpublished manuscript.
Oldenburg, P. (1992): “Sex Ratio, Son Preference and Violence in India: A Research Note,”
Economic and Political Weekly, 27, 2657–2662.
Park, C. B. and N.-H. Cho (1995): “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility Society:
Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea,” Population and Development Review, 21, 59–84.
Paxson, C. (1992): “Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory
Income in Thailand,” The American Economic Review, 82.
Paxson, C. H. and N. Schady (2005): “Child Health and Economic Crisis in Peru,” The World
Bank Economic Review, 19, 203–223.
146
Pop-Eleches, C. (2006): “The Impact of a Change in Abortion Regime on Socio-Economic
Outcomes of Children: Evidence from Romania,” Journal of Political Economy, 114.
Po¨rtner, C. C. (2010): “Sex Selective Abortions, Fertility and Birth Spacing,” University of
Washington, Department of Economics, Working Paper UWEC-2010-4-R.
Porto, G. G. (2007): “Estimating Household Responses to Trade Reforms: Net Consumers and
Net Producers in Rural Mexico,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper.
Qian, N. (2008): “Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-Specific
Income on Sex Imbalance,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1251–1285.
Rahman, L. and V. Rao (2004): “The Determinants of Gender Equity in India: Examining
Dyson and Moore’s Thesis with New Data,” Population and Development Review, 30, 239–268.
Rosenzweig, M. and K. Wolpin (1980): “Life-Cycle Labor Supply and Fertility: Causal Infer-
ences from Household Models,” Journal of Political Economy, 88.
——— (1993): “Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing, and the Accumulation of
Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India,” Journal
of Political Economy, 101.
Sinha, N. and J. Yoong (2009): “Long-Term Financial Incentives and Investment in Daughters:
Evidence from Conditional Cash Transfers in North India,” World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 4860.
Stopnitzky, Y. (2012): “The Bargaining Power of Missing Women: Evidence from a Sanitation
Campaign in India,” Unpublished manuscript, University of San Francisco.
Strauss, J. A. and D. Thomas (1998): “Health, Nutrition, and Economic Development,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 36, 766–817.
——— (2008): Health over the Life Course, Elsevier, vol. 4 of Handbook of Development Economics,
chap. 54, 3375–3474.
Tambiah, S. J. (1973): Bridewealth and Dowry: Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, Cam-
bridge University Press, chap. Dowry, Bridewealth and Women’s Property Rights, 7.
Topalova, P. (2004): “Trade Liberalization on Productivity: The Case of India,” International
Monetary Fund Working Paper.
——— (2007): Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from Indian Districts,
University of Chicago Press, vol. Globalization and Poverty, chap. 7.
——— (2010): “Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization: Evidence on
Poverty from India,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2, 1–41.
Townsend, R. (1994): “Risk and Insurance in Village India,” Econometrica, 62.
Trefler, D. (2004): “The Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” American
Economic Review, 94, 870–895.
Trivers, R. and D. Willard (1973): “Natural Selection of Parental Ability to Vary the Sex
Ratio of Offspring,” Science, 179, 90–92.
Tybout, J. R. (2003): Handbook of International Trade, Malden, MA: Blackwell, chap. Plant-
and Firm-Level Evidence on “New” Trade Theories, 388–415.
147
Wood, A. (1991): “North-South trade and female labour in manufacturing: An asymmetry,”
Journal of Development Studies, 27, 168–189.
Yamaguchi, K. (1989): “A Formal Theory for Male-Preferring Stopping Rules of Childbearing:
Sex Differences in Birth Order and in the Number of Siblings,” Demography, 26, 451–465.
Zeng, Y., P. Tu, B. Gu, Y. Xu, B. Li, and Y. Li (1993): “Causes and Implications of the
Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China,” Population and Development
Review, 19, 283–302.
